

The Franciscan Educational Conference

VOL. XIII

NOVEMBER, 1931

No. 13


REPORT

OF THE

Thirteenth Annual Meeting

DETROIT, MICH.

JULY 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 1931



FR. FERDINAND MAVER, O.M.C.

IN SANCTITATE ET DOCTRINA

PUBLISHED BY THE CONFERENCE

Office of the Secretary
CAPUCHIN COLLEGE
BROOKLAND, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Thirteenth Annual Meeting of the Franciscan Educational Conference, Detroit, Mich., July 1-3, 1931.

LEFT TO RIGHT—BOTTOM ROW: 1. Conrad Link, Detroit, Mich.; 2. Victorine Hoffman, Westmont, Ill.; 3. Frederick Schillhab, Floyd Knobs, Ind.; 4. Salesius Schneeweis, Detroit, Mich.; 5. Ephrem Longpre, Quaracchi, Italy; 6. Thomas Plassmann (President), St. Bonaventure, N. Y.; 7. Claude Vogel (Secretary), Washington, D. C.; 8. Gerard Schmalz, Cleveland, O.; 9. Berard Vogt, Butler, N. J.; 10. Simon Archambault, Sherbrooke, Que., Canada; 11. Valentine Schaaft, Washington, D. C.

SECOND ROW: 1. Vincent Kroger, Detroit, Mich.; 2. Edwin Dorzweiler, Victoria, Kans.; 3. Maynard Geiger, Santa Barbara, Calif.; 4. Theodore Roemer, Mt. Calvary, Wis.; 5. Philibert Ramstetter, Detroit, Mich.; 6. Edwin Auweiler, Cincinnati, O.; 7. Seraphin Mullen, Santa Barbara, Calif.; 8. Reginald Doyle, Cleveland, O.; 9. Emil Brum, Detroit, Mich.; 10. Pius Kaelin, Cumberland, Md.

THIRD ROW: 1. Clement Neubauer, Huntington, Ind.; 2. Hugolin Lemay, Montreal, Canada; 3. Mark Stier, Marathon City, Wis.; 4. Lawrence Merten, Mt. Calvary, Wis.; 5. Dominic Meyer, Marathon City, Wis.; 6. Theodosius Foley, Glenclyffe, N. Y.; 7. Francis Edic (Vice-President), Staten Island, N. Y.; 8. Hyacinth Barnhardt, St. Bonaventure, N. Y.; 9. Alfred Martin, Washington, D. C.; 10. Reginald Lutomski, Detroit, Mich.; 11. John de Deo Oldegeering, Detroit, Mich.

FOURTH ROW: 1. Athanasius Karlin, Victoria, Kans.; 2. Br. Florence Tassin, Detroit, Mich.; 3. Gerald Reinmann, Rensselaer, N. Y.; 4. Rolland Danault, Catskill, N. Y.; 5. Conrad O'Leary, St. Bonaventure, N. Y.; 6. Raphael von der Haar, San Luis Rey, Calif.; 7. Hubert Vecchierello, St. Bonaventure, N. Y.; 8. Lambert Brockmann, Oldenburg, Ind.; 9. Barnabas McAlarney, Detroit, Mich.

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
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CUM PERMISSU SUPERIORUM

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tralia.
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Province of St. Antony of Padua, London, England.

CONSTITUTION

OF THE

Franciscan Educational Conference

Adopted at the final meeting of the Franciscan Educational Conference, St. Louis, Mo., July 2, 1919.

ARTICLE I

NAME AND OBJECT

SECTION 1. The name of this organization shall be: "The Franciscan Educational Conference."

SECTION 2. The general object of this Conference shall be to safeguard the principles and to promote the interests of Catholic Education.

SECTION 3. The particular object shall be:

- a) To encourage the spirit of mutual helpfulness and coöperation among the Friar educators of the American provinces;
- b) To advance by study and discussion the Franciscan educational work in all its departments;
- c) To offer means and incentives toward the advancement of learning and the pursuits of literary work among the Friars.

ARTICLE II

DEPARTMENTS

SECTION 1. The Conference shall consist of three departments: The Classical, the Philosophical, and the Theological Department.

ARTICLE III

OFFICERS AND THEIR ELECTION

SECTION 1. The Officers of the Conference shall be a President, a Vice-President, and a Secretary.

SECTION 2. These officers shall be elected separately, by secret ballot, in the last session of each convention, a simple majority deciding the successful candidate. If, after two ballots, no election has been effected, the two having the greatest number of votes shall be the exclusive candidates in the third ballot. In case two candi-

dates receive an equal number of votes, the senior Friar shall have the preference.

ARTICLE IV

DUTIES OF OFFICERS

SECTION 1. The President shall preside at all the meetings of the Conference and of the Executive Board.

SECTION 2. The Vice-President shall preside at these meetings in the absence of the President.

SECTION 3. The Secretary shall record and keep all matters pertaining to the Conference. He shall make due announcement of meetings and make the necessary preparation for them. He shall finish all the business of the previous meeting.

ARTICLE V

THE EXECUTIVE BOARD

SECTION 1. The three officers aforementioned shall ex officio constitute an Executive Board.

SECTION 2. The Executive Board shall have the management of the affairs of the Conference. It shall be invested with power to make the regulations regarding the writing, reading, and publishing of the papers of the Conference meetings.

SECTION 3. It shall interpret the Constitution, By-Laws, and Regulations of the Conference, and, in matters of dispute, its decision shall be final. It shall also have the power to appoint the various committees of the Conference.

SECTION 4. The outgoing officers shall finish all the business of the previous convention.

ARTICLE VI

CONVENTIONS

SECTION 1. The Conference shall convene at such time, place and interval as may be determined by the Very Rev. Provincials in their annual meeting.

ARTICLE VII

AMENDMENTS

SECTION 1. This Constitution may be amended by a two-thirds majority vote in any general session of the Conference, provided such amendment has been presented in writing and announced in a previous general session.

ARTICLE VIII

BY-LAWS

SECTION 1. By-Laws which are not inconsistent with this Constitution may be adopted by a majority vote in any general session of the Conference.

AMENDMENT

The Executive Board shall consist of the President, the Vice-President, and the Secretary. The aforementioned officers, in turn, shall designate as associate officers one member from each Province affiliated to the Conference, and not yet represented on the Executive Board.

AMENDMENT

On the occasion of the Annual Conference there shall be at least one Executive Session of the Executive Board and of the associate officers. In case anyone of them is absent, the senior member of his Province or Commissariat shall have his place and vote.

AMENDMENT

The Executive Board shall be augmented by one more member, *viz.*, a Secretary for Franciscan Literature. He shall act as Chairman on the Committee for Franciscan Literature at the Conference and, under the direction and with the authority of the Executive Board, shall promote and edit the "Franciscan Studies."

AMENDMENT

In order to insure the continuity, efficiency and a more active representation of the Franciscan Educational Conference, the election of officers shall proceed as follows:

The three branches of the Order shall be represented on the Executive Board on the basis of the number of Provinces affiliated, i.e., two officers shall be chosen from the Friars Minor (with nine affiliated Provinces), one from the Minor Capuchins (with five affiliated Provinces), and one from the Minor Conventuals (with four affiliated Provinces).

The election shall be preceded by nomination and free discussion from the floor.

No one shall be elected who has not attended at least one previous Meeting of the Conference.

All officers shall serve at least two years, and not more than two new officers shall be elected each year.

Franciscan Educational Conference

FIRST SESSION

DETROIT, MICH., July 1, 1931, 7:30 p.m.

The first session of the Thirteenth Annual Meeting of the Franciscan Educational Conference was called by the Rev. Thomas Plassmann, O.F.M., President of the Conference, on July 1, 1931, at 7:30 p.m., in the Assembly Hall of Duns Scotus College, Detroit, Mich.

There were present: Rev. Conrad Link, O.F.M., Detroit, Mich.; Rev. Philibert Ramstetter, O.F.M., Detroit, Mich.; Rev. Thomas Plassmann, O.F.M., St. Bonaventure, N. Y.; Rev. Conrad O'Leary, O.F.M., St. Bonaventure, N. Y.; Rev. Lambert Brockmann, O.F.M., Oldenburg, Ind.; Rev. Vincent Kroger, O.F.M., Detroit, Mich.; Rev. Emil Brum, O.F.M., Detroit, Mich.; Rev. Athanasius Karlin, O.M.Cap., Victoria, Kans.; Rev. Reginald Lutomski, O.F.M., Detroit, Mich.; Rev. Simon Archambault, O.F.M., Sherbrooke, Que., Canada; *Rev. Edwin Dorzweiler, O.M.Cap., Victoria, Kans.; Rev. Pius Kaelin, O.M.Cap., Cumberland, Md.; Rev. Victorine Hoffman, O.F.M., Westmont, Ill.; Rev. Raphael Von der Haar, O.F.M., San Luis Rey, Cal.; Rev. Gerard Schmalz, O.F.M., West Park, O.; Rev. Theodosius Foley, O.M.Cap., Glenclyffe, N. Y.; Rev. Reginald Doyle, O.F.M., Cleveland O.; Rev. Mark Stier, O.M.Cap., Marathon City, Wis.; Rev. Frederick Schilhab, O.M.C., Floyds Knobs, Ind.; Rev. Edwin Auweiler, O.F.M., Cincinnati, O.; Rev. Valentine Schaaf, O.F.M., Washington, D. C.; Rev. Hyacinth Barnhardt, O.F.M., St. Bonaventure, N. Y.; Rev. Hubert Vecchierello, O.F.M., St. Bonaventure, N. Y.; Rev. Ephrem Longpré, O.F.M., Quaracchi, Italy; Rev. Rolland Danault, O.F.M., Catskill, N. Y.; Rev. Seraphin Mullen, O.F.M., Santa Barbara, Cal.; Rev. Maynard Geiger, O.F.M., Santa Barbara, Cal.; Rev. Salesius Schneweis, O.M.Cap., Detroit, Mich.; Rev. Dominic Meyer, O.M.Cap., Marathon City, Wis.; Rev. Hugolin Lemay, O.F.M., Montreal, Canada; Rev. Theodore Roemer, O.M.Cap., Mt. Calvary, Wis.; Rev. Clement Neubauer, O.M.Cap., Huntington, Ind.; Rev. Francis Edic, O.M.C., Staten Island, N. Y.; Rev. Gerald Reinmann, O.M.C., Rensselaer,

N. Y.; Rev. Berard Vogt, O.F.M., Butler, N. J.; Rev. Alfred Martin, O.F.M., Washington, D. C.; Rev. Lawrence Merten, O.M.Cap., Mt. Calvary, Wis.; Rev. Conrad Wallbraun, O.F.M., Teutopolis, Ill.; Rev. Barnabas McAlarney, O.F. M., Detroit, Mich.; Rev. John de Deo Oldegeering, O.F.M., Detroit, Mich.; Rev. Claude Vogel, O.M.Cap., Washington, D. C.

The Friars of Duns Scotus College welcomed the Delegates most cordially. In the refectory the Rev. Conrad Link, O.F.M., Guardian, gave the guests the glad hand and led in a prolonged cheerful applause. The same sentiments of good will and affection toward the Friars of the three branches of the Order were repeated in the following letter which the Very Rev. Urban Freundt, O.F.M., Provincial of the Province of St. John Baptist, addressed to the Conference, and which was read by the Secretary:

OFFICE OF THE PROVINCIAL

St. Francis Monastery,
1615 Vine St., Cincinnati, Ohio

June 30, 1931.

Very Reverend and Reverend Delegates:

On behalf of the Franciscan Friars of St. John Baptist Province, and more particularly in the name of the Friars of Duns Scotus College, allow me to extend to each of you present a most cordial welcome.

In the heart-warming words of the gentle Francis, we say: *Pax huic domui et omnibus habitantibus in ea*. The Lord must look lovingly upon the noble aims which the members of this Conference have set for themselves to accomplish during this Convention of 1931. Keenly alive to the rich benefits accruing to the cause of Franciscan education as fostered by the annual meeting of the various branches of the Order, we rejoice in the knowledge that the Friars are again uniting their energies for the promotion of Franciscan ideals. May the Holy Spirit pour out His graces in generous abundance upon each of you during these days of serious deliberation. May each session prove to be a source of mutual encouragement, instruction, and edification. *Vivat, Floreat, Crescat*, this is our sincere wish and prayer at the opening of this Conference.

May we also take this occasion to felicitate our beloved Chairman, the Very Rev. Thomas Plassmann, O.F.M., of New York, who was recently privileged to observe the twenty-fifth anniversary of his ordination to the priesthood. *Ex intimo corde dicimus — Ad multos faustissimosque annos!* To him the Franciscan Educational Conference owes an immeasurable debt of gratitude, for from its inception Friar Thomas has done yeoman's service unstintingly, unfailingly, and courageously. He has, indeed, been to the cause of Franciscan education philosopher, guide, and friend. May God grant that he continue to assist us in our holy purpose to carry on the work of Franciscan education with ever-mounting fruitfulness.

In extending to you the hospitality of this monastery, I can assure you that the nuns, with our beautiful motto always before us — *In Sanctitate et Doctrina*.

Father Guardian, after the injunction of our sainted Founder, will amply provide for your every convenience. May the Lord, through the potent intercession of St. Francis, bless your work and keep all of you in health and happiness.

Fraternally and respectfully yours,

FR. URBAN FREUNDT, O.F.M.,
Provincial.

In connection with this letter of Fr. Urban the following brief note from the Very Rev. Raphael Huber, O.M.C., former Vice-President of the Conference, was also read:

COLLEGIO DEI PENITENZIERI

Piazza Scossa Cavalli, 145,
Roma, (113) Italia

June 20, 1931.

To the Members of the Conference:

Allow me to extend to you my very best wishes for a successful Conference. In spirit I shall be present at your various sessions and shall pray God to bless your deliberations.

Fraternally in S.P.N.F.,
RAPHAEL HUBER, O.M.C.

In expressing public thanks to the writers of these two letters, the President remarked that whatever sacrifices he had made in behalf of the Conference had come back to him a hundredfold. The very fact that the yearly Reports of the Conference have gone abroad and have attracted the attention of distinguished scholars in all the great countries of Europe is more than sufficient compensation for the efforts made throughout the twelve years of his presidency. Especially gratifying was the honor conferred on the present Meeting by the presence of Doctor Ephrem Longpré, O.F.M., probably the greatest living authority on Scotism, who had journeyed all the way from Quaracchi, Italy, to lend his inspiration and authority to the work of the American and Canadian Friars. The President also commended the members of the Executive Board which had shown such whole-hearted coöperation in arranging the program for the present Meeting.

The Secretary now submitted his Report. The minutes of the Twelfth Annual Meeting were adopted as printed in the Report and congratulation and thanks tendered the Secretary. Fifteen hundred copies of the Report of the Twelfth Annual Meeting were printed and a reprint was brought out by the Bruce Publishing Company of

Milwaukee, New York, and Chicago, under the title, *Franciscan Philosophy and Education*. One new number of the "Franciscan Studies" also appeared during the year. This was entitled *Père Girard, Educator*, and was written by the Rev. Andrew Maas, O.M.C., of Floyds Knobs, Ind., while student at the Catholic University of America. The essay was awarded the A.M. degree by the University. The Secretary also announced that the editing of several other monographs was in progress. The total expenses of the Conference for the past year were \$1,236.00.

Knowing his deep interest in things Franciscan, the Very Rev. Raphael Huber, O.M.C., confessor for English-speaking pilgrims at St. Peter's, Rome, presented to Cardinal Ehrle a specially bound copy of the Twelfth Annual Report accompanied by the following letter:

COLLEGIO DEI PENITENZIERI
Piazza Scossa Cavalli, 145,
Roma, (113) Italia

January 5, 1931.

His Eminence Francis Cardinal Ehrle, S.J.,
Via Giaocchino Belli, 3,
Roma, Italia.

Your Eminence:

At the request of the Secretary of the Franciscan Educational Conference, the Very Rev. Claude Vogel, O.M.Cap., I present herewith a bound copy of the Report of the Twelfth Annual Meeting held at Herman, Pennsylvania, U. S. A., June 30, July 1 and 2, 1930.

The topic for this year's discussion was Philosophy, especially in its relation to the Franciscan School. The Meeting was attended by representatives of the three branches of the Friars Minor.

Begging in the name of the Conference the blessing of Your Eminence on its work, I have the honor to be

Most respectfully in Christ,
FR. RAPHAEL HUBER, O.M.C.

In answer to this letter His Eminence sent his personal card on which he penned the following words:

12/1, '31.

With due thanks and his special blessing,

IL CARDINALE EHRLE.

These words are few, but coming from the feeble hand of the eighty-five-year-old Cardinal student of Franciscanism are all the more precious.

In addition to these communications the Secretary presented the following:

ARCHBISHOP'S HOUSE
Eaglemount, Simla,
India

August 30, 1930.

Dear Rev. Secretary:

His Grace, the Archbishop of Simla, desires to complete the series of Reports issued by the Franciscan Educational Conference. He has only Numbers 9, 10, and 11. If you can possibly supply from number 1 to number 8 inclusive, he would be grateful.

Believe me,

Yours fraternally,

FR. ALBERT, O.M.Cap.,
Secretary.

PROVINZIALAT DER SÄCHSISCHEN
FRANZISKANERPROVINZ
VOM HL. KREUZ

Werl i. W., den 3, Sept., 1930.

Hochwürdiger, lieber P. Claudius:

Ihre Sendung ist soeben hier angekommen und hat mir grosse Freude bereitet. Von ganzem Herzen danke ich Ihnen für Ihr grosses Entgegenkommen und würde mich freuen wenn ich Ihnen einen Gefallen wiederweisen könnte. Als kleine Anerkennung sende ich Ihnen ein Buch über die sozialische Erziehungsbewegung, das soeben einer unserer Patres herausgegeben hat.

Mit herzlichem Gruss,

Ihr
FR. EPHREM RICKING,
Provinzial.

FRANCISCAN COLLEGE
North Edmonton
Alberta

Nov. 19, 1930.

Reverend Father:

We were really pleased to receive the Report of the Franciscan Educational Conference. This record of the Franciscan Conference is of the greatest help to us in our work of education.

With many thanks,

JOHN DE CAPISTRAN, O.F.M.,
Guardian and Rector.

ST. FRANCIS CONVENT
812 N. Salina St.,
Syracuse, N. Y.

November 24, 1930.

Reverend and Dear Father:

Please excuse the delay in acknowledging the receipt of the Report of the Annual Meeting of the F. E. C. The Report is certainly interesting and reflects credit on

the Conference. I am especially well pleased to note that our Reports have attracted such attention outside the Order.

With best wishes, I am

Very sincerely yours,

FR. FERDINAND, O.M.C.,
Provincial.

ST. JOSEPH'S HEIGHTS

Covington, Kentucky

Nov. 17, 1930.

Dear Fr. Vogel:

Please accept my most cordial thanks for sending me a copy of the Report of the Franciscan Educational Conference for 1930. I was delighted with the papers on philosophy. Being a teacher of philosophy, I can appreciate the very successful efforts made to solve some of the thorny problems facing the teacher. "The Franciscan School of Philosophy" is a fine paper and will prove enlightening to many a thoroughgoing Thomist.

Thanking you once more and wishing you all good things,

Yours sincerely,

J. J. LAUX.

FORDHAM UNIVERSITY

New York, N. Y.

Nov. 18, 1930.

My dear Fr. Vogel:

I am very grateful to you for sending me the Report of the Twelfth Annual Conference. You are furnishing Catholic Education and all education with valuable material in the yearly survey of the Franciscan Educational world. As I have said before, your Conference is really compiling a Franciscan Encyclopedia.

Gratefully yours in Do.,

FRANCIS P. DONNELLY, S.J.

AMERICAN CATHOLIC HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION

Washington, D. C.

November 11, 1930.

My dear Fr. Claude:

Let me congratulate you on the excellence of the Report which I have just received. Be assured, I take great pleasure in waiting for the Report from year to year. Some day I hope the Conference will take up the subject of Franciscan American Church History, for there is a field ripe for the harvest after four hundred years of sacrifice, missionary zeal, sanctity and martyrdom, given without stint by the Sons of St. Francis that the name of Christ be made known to a new world.

Affectionately yours in Christ,

PETER GUILDAY.

MARQUETTE UNIVERSITY
Milwaukee, Wis.

Nov. 14, 1931.

Dear Fr. Secretary:

Sincere thanks for sending me the Report so faithfully. It is always gone through with lively interest.

Yours in Domino,
F. S. BETTEN, S.J.

FREIBURG, SCHWEIZ

Nov. 28, 1930.

Hochw. P. Claude Vogel, O.M.Cap.,
Capuchin College,
Washington, D. C.

Hochwürdiger und verehrter Mitbruder:

Es freute mich sehr den Report of the Twelfth Annual Meeting of the Franciscan Educational Conference zu erhalten. . . . Ihre diesjährige Konferenz befasste sich mit dem Umfang, dem Programm und der Methodologie der Philosophie. Die hierüber gehaltenen Referate sind sehr wertvoll. Wie mir scheint, ist dieser 12. Report überhaupt einer der besten der bisher erschienenen. Wichtig ist die Resolution, es solle die Philosophie nicht bloss unbedingt volle drei Jahre umfassen, sondern auch nach unten und oben fest geschlossen und verselbstständigt werden, damit diese Wissenschaft nicht, als Mädchen für alles, verwaiste Disziplinen aus dem Gymnasium oder aus der Theologie mitschleppen muss. Nur so können neben den altangestammten philosophischen Fächern auch die Philosophiegeschichte, die Soziologie und die Experimental-psychologie richtig behandelt werden.

Unsere Konferenz der deutschsprachigen Kapuzinerprovinzen vom letzten September gedachte wiederholt Ihrer amerikanischen Schwester. Arbeiten wir hand in hand mit zur Förderung unserer Ordenstudien!

Mit brüderlichem Gruss ergeben Ihr,
P. HILARIN FELDER, O.M.Cap.

COLLEGIO DI S. LORENZO DA BR.
DEI MINORI CAPPUCCINI
Via San Francesco,
Assisi.

Nov. 25, 1930.

Adm. Rev. Pater:

Fasciculum seu Ephemeridem — the Report of the Franciscan Educational Conference — inscriptum, libentissime excepi, eundemque per summa capita delibui; praesertim quae de re philosophica meliore ordine digerenda pertractant. (Coordination of the Various Parts of Philosophy). Opus mihi videtur valde probandum apud quemque prudentis consilii virum, qui pro suo erga sapientiam amore perennis philosophiae culturam atque in dies sanum incrementum cordi habeat.

Itaque tibi toto ex animo gratulor tibi pro accepto dono gratias ago. Vale!
FR. AMADEUS TEETAERT, O.M.Cap.

PENSION HERMANN
Rue de l'Universite 6,
Fribourg, Switzerland

Nov. 26, 1930.

Dear Fr. Claude:

I want to thank you for the copy of the Report of the Franciscan Educational Conference which I receive annually with great joy. I am particularly glad to know that it is maintaining its high standard.

With every expression of gratitude and my blessing upon you, I remain in interest with you,

Fraternally yours in Christ,
GEORGE UNDRERER.

NIVELLES, BELGIUM

Nov. 28, 1930.

Dear Father Vogel:

Please accept my sincerest thanks for the Report of the Twelfth Annual Meeting of the Franciscan Educational Conference. The nature of the subject and the manner in which it was treated will undoubtedly provoke much thought among those directly concerned.

My collection is lacking Vols. I and II to be complete. I would be very grateful if you could supply the missing numbers.

Wishing you continued and increasing success in your yearly Conference, I am

Yours sincerely in Xto.,
BROTHER MICHAEL.

SAINT VINCENT COLLEGE
Latrobe, Pa.

Nov. 26, 1930.

My dear Fr. Claude:

I wish to thank you very much for your kindly thoughtfulness in letting me have a copy of the Proceedings of the Twelfth Franciscan Educational Conference. The papers and discussions therein on the subject of Catholic philosophy and its presentation in the seminary course are of the usual very high order and merit obtaining *ab initio* in the deliberations at the annual meetings of your Conference.

Greeting you most cordially, I am

Yours very sincerely,
P. LOUIS HAAS, O.S.B.

PROVINCIALAAT DER MINDERBROEDERS
Weert, Holland

November 25, 1930.

Bemide Broeder:

Het voorbeeld volgend van mijn geachte medebroeder Pater Hippolytus Gerz O.F.M., gegeven in zijn dankwoord van November 28, 1929, wil ik ook gaarne de indrukken die ik ontving bij het lezen van het Report of the Twelfth Annual Meeting in mijn moedertaal weergeven.

Het Report is voor mij een oude kennis en een oude vriend: reeds voor twaalf jaar had ik het genoeg het te mogen begroeten en er nut uit te mogen trekken. Ik heb dan ook dit rapport weer met veel belangstelling doorgezien, om te vernemen wat onze medebroeders aan gene zijde van de Oceaan ons te verhalen hebben, en om hun mede te deelen, hoe gaarne wij van hun kennis en ervaring wenschen te profiteren.

Wij feliciteeren onze Amerikaansche confraters met het koperen jubilé van hun Educational Conference, en hopen dat er een steeds heilzamer invloed van uit zal gaan.

Als ik omtrent het jaarlijksch Report nog één wensch zou mogen uiten, dan is het deze: dat het Report zou kunnen verschijnen in de taal van Onze Moeder de H. Kerk, in de taal van alle seculiere en reguliere geestelijken, in de Latijnsche taal. Het nut zou dan nog veel grooter zijn.

Gods rijkste zegen over uw arbeid wenschend verblijf ik

uw dw br,

FR. SIMON BENNENBROEK, O.F.M.
Delegatus Provincialis.

COLLEGIO SERAPHICO

Rio Negro,
Estado do Parana, Brazil

Dec. 2, 1930.

My dear Fr. Vogel:

I received the Report of the Twelfth Annual Meeting of the American Friars. Many thanks for same. I have read with interest all your previous Reports and feel sure that the latest issue will be no less interesting and inspiring. I hope that in not too long a time the Brazilian Provinces of Friars will also participate in these educational meetings.

With best wishes,
Fraternally,

FR. CHRYSOSTOM ADAMS, O.F.M.

1248 Newton St., N. E.,
Washington, D. C.

December 1, 1930.

My dear Father Vogel:

Please accept my grateful acknowledgments for the copy you sent me, of the Twelfth Annual Meeting of the Franciscan Educational Conference. Like the previous Reports, it covers the ground selected for investigation with both thoroughness and embracing completeness. The Annual Conference is gradually building up a splendid edifice of Franciscan educational experience digested into readable and highly informative papers and discussions.

With renewed acknowledgments, I am

Sincerely yours,
H. T. HENRY.

ST. LOUIS UNIVERSITY
St. Louis, Mo.

Dec. 19, 1930.

Dear Rev. Father:

Please accept our thanks for the Twelfth Annual Report of the Franciscan Educational Conference which you kindly forwarded to our library. Educators in general and Catholic educators in particular look forward to your yearly contribution to the sum total of Catholic educational theory and practice in the various fields into which you delve, singly and deeply, year after year. May your ideals be realized and your influence felt more widely.

Yours very sincerely,
HENRY H. REGNET, S.J.

IGNATIUSKOLLEG VALKENBURG
Limburg, Holland

Valkenburg, Den 9 Dez. 1930.

Hochwürdiger P. Vogel!

Ich bin meinem lieben Freund P. Betten sehr dankbar, dass er mir die Zusage Ihres Report of the 12. Annual Meeting vermittelt hat.

So weit eine kurze Durchsicht mir zu urteilen gestattet, finde ich die Auswahl und Behandlung der Themata vorzüglich. Jeder Professor der scholastischen Philosophie wird es mit Nutzen studieren. Es werden wirklich durchgängig sehr aktuelle Fragen behandelt und ausgezeichnete Anregungen gegeben. Besonders sympathisch ist die unbefangene Würdigung der zwischen den scholastischen Schulen strittigen Ansichten, die aus allem zu lernen versteht.

Ich brauche nicht zu sagen, dass mein Hauptinteresse auf die Behandlung der psychologischen Fragen geht, die der mir persönlich bekannte P. van de Veldt so schön behandelt. Er wie auch P. Dorzweiler hatte die Freundlichkeit, auf mein Kompendium hinzuweisen. Ich glaube, dass beide mit Recht bemerken, dass dieses Buch dem Geist Ihrer Versammlung in vielen Punkten nicht fern steht.

Mit herzlichem Dank verbleibe ich Ihr ergebenster,

JOSEPH FRÖBES, S.J.

MILANO (108)
Via S. Agnese 2, Italia

20 December, 1930.

Reverend Father:

I have received the 12th vol., November, 1930, of the Report of the Twelfth Annual Meeting. I thank you sincerely for it, and send you in return some publications of the University of which I have the honor to be the Rector. May they convey to you my warm sympathy for the wonderful organization of which you are secretary.

Please be so kind as to send me always your Report so that I may have the pleasure of keeping it in our Library.

With best regards,

Yours, Il rettore,

FR. AGOSTINO GEMELLI, O.F.M.

Office of
DIOCESAN SUPERVISOR OF SCHOOLS
Seventy-five Union Park Street
Boston, Massachusetts

December 1, 1930.

The Reverend Claude L. Vogel, O.M.Cap.

Capuchin College,

Washington, D. C.

My dear Father Vogel:

I am very grateful to you for your kindness in sending me a copy of the Report of the Twelfth Annual Meeting of the Franciscan Educational Conference.

I have read the various papers and discussions contained in this Report. All evidence thorough and zealous scholarship. Every Catholic educator interested in the teaching of Philosophy will profit greatly by a careful study of the Report of the Twelfth Annual Meeting of the Franciscan Educational Conference.

Very sincerely yours,

RICHARD J. QUINLAN,
Diocesan Supervisor of Schools.

DORSTEN
Franziskanerkloster

14. Jan. 1931.

Hochwürdiger P. Sekretär:

Haben Sie vielen Dank für die freundliche Uebersendung des Berichtes Ihrer vorjährigen Lektorenkonferenz. Die Abhandlungen über die Philosophie, besonders über die Franziskanerschule haben mich sehr interessiert. Mögen die Konferenzen auch fernerhin reichen Segen bringen.

Mit den besten Grüßen und Wünschen zum neuen Jahre ergebent,

P. ERICH WEGERICHE, O.F.M.

CONVENTO DE PP. FRANCISCANOS
Consuegra (Toledo), Spain

January 25th, 1931.

Rev. Father Claude Vogel, O.M.Cap.,
Capuchin College,
Brookland, D. C.

My dear Father Claude:

Please accept my very sincere thanks for your kindness in sending our College a copy of the Report of the Twelfth Annual Meeting of your Educational Conference.

I have — as usual — read all the papers with much pleasure and I found them very interesting.

The whole volume from Father James' valuable work to Father Cuthbert's "Teaching of Ontology" shows a spirit of careful investigation, so that the present Report must be highly appreciated by every teacher of philosophy.

With the best of wishes for your coming meetings, with heartfelt congratulations and thanks, I am,

Faternally yours in St. Francis,

FR. DOMINGO ALONSO, O.F.M., D.D.,
Theol. Lect.

COLLEGIO SERAPHICO
Rio Negro,
Estado do Parana, Brazil

23. I, 1931.

Hochwürdiger, sehrgeehrter Herr Pater:

Empfangen Sie meinen aufrichtigsten Dank für Bd. XII Ihres Report. Ich darf Sie versichern, dass wir Ihren Verhandlungen mit dem regsten Interesse folgen und denselben reiche Belehrung entnehmen.

Mit nochmaligem Dank bin ich Ihr sehr ergebener,

FR. DAMIAN, O.F.M.

THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA
Washington, D. C.

January 20, 1931.

Very Reverend Claude Vogel, O.M.Cap.,
Superior, Capuchin College,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Father Vogel:

Many thanks for sending me a bound copy of *Franciscan Philosophy and Education*. I went through this when it first appeared and I wish to congratulate you

most sincerely on it. Some of the papers are really very well done. The book itself will be very valuable to me and I am deeply appreciative of your thoughtfulness in sending it.

With best wishes,

Yours very sincerely,

JAMES H. RYAN,
Rector.

P. HILDEBRAND
Courte rue de la Boutique, 1
Anvers

28. I, 31.

Rd. P. Dr. Claude Vogel, O.M.Cap.,
Brookland, Washington, D. C., U. S. A.

Bien cher Confrère:

On vient de me passer le Report de la dernière Session de la Franciscan Educational Conference. Je Vous en remercie de tout coeur. Mais puis-je Vous rappeler que ma Revue Franciscana a dû cesser sa publication, à cause de difficultés financières? Il n'y a donc pas moyen d'y donner une recension de vos travaux. J'ose néanmoins Vous prier, de vouloir bien me continuer le service de vos importantes publications, puisque, comme archiviste de la province, je m'occupe toujours de l'histoire de l'Ordre. Mon adresse est actuellement (non plus ISEGHEM) mais: P. Hildebrand, Courte rue de la Boutique, 1, Anvers.

En Vous remerciant d'avance bien cher confrère, le Vous souhaite le meilleur succès dans vos doctes travaux et je Vous présente mes salutations fraternelles en S. François.

P. HILDEBRAND.

HEIHSIEN, KANSU
China

Jan. 28, 1931.

Very Rev. Dr. Claude Vogel, O.M.Cap.,
Capuchin College, Washington, D. C.

Dear Rev. Father:

I am happy to inform you of the arrival of the Twelfth Annual Report of the Franciscan Educational Conference. I am deeply interested in the Conferences, read each Report "*attente ac devote*," and look forward to the next with ever-increasing expectation and desire.

Sincerely yours,

RODOLF BLOCKINGER, O.M.Cap.,
Miss. Ap.

SAINT FRANCIS COLLEGE
Brooklyn, N. Y.

March 19, 1931.

Rev. Claude Vogel, O.M.Cap.,
Capuchin College,
Brookland, Washington, D. C.

Reverend dear Father Vogel:

Permit me to thank you sincerely for your kindness in sending me the Reports

of the Franciscan Educational Conference. I am taking supreme delight in their perusal.

They will form an instructive addition to our College library.

Gratefully and sincerely yours,

BROTHER COLUMBA, O.S.F.

COLLEGIO INTERNAZIONALE DI S. ANTONIO

Dei Frati Minori

Roma (24) — Via Merulana, 124

5-V-31.

Mon Reverend Père:

Èrès intéressant et plein de choses pratiques pour l'éducation philosophique des étudiants de l'Ordre Franciscain le rapport de la 12e Conférence des lecteurs de l'Ordre. En vous remerciant de l'envoi je Souhaite que la Conférence continue a prospérer.

P. ARSÈNE VERCAUTEREN, O.F.M.,

Pref. des Études.

OLINDE, BRASILIEN

den 24 März, 1931.

Hochw. P. Claude Vogel:

Dieses Mal bin ich Ihnen zu ganz besonderen Dank verpflichtet für die Zusendung des 12. Jahresberichtes der Franciscan Educational Conference. Es gilt für mich als eine der besten Leistungen der amerikanischen Mitbrüder, einmal mit solcher Gründlichkeit und zugleich praktischer Anleitung die Methodik des philosophischen Unterrichts für die modernen Verhältnisse herausgearbeitet zu haben. Mir und vielen wird dieser Bericht von grossen Nutzen sein bei der Heranbildung unserer Kleriker im Studium der Philosophie.

Indem ich Ihnen meinen herzlichen Dank ausspreche für die Zusendung dieses wichtigen Reports,

Verbleibe ich,

Ihr in Christo ergebener Mitbruder,

FR. MATHIAS FEVES, O.F.M.

MONASTERY OF ST. PAUL OF THE CROSS

Passionist Fathers

Davison Ave., W. and Hazelton Ave.

Detroit, Mich.

April 22, 1931.

Rev. and dear Father:

Please mail me a copy of the Report of the Twelfth Franciscan Educational Conference and enclose the bill.

I would greatly appreciate a list of the previous numbers of the Report.

Congratulations on the splendid work being done by the Franciscans of America in the field of education. In my opinion, no other Catholic group or agency in this country has a finer educational heritage and tradition than the sons of St. Francis. I mean no other body is in a better position to harmonize the old and the new. Carry on with the help of God.

Sincerely,

FR. JOSEPH O'LEARY,

Director of Studies.

CURIA GENERALIS FF. MINORUM CAPUCCINORUM

Via Boncompagni, 71
Roma (125)

12th. May, 1931.

Dear Father Claude:

I trust it is not too late to thank you for the Report of the Twelfth Educational Conference, which you were good enough to send me. I have read it with great pleasure and congratulate you on the way it is turned out.

The papers and discussions of the Conference will, no doubt, stimulate greater interest in study of the science itself and in the method of teaching it to students. I trust it will also have the effect of interesting some of the younger generation in the study of Franciscan thought in the seventeenth century; Valeriano Magno, we are told was an exponent of Bonaventurian thought but he is surely not a solitary star in the Franciscan firmament of Philosophy.

With renewed thanks and all good wishes,

I am, Dear Father,
Yours fraternally,

FR. SYLVESTER, O.M.Cap.,
Def. Gen.

ST. MEINRAD'S ABBEY
St. Meinrad, Indiana

June 16, 1931.

Very Rev. Claude Vogel, O.M.Cap.,
Capuchin College,
Washington, D. C.

My dear Fr. Claude:

I thank you for the Report which, as usual has much of value in its pages. Personally I have benefitted greatly from reading the splendid papers it contains.

Gratefully yours in Christ,

STEPHEN THUIS, O.S.B.

SACRED HEART MISSION HOUSE
Girard, Pennsylvania

April 17, 1931.

Very Rev. dear Father:

If it is not too much intrusion, I should like to ask you to kindly let me know where the Reports of your Annual Conference were published. I know some of them and they are really excellent. We are going to have a Conference ourselves, although on a very modest scale. I would be very glad to read your Reports before I write my paper.

Thanking you for your trouble, I beg to remain,

Very sincerely yours,

JOSEPH A. SHENDILL, S.V.D.

CAPUCIJNENKLOOSTER-UDENHOUT

Holland

November 30, 1930.

Reverend Father:

I kindly request you to be so kind as to send me all the numbers of the "Franciscan Studies" which are published in connection with the Franciscan Educational Conference.

With kindest regards,

Fraternally,

FR. CLARENT, O M.Cap.

After these preliminaries the Chairman introduced the subject of this year's Meeting, "Psychology." "There can be no question of the opportuneness of this subject," the President remarked, "since in these days psychology is provoking an ever-increasing interest. That the Franciscan schoolmen have contributed toward the development of the modern empirical psychology is only to be expected in view of the versatility of their genius and the universality of their work. We Friars of the twentieth century are here assembled from all parts of the country to investigate our contribution to this subject in the past and to resolve upon measures to advance it in our schools for the future." The first paper on the program was that entitled: "St. Augustine and the Franciscan School," by the Rev. Berard Vogt, O.F.M., Ph.D., lector of Philosophy in the Franciscan Seminary, Butler, N. J. In this paper we have a fine delineation of the Augustinian doctrine throughout the ages. The discussion centered mainly on St. Augustine as the founder of Christian philosophy and theology, and contrasted the Platonic Augustinianism with the Aristotelianism in the schools of the fourteenth century. The question of St. Bonaventure and his alleged teaching of ontologism was also reviewed and explained.

The Meeting adjourned at 10:00 p.m.

SECOND SESSION

DETROIT, MICH., July 2, 1931, 8:00 a.m.

The Meeting was opened with the paper entitled: "The Psychology of Duns Scotus and Its Modernity," by Doctor Ephrem Long-

pré, O.F.M., outstanding authority on the philosophy of Duns Scotus. Since the paper comprised more than one hundred typed pages, its eminent author, in order to gain time, lectured freely on its salient points. Throughout the lecture Doctor Longpré held his audience spellbound and at its conclusion answered questions of a most subtle and intricate nature. Long was Father Ephrem required to explain the peculiarities of Scotistic doctrine and its points of difference with that of the Angelic Doctor. As the time allotted for the discussion of this learned paper was all too short, Doctor Longpré was plied with questions throughout the remaining days of the Conference. Groups of anxious Friars constantly gathered around this foremost authority on Scotism to benefit by the fruits of his lifelong study of his master. Indeed, so general and intensive was the interest of the assembled Friars that Doctor Longpré, at the close of the Meeting on Friday, gave a second formal lecture on Scotus in which he related many points of interest recently uncovered as a result of his extensive researches into the libraries and archives of Europe.

The second paper read at the morning session was on "Freud's Psychoanalytic Theory," by the Rev. Hyacinth Barnhardt, O.F.M., Ph.D., St. Bonaventure's Seminary, St. Bonaventure, N. Y. This paper gave a clear exposition of the vagaries of modern science expounded especially by Freud. The discussion fully acknowledged the phenomenal success of Freud's method of treating many nervous disorders, but at the same time called attention to his gross generalization and exaggeration in attempting to solve by his new teachings such important problems as the origin of human social life, of religion, morality and conscience. The threadbare character of his anthropological doctrines was also stressed.

Before adjourning, the Chairman appointed the following Committees:

On Resolutions: Friars Valentine Schaaf, O.F.M., Gerard Schmalz, O.F.M., Frederick Schilhab, O.M.C., Hubert Vecchierello, O.F.M., Mark Stier, O.M.Cap., Edwin Dorzweiler, O.M.Cap.

On Press and Publicity: Friars Reginald Lutomski, O.F.M., Emil Brum, O.F.M., Conrad O'Leary, O.F.M., Theodore Roemer, O.M.Cap., and Seraphin Mullen, O.F.M.

On Franciscan Literature: Friars Athanasius Karlin, O.M.Cap.,

Simon Archambault, O.F.M., Gerald Reinmann, O.M.C., Theodosius Foley, O.M.Cap., and Victorine Hoffman, O.F.M.

After announcing the time for private Meetings of the members of these various Committees and also of the members of the Executive Board, the Session adjourned at 11:45 a.m.

THIRD SESSION

DETROIT, MICH., July 2, 1931, 3:00 p.m.

As a result of the meeting of the Executive Board the following amendment to the Constitution was proposed:

The Executive Board shall be augmented by one more member, *viz.*, a Secretary for Franciscan Literature. He shall act as Chairman on the Committee for Franciscan Literature at the Conferences and, under the direction and with the authority of the Executive Board, shall promote and edit the "Franciscan Studies."

Hitherto the "Franciscan Studies" have been edited by the Secretary of the Conference and from 1923 to date nine issues have appeared. They are as follows:

1. *Science in the Franciscan Order*, by the Rev. John Lenhart, O. M. Cap.
2. *Bonaventure, The Seraphic Doctor*—two articles—*St. Bonaventure, His Life and Works*, by the Rev. Ludger Wegemer, O.F.M., and *St. Bonaventure on the Knowledge of God*, by the Rev. Vincent Mayer, O.M.C.
3. *The Origin and Development of the Franciscan School*, by the Rev. Berard Vogt, O.F.M., Ph.D.
4. *Ven. John Duns Scotus*—three articles—*His Life and Works*, by the Rev. Edwin Dorzweiler, O.M.Cap., A.M.; *The Doctrine of Ven. John Duns Scotus Concerning the Causality of the Sacraments*, by the Rev. Raphael Huber, O.M.C., S.T.D., and *The Teaching of Ven. John Duns Scotus Concerning the Immaculate Conception of Our Lady*, by the Rev. Vincent Mayer, O.M.C. Price of each of the above issues: 25 cents per copy.
5. *Language Studies in the Franciscan Order*, by the Rev. John Lenhart, O.M. Cap. Price per copy, 75 cents.
6. *Franciscan Mysticism*, by the Rev. Dunstan Dobbins, O.M.Cap., B. Litt. (Oxon.). Price per copy, \$1.25.
7. *The History of Franciscan Preaching and of Franciscan Preachers* (1209-1927), by the Rev. Anscar Zawart, O.M.Cap. Price per copy, \$1.50.
8. *The Capuchins in French Louisiana* (1722-1766), by the Rev. Claude Vogel, O.M.Cap., Ph.D. Price per copy, \$1.50.
9. *Père Girard, Educator*, by the Rev. Andrew Maas, O.M.C., A.M. Price per copy, 50 cents.

All of the above issues are for sale at the publishers, Joseph F. Wagner, Inc., 54 Park Place, New York City, or at the Capuchin College, Brookland, Washington, D. C.

Convinced that other material dealing with Franciscan subjects lies hidden in the desks of other Friars, the Executive Board suggested the amendment creating a new officer whose duty it should be to collect such manuscripts from the Friars throughout the world and edit them under the auspices of the Conference. The proposed amendment creating a fourth officer naturally called for the following amendment regulating the election of officers:

In order to insure the continuity, efficiency and a more active representation of the Franciscan Educational Conference, the election of officers shall proceed as follows:

The three branches of the Order shall be represented on the Executive Board on the basis of the number of Provinces affiliated, i.e., two officers shall be chosen from the Friars Minor (with nine affiliated Provinces), one from the Minor Capuchins (with five affiliated Provinces), and one from the Minor Conventuals (with four affiliated Provinces).

The election shall be preceded by nomination and free discussion from the floor. No one shall be elected who has not attended at least one previous Meeting of the Conference.

All officers shall serve at least two years, and not more than two new officers shall be elected each year.

The Friars were now asked to give these proposed amendments serious consideration so as to be ready to vote on them in the final Session of this Convention. The Chairman now called for the next paper: "A Theory of the Genesis of Knowledge," by the Rev. Alfred Martin, O.F.M., Holy Name College, Washington, D. C. An animated discussion followed on the manner in which the mind gets in touch with reality. Is there only one source of knowledge both for the created and the Increate, for material things and for God? Is the soul itself the second source of knowledge? Which system will fit in best with Catholic belief? What is the value of the Thomistic, the Scotistic and the Modern Theories?

The paper entitled, "*Rapprochement* between Modern Empirical Psychology and Scholastic Rational Psychology," by the Rev. Conrad O'Leary, O.F.M., Ph.D., Holy Name College, Washington, D. C., was next in order. The discussion dealt with such questions as: Can the rational psychology of the Scholastics interpret the facts of experimental psychology, or must the Scholastics cling to metaphysical dicta and avoid experimental facts? Are the Scholastic metaphysical concepts insufficient in view of the findings of experimental psychology? Is there need of fear on the part of Scholastics because of definitions by the Church concerning the soul? What is

the difference between the terms, *de anima* of the Scholastics, and *psychology* of the Moderns?

The final paper of the afternoon session, "The Plurality of Forms," was read by the Rev. Hubert Vecchierello, O.F.M., Ph.D., of St. Bonaventure's Seminary, Allegany, N. Y. In the discussion it was contended that the doctrine of the Plurality of Forms is becoming more common among Neo-Scholastics. Not only in compounds but also in organisms the various constituents, e.g., tissue, blood and bone, are believed to have their own determining principles. This teaching cannot be considered new, since it was held at least as probable by such authorities as Albert the Great, Lugo, and others. At the close of this session a photograph of the Friars was taken by a photographer from Detroit.

The Meeting adjourned at 5:45 p.m.

FOURTH SESSION

DETROIT, MICH., July 2, 1931, 8:00 p.m.

In the paper: "The Study of Abnormal Psychology for the Guidance of Souls," the Rev. Edwin Dorzweiler, O.M.Cap., A.M., of St. Fidelis' Monastery, Victoria, Kansas, presented a fitting climax to our Conference and showed that psychology and its allied subjects are eminently serviceable to our great work — the cure of souls. The discussion emphasized that while the study of abnormal psychology is most interesting and necessary, it must never displace or curtail the study of normal psychology. The latter must always be looked upon as the basis of the former. Nor should abnormal psychology be pursued by our clerics in their years of philosophy, but rather in their course of theology when it should be studied in connection with pastoral theology. Caution and prudence, however, must be exercised by the teacher so that the students be not led by an unhealthy curiosity but rather by the pure spirit of science and vocational education.

As a fitting close to a busy day the Rev. Conrad Link, O.F.M., guardian of the local friary, announced that the clerics of Duns Scotus College would entertain the delegates with "The Beloved," a drama of the life of St. Anthony commemorating the seventh cen-

tenary of his death. The drama, composed by the youthful students, was presented in the open-air theater on the grounds of Duns Scotus College. It was instructive and inspiring to witness again the life story of Padua's saint with its beautiful lessons of faith, humility and Franciscan simplicity so well portrayed by these youthful actors. Hearty congratulation to the clerics of Duns Scotus College!

FIFTH SESSION

DETROIT, MICH., July 3, 1931, 8:00 a.m.

The Chairman opened the Meeting by explaining the reason for the paper to be read. "Our Seraphic Seminaries," by the Rev. Theodosius Foley, O.M.Cap., A.M., of Glenclyffe, N. Y., is a subject not cognate with psychology. But since the last two Meetings of the Franciscan Educational Conference had dealt with subjects pertaining to the major seminaries, it was explained that our avowed interest in all departments of education would make necessary for next year's Meeting the choice of some subject allied with the preparatory seminaries. The purpose of the present paper was to serve as a transition, to survey the field and prepare a program for a future Meeting. In the topics treated, affiliation with the State, bringing the curriculum up to date, teachers' qualifications, administration and government of our institutions, spiritual training, athletics, the writer showed the various problems confronting our seraphic or preparatory seminaries. The discussion brought out among other things that, if our seminaries are to be truly seraphic, they must ever aim at the ideals of St. Francis and have a sacred regard for the same traditions of Franciscan education. The Friars now took up the discussion of what should be the subject of next year's Meeting. While appeals were made for liturgy, sociology and Franciscan American Church History, the majority decided in favor of a subject dealing with our seraphic seminaries. At the same time, it was suggested that on the program for next year's Meeting there be at least one paper of particular interest to major seminaries. In this way the latter will find reason to be represented at the Meeting and the continuity of the Conference will be secured.

The next important step taken by the Conference was the founding of the Franciscan Bibliographical Institute for cataloging books and articles dealing with Franciscan subjects. It was pointed out that the Rev. Austin Waldvogel, O.M.Cap., of Herman, Pa., had by order of the Most Rev. Melchior a Benisa, O.M.Cap., General of the Capuchin Order, undertaken a similar task with regard to the works by Capuchin authors in American libraries. Fr. Austin visited the libraries of the Capuchin Province of Pennsylvania and also the Congressional Library and other main libraries of Washington, D. C., and succeeded in gathering invaluable data regarding works written by Capuchins before the year 1900. Acting on the suggestion of the Rev. Hugolinus Lemay, O.F.M., of Montreal, Canada, the Chairman appointed the following committee to inaugurate the work of cataloging all books and articles treating of Franciscan subjects: Friars Albert O'Brien, O.F.M., Austin Waldvogel, O.M.Cap., Valentine Schaaf, O.F.M., Hugolinus Lemay, O.F.M., and Edwin Auweiler, O.F.M. It was then moved that the Rev. Hugolinus Lemay, O.F.M., be appointed Chairman of this committee and that he should hold a meeting with his Committee before the adjournment of the Convention. With characteristic generosity the Rev. Ephrem Longpré, O.F.M., volunteered to catalog Franciscan material appearing in European magazines and papers.

The Rev. Athanasius Karlin, O.M.Cap., of St. Fidelis' Monastery, Victoria, Kans., made the following report on what the Friars had published during the year:

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Barry, Alfred, O.M.Cap.

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Basil, Fr., O.M.Cap.

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 "Irish Saints, St. Columba." *Father Mathew Record*, Dublin, Sept., 1930.
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- Becker, Eugene, O.M.Cap.**
 "In the Mountains." *Seraphic Chronicle*, March, 1931.
 "The Childhood of St. Anthony." *Ibid.*
 "Our New Chapel at Mameyes." *St. Francis Home Journal*, Aug., 1931.
- Bernholz, Adolph, O.M.C.**
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 "Beyond the Bourne." *St. Anthony Messenger*, Nov., 1930.
 "Merrily We Welcome in the Year." *Ibid.*, Jan., 1931.
 "Our Lady's Eternal Springtime." *Ibid.*, Dec., 1930.
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- Boiteau, Leopold, O.F.M.**
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Nos collègues, le collège séraphique des Trois-Rivières. Enseignement secondaire, Quebec, 1930.
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 "The English Franciscans and Jansenism." *The Clergy Review*, Aug., 1931.
- Brookman, Bertrand, O.M.Cap.**
Report of the Capuchin Educational Conference. Friary Press, Hays, Kans., 1931.
- Brunner, Richard, O.M.Cap.**
 "Eastward, Ho!" *Seraphic Chronicle*, Feb., 1931.
 "Allahabad." *Ibid.*, March, 1931.
 "Holy Benares." *Ibid.*, April, 1931.
- Buessing, Venantius, O.M.Cap.**
Holy Hour for Public and Private Devotion. Revised edition. Detroit, 1930.
- Burke, Bernard, O.M.Cap.**
 "St. Anthony of Padua." *Seraphic Chronicle*, Feb.-Sept., 1931.
- Cardiff, Ethelbert, O.F.M.**
 "St. Anthony of Padua." *Franciscan Almanac*, 1931.
- Causse, Candide, O.M.Cap.**
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- Lavery, Paulinus, O.F.M.**
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- "Is Convalidation of Convert's Marriage Necessary?" *Ibid.*, Jan., 1931.
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- "Our Mission—Starting Out." *St. Francis Home Journal*, Sept., 1931.
- Schmitt, Berchmans, O.M.Cap.**
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- Schneider, Sigfrid, O.F.M.**
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- Shearer, Donald, O.M.Cap.**
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The two Amendments to the Constitution proposed in the Third Session were now voted on and unanimously adopted. The Resolutions were then presented by the Rev. Mark Stier, O.M.Cap., and were adopted as read. The final business of the Meeting was the

election of officers for the coming year. After nomination from the floor, the following Friars were elected by ballot:

President, Fr. Thomas Plassmann, O.F.M., Allegany, N. Y.

Vice-President, Fr. Francis Edic, O.M.C., Staten Island, N. Y.

Secretary, Fr. Claude Vogel, O.M.Cap., Washington, D. C.

Editor, Fr. Sebastian Erbacher, O.F.M., Detroit, Mich.

The following Friars were chosen as members of the Executive Board of the Conference: Province of the Sacred Heart, Fr. Gerard Schmalz, O.F.M.; Province of St. John the Baptist, Fr. Romuald Mollaun, O.F.M.; Province of Santa Barbara, Fr. Joseph F. Rhode, O.F.M.; Province of the Assumption of the B. V. M., Fr. Isidore Cwiklinski, O.F.M.; Canadian Province of St. Joseph, Fr. Simon Archambault, O.F.M.; Province of St. Antony of Padua, Fr. Giles Kaczmarek, O.M.C.; Province of Our Lady of Consolation, Fr. Paul Vollrath, O.M.C.; Province of St. Patrick, Fr. Brendan O'Callaghan, O.M.Cap.; Province of St. Louis, Fr. Fortunatus Fortin, O.M.Cap.; Province of St. Lawrence of Brindisi, Fr. Alfred Barry, O.M.Cap.; Province of St. Joseph, Fr. Theodosius Foley, O.M.Cap.; Province of the Immaculate Conception (England), Fr. Daniel Luitz, O.M.C.; Province of St. Francis, Fr. Timothy Leary, O.F.M.; Province of the Immaculate Conception, Fr. Aloysius Costa, O.F.M.

Before adjourning, the President appealed to all the Friars to continue their interest in the work that is being done at the Franciscan Friary at Quaracchi. At present the Friars there under the guidance of the learned Fr. Ephrem Longpré, O.F.M., foremost scholar in Scotism, are striving to reëdit critically the works of Scotus and Alexander of Hales. The President also called attention to the Collegio S. Lorenzo da Brindisi founded by the Capuchin Fathers at Assisi in November, 1930. The purpose of this college is to house a body of Capuchin scholars who are to devote themselves to research work in Franciscan, and more particularly in Capuchin, history and literature. In conjunction with their work of reëditing forgotten works of Capuchin writers the Friars at Assisi publish also the *Collectanea Franciscana*, a quarterly magazine under the editorship of Doctor Amedée Teetaert, O.M.Cap. Whatever patronage, material or moral, the American Friars can give the

institutions at Quaracchi and Assisi to continue their researches will be gratefully appreciated in these days of general depression.

With a warm word of thanks to the Friars of Duns Scotus College for their truly Franciscan hospitality during these historic days of the Convention, the Rev. President brought the Meeting to a close.

FR. CLAUDE L. VOGEL, O.M.Cap., *Secretary.*

PAPERS AND DISCUSSIONS

ST. AUGUSTINE AND THE FRANCISCAN SCHOOL

FR. BERARD VOGT, O.F.M., Ph.D.

ST. AUGUSTINE has been called the *Cor Ecclesiae*. Down to the middle of the thirteenth century theology bears practically the exclusive impress of the personality of St. Augustine, who created it. The philosophical views of St. Augustin  were, with certain reservations and adaptations, Platonic. This Platonism is, consequently, found to be the speculative basis of St. Augustine, his theology. Furthermore, as Father of Theology, the Father of St. Augustine, in great part, necessarily inspired Theology the earlier Scholasticism. For it was in the domain of theology that the philosophical opinions of the time had their origin; in and with theology the leading problems of philosophy had to be discussed in order to find a rational basis for the interpretation, discussion and development of revealed truth. In fact, Augustine's influence on Scholastic thought was distinctly preponderant down to the thirteenth century, Augustinian Platonism completely overshadowing Aristotelianism.

The earlier centuries knew Aristotle only as a master of logic. Of all his writings, they possessed merely the first part of his logic in a translation of Boethius. It was only in the second half of the twelfth century that the entire organon became known, whereas the metaphysics, physics and the *de Anima*, which formed the very groundwork of Aristotelian philosophy, were entirely unknown at this period. But in the opening decades of the thirteenth century the western world of thought was introduced to the hitherto unknown complete works of Aristotle, his physical, metaphysical and ethical treatises; gradually the Stagirite with his theory of being, its principles, categories and causes, his views on potency and act, matter and form, generation, corruption, space, time and movement, his conception of the soul, its faculties and activities, his teaching on the ethical virtues and man as a social being, replaced

Aristotle
Supplants
Plato

Plato as "the Philosopher." All this, of course, did not take place without a struggle between the supporters of the old and those of the new view. For several decades it remained uncertain which of the two princes of Greek thought would eventually predominate. During this period of transition some philosophers attached themselves more closely to the founder of the Academy, and others to the founder of the Lyceum, and were in consequence known as Platonists or Aristotelians.

The earlier Franciscans, as is well known, belonged to the Platonic-Augustinian wing of the Scholastics, whereas the Dominicans, under the leadership of Albert the Great and St. Thomas, espoused the new Aristotelian views. We must not, however, misunderstand this sweeping classification. Perhaps it would be better to say that the Franciscans gave the preference to Platonic Augustinianism. For, though they espoused Plato's

Attitude of the Franciscans toward Aristotle

views, as modified and adapted by St. Augustine, in the leading doctrines which constitute the difference between his system and that of Aristotle; they at the same time studied Aristotle also, and highly esteemed him, freely supplementing and developing their own synthesis with Aristotelian elements. In many ways they even tried to reconcile and combine the two, as when, for example, they conceived the relation of body and soul as one of matter and form, and at the same time held the soul itself to be composed of matter and form. In fact, it was the Franciscans, both at Paris and at Oxford, who first introduced the new doctrines of Aristotle into their speculative treatment of theology.

It is the purpose of the present paper to outline briefly the Augustinian elements characterizing the Franciscan School.

Alexander of Hales, the founder of the Franciscan School, had been trained in the Augustinian and pre-Aristotelian days. Still, as is well known, he represents at Paris the first successful attempt to apply the newly introduced philosophy of Aristotle to theology and to render it fruitful for theological speculation. He was the first to utilize the complete works of Aristotle in his speculative interpretation of dogma, contained in that monumental *Summa*, which the *Patres Editores* of Quaracchi are just now editing in such scholarly fashion.

Alexander admits the validity of St. Augustine's ideal arguments for the existence of God, for example, he quotes the argument of St. Augustine from the need of an absolute truth. We find him maintaining likewise, that God alone is pure actuality, and that all created beings, even spiritual beings, are composed of matter and form, that is, of potency and act. In true Augustinian vein, primal matter is not conceived as an indeterminate reality. It is not purely passive; it has a positive actuality apart from the informing influence of a substantial form. Its eternal creation is impossible. In psychology Alexander stresses the independence of the soul in regard to the body. Aristotle's definition of the soul seemed to him too specifically biological: it views and defines the soul too exclusively from the point of view of the informing rôle the soul plays in relation to the body, and thus over-stresses its dependence upon the body. For this reason Alexander preferred the more metaphysical and unbiological Platonic-Augustinian definition which stressed the independent character of the soul as a spirit, and thus brought into bolder relief the self-subsisting personal character of the soul. St. Augustine defined the soul as a "rational substance destined to direct the body." (*De Quantitate Animae*, C. 136, P.L. 32, 1048, n. 22.)

Alexander also adopts the traditional Augustinian division of the mind into the *ratio* which has for its object the knowledge of the corporeal world, the *intellectus* which has for its object the knowledge of created spiritual substances, and the *intelligentia*, which has for its object the knowledge of the *rationes aeternae*, the first principles. The external world we know by the combined activity of the active and passive intellect, a newly adopted Aristotelian element, whereas our knowledge of the suprasensible world and of all higher ideal and spiritual truth is dependent upon a special divine illumination, the famous Augustinian theory, of which more in a moment.

Alexander's great pupil, St. Bonaventure, adopted and perfected the system of his teacher. Jacques Maritain, the competent and subtle judge of the mental world in which the schoolmen lived, says

Alexander's System Perfected by St. Bonaventure of St. Bonaventure that he succeeded best "in recapturing Augustine's lofty inspiration, and a ray of his wisdom."¹ To convince ourselves of the truth of this assertion, we need but recall St. Bonaventure's doctrine of Exemplarism. This doctrine occupies the center of his philosophical synthesis; its articulations constitute the metaphysical framework of his reasoned universe. It might be defined as the doctrine of the relations between God and creature, or simply, the dynamic divine Idea. This divine Idea is the resemblance of things, according to which God knows, creates, and endows all finite beings. St. Bonaventure, like Augustine, considers God's Essence primarily under the aspect of Truth, and the Idea of God as the expression of this truth. Whereas St. Thomas regards this Idea primarily as the divine Essence as imitable in creatures. And thus while for St. Thomas God is primarily Being, knowable as such, for St. Bonaventure God is essential Truth, illuminating our minds by its light. Things and their relations are nothing else but expressions of this original divine thought. Their full truth, therefore, is anchored in God, and no one can know things truly except the divine Idea illumine him.

It is not difficult to recognize Augustine's "lofty inspiration." Our inner experience, says the Sage of Hippo, reveals to us an unchangeable, eternal, immanent truth. Now the antimony between the contingency of our finite minds and the material world of the senses, *and* the necessary and universal character of truth as revealed to man, can only be solved by the existence of a Subsisting Truth (which is God). Moreover, we could not know this Truth, were not our minds enlightened by its light. In a very true sense, then, the absolute character of our knowledge reveals to us the illuminating presence of God within us.

Augustine transformed Plato's airy idealism by reducing the independent separate world of ideas to exemplary ideas in the mind of God. For the rest, like Plato, he bids us *look up* for an answer to the question of the source of our knowledge; *not down* to the material world, which merely faintly participates in truth. In our

¹ *A Monument to St. Augustine* (New York: The Dial Press, 1930), p. 212.

higher knowledge the mind reaches truth because of a participation in the ideas of God, and by reason of an illumination deriving from the light of these ideas (*De Civitate Dei*, XI, XXIII). We attain the eternal divine light in our vision of ideal truth. Our soul is a spirit, and as such, akin to God. Augustine calls it a pin-point of light, in an ocean of light. Nothing created being luminous of itself, we are enlightened by the eternal light; in fact, we are a spark (*scintilla*) of the wisdom of God.

In Augustine's theory of knowledge there is no sensible image to be spiritualized by an active intellect; the ideal image is an immediate content of the soul. **Augustine's Theory of Knowledge** Sensation acts merely as a sentinel directing the attention of the soul to an immediately present idea. **Contrasted with that of Aristotle** The Aristotelian active intellect elaborates a concept out of a phantasm, the Augustinian illumination reveals a thought. In the Aristotelian psychology perception and knowledge are one psychophysical process; with Augustine they are an activity of the soul dwelling within a body. Truth is not a product of human thought elaborated by the mind in a process of abstraction; it is a reality beheld in the inner intuition of the soul. Truth is found, not made, and the human mind is subject to it. We can readily understand, then, why St. Augustine calls God the Sun of the soul, the Light of the intellect by which we see.

The celebrated Augustinian texts to the effect that all knowledge takes place *ratione lucis increatae* and *rationibus aeternis*, have played a great historical rôle in the Middle Ages. They have often been interpreted ontologically, as if the human intellect directly contemplated immutable Truth in the divine Essence. St. Bonaventure, while preferring Aristotle's explanation of our knowledge of this physical world, adopted St. Augustine's theory concerning the origin of man's higher knowledge, and in consequence he, too, has been accused of **Augustine and Bonaventure Accused of Ontologism** Ontologism. Attempts have been made to harmonize Augustine and St. Bonaventure with St. Thomas, as though by their illumination theory they meant no more, than that it consists in the divine resemblance imprinted upon our intelligences by the creative act, and in the

immediate concursus of the First Cause in every creatural exercise of thought. God's presence by His truth, and our seeing truth *ratione lucis increatae* or *rationibus aeternis* are interpreted to mean simply that the divine ideas are the ultimate objective foundation of all truth and certitude.²

Augustine and St. Bonaventure meant more than this. St. Augustine speaks of the soul being in contact with the divine ideas in God, when illumined by Him in our higher knowledge, and again of touching the light of immutable truth (*De Quantitate Animae*, Cap. XXIII, N. 76, *De Civitate Dei*, Lib. VIII, N. 112, Cap. II, N. 3). And St. Bonaventure speaks of *attingere et contueri rationes aeternas* (*De Scientia Dei*, Cap. 4, i.c. V, 23a). How are we to interpret these words? According to Gilson, this contact or attaining of the divine ideas is indirect. The action of the divine illumination does not lead to the direct vision of the First Cause, but to its inferred presence by induction based upon an analysis of observed facts.³ Inasmuch as the soul and its environment are contingent, all immutable and absolute character attaching to its knowledge must come from the Immutable Truth itself. As we behold material objects by the diffused light of the sun, thus know of its presence in the skies and are in indirect contact with it even when it is hidden by clouds, so we behold the absolute character of human knowledge by the light of the eternal Truth and thus perceive its presence indirectly by its illuminating influence upon our minds. Bissen and Schwendinger maintain that according to the Seraphic Doctor this illuminating influence is real influence over and above the ordinary *concursus generalis*, but distinct on the other hand from the special illumination belonging to the realm of grace. It regards the form rather than the content of our knowledge, which latter is derived from experience.⁴

Viewed in relation to creatures, St. Bonaventure's Exemplarism or dynamic divine Idea accounts for the world of our experience. As a ray of light sent through a prism breaks up into the many wonderful hues of the color scale, so the divine Idea disperses itself

²*History of Medieval Philosophy*, by M. de Wulf (New York, 1926), I, p. 369.

³*A Monument to St. Augustine* (New York: The Dial Press), 1930, p. 307.

⁴*Fünfte Lektorenkonferenz* (Werl, 1930), p. 135.

into various ideas embodied in the manifold essences of the creatural universe. Moreover, it finds concrete expression in the *rationes seminales*, or plastic principles deposited in the bosom of matter. These active forces guide the evolution which matter undergoes in the course of time. They explain the emergence of new forms and types. The *rationes seminales*, under the action of extrinsic agencies of nature give rise to new individuals and types. They represent in a latent and undeveloped state the new forms which matter is capable of receiving when circumstances become favorable, *acceptis opportunitatibus*, as St. Augustine puts it. On the contrary, Aristotle and St. Thomas account for the production of created substances by the purely passive potency of matter acted upon by natural agencies.

According to the theory of Seminal Reasons, which Augustine took over from Neo-Platonism (Plotinus, *Enneades* II, 3, 16 and 17), God created all things simultaneously, some in their specific nature, others in a mode seminal and potential (St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litt. Lib. VII, Cap. XXVIII*). St. Bonaventure holds that light is the primordial substantial form of all material substances, the *forma communis* of matter, to which is superadded the elemental form, the *forma mixti* in composite realities, and the vital form in living beings. All things, then, have a plurality of substantial forms (In Sent. II, a13, division text II, 310a).

Exemplarism, in yet another of its functions, accounts for man's moral code and consummation. God influences the human soul not only as *ratio intelligendi*, but also as *ratio vivendi*. As we arrive at knowledge of truth by rethinking divine ideas, so we attain moral perfection by copying divine activity, and a divine influence not merely enlightens our reason that it may properly propose moral principles and motives, but also moves the will.

Again, neither Augustine nor St. Bonaventure consider man merely *in statu naturae purae*; such a man is an abstraction foreign to their conception. The concrete living man they know is the complete man in the unity of his destiny, in whom nature and grace are indivisibly intertwined. They may distinguish, but they do not

Man in the Minds of Augustine and Bonaventure separate these elements in their analysis of man. That is why for both of them the aim of philosophy is not so much the understanding of things as the consummation of love. Augustine would make all study and science directly serviceable to the knowledge and love of God,⁵ a thought we find reiterated in St. Bonaventure's *De Reductione Artium ad Theologiam*. The principle of both their philosophy and theology, may be summed up in the brief words: God is love.

In a word, the *Summum Bonum* communicating and revealing itself through the dynamic exemplary Idea is the beginning and end in the drama of creation.

The Franciscan tradition founded by Alexander and Bonaventure, and faithfully continued by their disciples, e.g., Matthew of Aquasparta, John Peckham, Peter John Olivi, Walter of Bruges, William of Ware, Richard of Middleton, had existed for half a century, when a new and conspicuous leader appeared in the person of John Duns Scotus. Up to quite recently it was customary to regard the earlier and later Franciscan Schools as two different movements of thought, as though Scotus had given to the studies of the Order a distinctly new orientation. Recent historical researches of Minges, Longpré (*La Philosophie de B. Duns Scot*, Paris, 1924), and Harris (*Duns Scotus*, Oxford, 1927) reveal Scotus as

Scotus, the Gifted Continuator of Franciscan Theories a gifted representative, and at the same time a critical and progressive continuator of the earlier Franciscan School, who, while he brought into vogue a fuller Peripateticism *sui generis*, retained in most important points

the older Augustinian view. To use a phrase of Harris' (*Duns Scotus*, Vol. I, p. 172), Scotus frequently merely arrays in peripatetic trappings the old theories of Augustine. While he went to Aristotle for much of his scientific equipment, he looked to Augustine for much of the substance of his wisdom. The hitherto little-known philosophical and theological antecedents of Scotus, as traced by the recent study of the published works and unedited manuscripts covering the period from 1260 to 1300, show the many links bind-

⁵A Monument to St. Augustine, p. 114.

ing Scotus to the earlier Augustinian traditions, and disclose the fact that many of the philosophical and theological theses ascribed to Duns Scotus, which have been the subject of disputes for centuries in the schools, are simply the common teachings of the Franciscan School anteriorly to the Subtle Doctor.

Thus, for example, the older Franciscan tradition had always adhered to the Augustinian view of the real identity of the soul and its faculties. We know that Scotus places a formal distinction between the soul and its faculties. For centuries the formal distinction has been regarded as the "great innovation" of Scotus. However, the antecedent history of this famous theory proves that the formal distinction was known in all preceding Franciscan circles, and that its formulation and application by Scotus is merely the ultimate personal systematization of fifty years of research and speculation from St. Bonaventure to Alexander of Alexandria.⁶

Scotus calls the formal distinction variously a distinction *a parte rei*; *ex natura rei*, *sed non simpliciter realis*, etc. (*Rep.* I, d. 45, qu. 2, n. 5-9, Paris Ed. Vol. XXII, 500b, 502 ff.). The formal distinction is an intermediate distinction between the real and the purely mental. It brings out the fact that in some of the plural concepts of the human mind concerning reality there exist antecedently to the cognitive activity of the mind and independently thereof, in the one reality, distinct moments of perfection, or positive aspects and intrinsic modes. These exist as *parte rei* and are actual *ex natura rei*; they are the foundation of the plural distinctions made by the mind, which latter are consequently not merely a projection of the mind into reality of its own modes of thought, arising from its limitations of cognitive perception. Now already St. Bonaventure speaks of this *distinctio media existens praeter intellectum* and applies it, as Scotus did later, in his endeavor to solve the mysteries of the soul and of divine life. It is found in almost identical terms in Peter John Olivi, and in Peter de Trabibus, the disciple of Olivi; in fact, in one way or another, it is a traditional doctrine in Franciscan circles, and forms one of

⁶Longpré, *op. cit.*, p. 240.

the most profound and fecund ideas in its various applications in theodicy, metaphysics and psychology.⁷

The matter and form theory is another case in point. It formed one of the central problems of the cosmological speculations of the Scholastics. Duhem tells us in his *Système du Monde* (p. 320) that the most obstinate intellectual battles of the thirteenth century were waged around the subject of matter and form. St. Thomas, adopting Aristotle's view, conceived matter as pure potency, which of itself has no existence and possesses no characteristics in its own intrinsic nature capable of becoming anything; it is of itself nothing but unlimited possibility, therefore, wholly indeterminate and unknowable as such. Scotus goes back to August-

Scotus on Matter and Form

tine's view which endows matter with an actuality of its own. That which has no actual existence, he argues, is nothing, and hence cannot be regarded as a cosmological principle. Moreover, having an actuality of its own, matter presupposes a representative idea in the divine mind and becomes the term of a creative act on the part of God. Aristotle had maintained matter and form to be coeternal constituents of an eternal world and one of the leading objections of the Augustinians against the new Aristotelian view of matter, regarded the problem of safeguarding the dogma of temporal creation in the face of the difficulty of assigning a beginning to matter conceived as a pure potency.

In his doctrine of form, Scotus again stands out as the champion of the Augustinian teaching, whereas St. Thomas is the great defender of the theory of the unicity of the substantial form. Plural substantial forms, maintains St. Thomas, are incompatible with real unity of being. He therefore holds that in the inorganic compounds of nature a new substantial form replaces the elemental forms, uniting itself directly to the primary matter of the combining elements, and likewise, that in living beings the soul is the only substantial form of the body. It is by virtue of the soul, united directly to the *materia prima* of the elements, that the human body is what it is. In agreement with the Augustinian tradition and the entire Franciscan School, Scotus maintains the possibility of plural substantial

⁷*Ibid.*, pp. 241 ff.

forms, in one composite substance, provided they be subordinated to one another, *and* the compatibility of these plural forms with the real unity of the resultant being (*Oxon.* IV, d. 11, qu. 3, n. 46, XVII, 429a). According to Scotus, the human body as a material reality possesses its own material form, giving it the corporeal nature; the soul is not the *forma constitutiva corporis*, but merely its *forma vivificativa*. This material form of the body Scotus calls the *forma corporeitatis*. Under this name it has been discussed for centuries as a distinctly Scotistic conception, whereas in reality it was known already to Alexander of Hales and St. Bonaventure; in fact, it is a lineal descendant of Augustine's view of the relation obtaining between soul and body.

Again, there is the well-known voluntarism of Scotus, the pre-eminence attributed by him to the will in our psychic life. With Thomas, the intellect, perceiving the limited character of the finite good, contains the ultimate reason and is the ultimate cause of liberty. The will is merely its subject or bearer. With Scotus the will is both the ultimate ground and subject of liberty; it determines itself, being essentially an active faculty which can never function after the manner of a necessary natural faculty. Even in the presence of the Supreme Good the will determines itself actively (*Oxon.* 1, d. 1, qu. 4, n. 1, VIII, 353a; Longpré, *op. cit.*, p. 276; Harris, *op. cit.*, II, p. 295). Scotus does not defend an extreme indeterminism, as though the choice of the will were wholly unguided by motives and wholly arbitrary; he admits the influence upon its decisions, of circumstances, habits, temperament, but he denies that these can have a necessitating influence. Ultimately the will must determine itself; moral action cannot be construed in intellectualistic terms. The will, he says, is the sole cause of its own act, whereas St. Thomas interprets the choice of the will in terms of greater intellectualistic origin. Stripped of its peripatetic trappings, the innermost kernel of Scotus' theory of the will is none other than the doctrine of Augustine.

Just as in ethics, so in psychology and theodicy, Scotus subscribes to the Augustinian primacy of the will. Thus in the act of perception the soul is not merely passive and receptive under the influence of the external impression; Scotus emphasizes the active function of

the soul in these cognitive processes (*Oxon.* I, d. 3, qu. 7). We are reminded of the active rôle played by the soul in the Augustinian interpretation of our processes of sentient knowledge. Again, there is the correlated teaching of Scotus that the human intellect has an immediate direct apprehension of the individual reality preceding its knowledge of the universal (*Quolib.*, qu. 13, n. 8), whereas St. Thomas maintained that the singular as such cannot be known by the mind.

Finally, there is Scotus' conception of theology as primarily a practical science of conduct and moral (*Oxon. Prol.*, qu. 4, n. 31).

We have limited ourselves to tracing the leading Augustinian traits characterizing the philosophy of the Franciscan School. Owing to restrictions of time imposed by circumstances we have omitted the domain of theology.

Throughout the centuries Augustinian thought has continued to nourish the minds of men. It has ever retained its vitality, its influence and its assimilative power. Especially is this true of our own day. A. Mansion writes in the *Revue Neo-Scholastique* of Louvain (Nov., 1921): "In our own day more than ever before, the person and the thought of St. Augustine are arousing vital interest." So strong is this appeal to the modern mind that the phrase of a return to Augustine is gaining currency.⁸ Maurice Blondel, critically examining the latent resources of Augustinianism,⁹ concludes thus: "St. Augustine has more to give us than he has yet done. The future reserves for the doctrine of St. Augustine a fruitful activity for surpassing all the influence it has exercised in the past." And J. Maritain believes that Augustinianism and Thomism are not antagonistic, but mutually complementary, and that in their harmonious development lies the promise of the future.

These opinions remind us of the opportunities of our Franciscan School, inasmuch as it is so deeply inspired with Augustinian wisdom. Our endeavor as Franciscan scholars must be, to bring out by positive, historical and critical work the permanent values which lie embedded in the tomes of the past, to restate them and to apply

⁸Denis J. Kavanagh, O.S.A., "The Modern Renaissance of St. Augustine." *Thought*, V (1930), pp. 181-208.

⁹*A Monument to St. Augustine*, pp. 352 ff.

them to the needs of our day, and thus to contribute to the noble cause of truth and of Catholic philosophy.

DISCUSSION

FR. MARK STIER, O.M.Cap.—Fr. Berard's scholarly paper, evincing, as it does, the true Franciscan spirit, touches upon the typical Franciscan attitudes in philosophy and on the Augustinian elements characterizing the Franciscan School. It is another proof that the modern Franciscan scholars are making void the statement of Peter Manero that the Order of Friars Minor *nescit publicare quid fecit*.

Truly, the most comprehensive representative of Platonic Augustinianism was St. Bonaventure, one of the greatest admirers of the doctrines of the Christian Plato. The illumination theory, i.e., that all knowledge takes place *ratione lucis aeternae* and *rationibus aeternis* when there is question of man's higher knowledge, is one of the distinctively Franciscan doctrines. In consequence, the charge of Ontologism has been brought against St. Bonaventure. Ontologism maintains that we know God directly (immediately) and from this knowledge of God, which is our very first act of intellectual knowledge, all other knowledge depends and flows.

It cannot be denied that the language of St. Bonaventure seems at times to suggest Ontologism. But a careful study of his positive and certain doctrine concerning our knowledge of God will completely dispel every impression of Ontologism.

St. Bonaventure sets up as his own doctrine that only the state of glory permits the immediate vision of the divine substance, so that then nothing will remain obscure. In our present condition, however, the human mind can contemplate God only in the mirror of created things; in other words, God is known through the creature: "*Deus qui est artifex et causa creaturae, per ipsam cognoscitur*" (S. Bon. t. I, p. 72). Another passage which is not open to any misunderstanding as to our knowledge of God in our present condition is the following: "*Cognoscere autem Deum per creaturam est elevari a cognitione creaturae ad cognitionem Dei quasi per scalam mediam. Et hoc est proprie viatorum*" (S. Bon. t. I, p. 74).

As to the few isolated passages in the *Itinerarium Mentis in Deum* that have led so many to wrong conclusions, we must bear in mind the mystical character of this work which might easily contain some less happy expressions bearing some resemblance to Ontologism. The few passages in the *Itinerarium* which seem to savor of Ontologism can be explained by employing Bonaventure's own rule of interpretation: "I beg that the intention of the author be kept in mind rather than his uncouth language, rather the exciting of the affections than the education of the affections."

There is a passage, however, in the *Second Book of Sentences*, a predominantly philosophical work of the Seraphic Doctor, that is capable of an Ontologistic interpretation. It reads: "*Necessario enim oportet ponere quod anima novit Deum et seipsam et quae sunt in seipsa sine adminiculo sensuum exteriorum*" (S. Bon. t. II, p. 904). Here Bonaventure denies that sense knowledge is necessary to know God. The knowledge of the soul and that of God are placed on the same level. The soul knows its own existence immediately, therefore we know God immediately.

But when Augustine and Bonaventure speak of an immediate knowledge of God in this life, they mean that after we know the existence of the soul it is easy and natural to come to the knowledge of God. Man has a natural impulse to know truth and therefore our knowledge of God is *per veritatem*. The soul in knowing its own existence immediately, sees God implicitly. When Bonaventure speaks of knowing God without the aid of the exterior sense, he is speaking of a confused or implicit knowledge, and in consequence, the soul has no need to go out of itself to know God.

St. Bonaventure certainly maintains a mediate knowledge of God through the senses, but he also maintains that we can know Him without the medium of the senses. He felt that this was neglected by Christian Aristotelians and wished to emphasize the fact. God has given us a *judicatorium naturale* whereby we can know all truth. This we call our intellect. Now the nature of the intellect is to know truth, all truth. In immediately knowing that it exists, the soul sees God in an implicit manner. By using the light of his intellect, a light which is a participation of the divine light, man has no need to go out of himself to see God, because as St. Thomas says, *omnia cognoscentia cognoscunt Deum implicite*.

Therefore, the knowledge that St. Bonaventure is speaking of in the passage given above, is only a mediate knowledge. In knowing truth, which is an object between God and itself, the soul implicitly knows God insofar as He is hid in all truth.

DOCTOR EPHREM LONGPRÉ, O.F.M.¹

Contrary to common opinion, Father Ephrem Longpré, O.F.M., author of following article, was not born in Canada but in Woonsocket, Rhode Island, on August 24, 1890. After a brief stay in the United States his parents, Joseph Longpré and Adeline Richard, settled at St. Ephrem d'Upton, in the Province of Quebec, Canada. Here on the farm Father Ephrem, then Zephirin Longpré, spent his childhood and attended the rural school.

On August 24, 1902, young Zephirin entered the Seraphic College of the Franciscans at Montreal, and on August 15, 1911, received the friar's habit, taking the name of Ephrem. Upon completing his novitiate he studied philosophy and theology in the Franciscan house of studies in Quebec. Here on July 14, 1918, he was ordained to the priesthood by His Excellency, Bishop P. E. Roy. In view of Father Ephrem's present attainments in the intellectual world it is significant that Father Georges-Albert, O.F.M., preacher on the occasion of Father Ephrem's first Solemn Mass, chose as the text of his sermon the cry of the people on witnessing the miracles of Jesus: *Propheta magnus surrexit in nobis* (Luke vii. 16).

In November, 1918, the newly ordained priest sailed for Rome where he matriculated as one of the first students at the Oriental Institute, founded by Pope Benedict XV. Here he pursued the prescribed studies for two years, also finding time to study the principal languages of Europe. After his first year at the Institute, Cardinal Marani offered him a professorship for the year 1920. Father Ephrem, however, continued his studies and received the doctorate in philosophy with the distinction *Summa cum Laude*. His thesis, *De Processione Spiritus Sancti apud Auctores Scholasticos Saeculi XII*, was rated high by the critics of Italy, Spain, Belgium and other countries. In recognition of his talent his superiors now sent him to the Collegio di S. Bonaventura, Quaracchi, near Florence, to engage in Franciscan research. It was said anent this appointment: "A Provincial has lost a brilliant subject, but the Order and the world have gained by the loss."

¹The Secretary acknowledges his indebtedness for these biographical data to the Rev. Simon Archambault, O.F.M., of Sherbrooke, P. Q., Canada.

The first task of Fr. Ephrem at Quaracchi was to study the preliminary sciences necessary for his researches. In less than four months he had learned paleography and was able to understand the manuscripts in the library of Florence which proved to be invaluable documents for his later work. He was now intrusted with the task of editing critically the works of Alexander of Hales, St. Bonaventure, and of other Franciscan schoolmen of the thirteenth century. It was this task that led him to the various renowned libraries of Europe where he uncovered many treasured manuscripts, and wrote many serial articles in the learned reviews of Europe which elicited unstinted praise from such learned scholars as Msgr. Grabmann, Cardinal Ehrle, Cardinal Mercier, Father Jansen, S.J., and Etienne Gilson. Soon, indeed, the young Franciscan was read and consulted by a host of scholars, many of whom had at first opposed his findings.

In the beginning of 1923, Fr. Ephrem was called upon to plead the cause of Duns Scotus before the Sacred Congregation of Rites. He found the task difficult because of the many strong opponents, but full of his conviction, he devoted the fullness of his powers to the defense of the "Doctor Subtilis" and "Doctor Immaculatae Conceptionis." *Apropos* of the defense of Scotus, Fr. Ephrem wrote his brother on April 9, 1925: "I have been thinking a great deal of writing a book on the mysticism of St. Bonaventure. (Previously he had published in the *Archivum Franciscanum* of 1921, pp. 36-198, "La Theologie Mystique de S. Bonaventure.") Father Cavallera, S.J., of Toulouse and Father Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P., have urged me to do so. But our Most Reverend Father General, although not unfavorable to such work, prefers that I devote all my energy to the defense of Duns Scotus. My opponents are very influential and powerful and I am practically alone, but I shall never give up. I must also inform you that my book on the philosophy of Scotus has had great influence throughout the intellectual world." The work referred to is the refutation of a book written against Scotus by Bernard Landry. This work of Fr. Ephrem appeared first in *Les Etudes Franciscaines*, then in book form in 1924 and stirred up considerable opposition. The author, however, was upheld by such men as Etienne Gilson, who corroborated the friar's claim that the Fran-

ciscan schoolmen were frequently the initiators of the sound philosophical and theological movements in medieval times.

About this time Fr. Ephrem was asked to give a course of lectures on Scotus at the University of Milan. Previous engagements, however, obliged him to postpone this work till the following year, 1927, when he delivered a course of seven lectures which, when published, will fill a volume of 300 pages. In the summer of the same year he visited Canada and lectured in Ontario and Quebec. On this occasion the Hon. Senator Dandurand, at one time president of the League of Nations, expressed his appreciation of Fr. Ephrem's ability in the words: "I am proud to speak of a Canadian who by his deep learning is considered the pride of our country in the scientific centers of Europe." In similar strain Etienne Gilson, eminent professor of Medieval Philosophy at the Sorbonne, remarked that he knew of no one superior to Fr. Ephrem in this difficult field.

Father Ephrem is also a prolific writer. In 1921, he published a book, *Le Tiers-Ordre séculier de Saint-François au Canada*. He, moreover, contributes to various dictionaries and reviews. The articles on Raymond Lulle, Matthew of Aquasparta and Ockam in the *Dictionary of Catholic Theology* (Vacant-Mangenot) are from his pen. Besides these, he wrote on the following subjects: "Saint François et l'Apologetique," in the *Dictionary of Apologetics of Alès*; "Questions inédites de Maître Eckart, O.P., et de Gonzalve de Balboa, O.F.M.," in the *Neo-Scholastic Review* of Louvain, Feb., 1927; "Les Distinctions du Frère Thomas de Pavie," in *Archivum Franciscanum*, 1923, pp. 3-33, and "Frère Thomas d'York and the First Metaphysical Summa of the XIII Century," *ibid.*, 1927, pp. 875-930; "Thomas d'York et Mathieu d'Aquasparta," unpublished documents on creation, in *Les Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire*, coll. Gilson et Thery, Paris, 1926, I, pp. 268-308. Mention might also be made of his important contributions to the "France Franciscaine," the "Studi Franciscani," the "Revista di filosofia neo-scholastica," the "Miscellanea" of Cardinal Ehrle and numerous other reviews.

Father Ephrem is not only a learned scholar, but also a master of literary expression. Read but his *St. Bonaventure*, his *Un savant Franciscain*, le P. Gemelli, his *L'Immaculée Conception et le B. Duns Scot*. He is also a poet of no mean worth and has written

much poetry which, if published, would afford the reader many delightful moments. However, his principal title today is that of President of the Commission founded in 1928 by the Most Reverend Bonaventure Marrani, O.F.M., General of the Franciscan Order to prepare a critical edition of the works of Scotus. From November, 1927, he has spent most of his time researching in the libraries of England, Scotland, and France. In February, 1929, he wrote to a confrere: "I have been in England for the past six months. The work done is considerable but I have still as much to do. At Cambridge I studied about three hundred manuscripts. At Oxford the task will be still greater. Among other valuable data I have found the official ordination certificate of Duns Scotus."

The following passage from a letter of June 30, 1925, to his brother reveals to us something of the motives of Father Ephrem's intellectual activities:

"What has made me prefer to all others the Augustinian and Franciscan philosophy is its religious and mystical thought. I fully believe that history proves the interior and mystical life of the Church to be more in accord with Augustinian doctrine as accepted and defended by the Franciscan School. I believe, further, that the conversion of Protestant Germany and of other nations is conditioned by a philosophy of faith and religious experience, by a theology and psychology of the supernatural in full accord with the Augustinian School. The reason why I cling to this philosophy is because I believe that the reign of God greatly depends upon Franciscan Augustinianism. I also regret that in our Catholic colleges and universities St. Bonaventure is so little known, for to my mind, no other author is more able to give the seminarian and the priest a supernatural trend. St. Bonaventure admirably blends science and virtue for all. This is why I am a Bonaventurian to the heart.

I am, moreover, a follower of Scotus not only because he follows Augustine, but also because of his great thesis on Christ. Herein he teaches that Christ was decreed before all things and that everything was made for Him, the King of angels and men. This thesis on the Universal Sovereignty of Christ is sublime and its complete acceptance would, no doubt, rid the world of its paganism and liberalism. I am a Scotus again, because he defended the glory of the Blessed Virgin in her Immaculate Conception. Herein lies the secret of my perseverance in Scotism."

The Franciscan Educational Conference sincerely hopes that Doctor Ephrem Longpré, O.F.M., will be allotted many years of health and opportunity to complete the arduous tasks for which he is so eminently fitted.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF DUNS SCOTUS AND ITS MODERNITY

FR. EPHREM LONGPRÉ, O.F.M., Ph.D.

The modernity of the psychology of Blessed Duns Scotus and its power of adaptation to contemporary psychology have been frequently noticed by medievalists. In the eighteenth century, a celebrated disciple of the Marian Doctor,¹ Charles of St. Florian, O.F.M. (c. 1782), drew up on the demand of Pascal de Varesio, Minister General of the Order of Friars Minor, a complete course of Scotistic Philosophy, in which he harmonized the thought of Duns Scotus, and particularly his psychological theories, with the philosophical movement of his time. This learned Witness to the Modernity of Scotus and very moderate work, in which the author does not conceal the difficulties he had to overcome in order to reach his end,² is even today of the greatest usefulness. In the nineteenth century, Frederick Morin, the esteemed Cartesian historian of medieval thought, wrote in his turn:³ "It is very remarkable that in the work of Hugo Cavelle, *Disputationes de anima* (a treatise which serves as commentary to the *De Anima* of Duns Scotus),⁴ we find a complete essay on psychology,

¹*Joannis Duns Scoti philosophia nunc primum recentiorum placitis accomodata*, 7 vol. (Milan, 1771). Cf. A. Bertoni, O.F.M., *Le B. Jean Duns Scot, sa vie, sa doctrine, ses disciples*, Levanto, 1917, p. 563.

²*L.c.*, *Logica*, Praefatio, Milan, 1771, I, pp. VII-VIII: "Perdifficile, fateor, sane opus ac plenum periculi! Cujus equidem rei difficultatum atque periculum eo magis in dies expertus sum, quo in hac describenda Philosophia magis progrederer. Etenim cum non nisi longe paucas ex iis quaestionibus, quae modo in medium revocantur, Scotus expressim instituatur, oportuit universa illius volumina attente ac iterato percurrere, et quae sparsim occurbant, quae ad rem. Neotericam facere poterant, diligenter adnotare: cumque pluribi aut ex aliorum sententia loquatur aut anceps momenta, hinc inde opposita proferat quin certi aliquid ipse decernat, difficile quandoque ac laboriosum valde fuit veram ejus mentem attingere. Quam ob rem inique prorsus a me exposceretur ut in omnibus evidenter ostenderem Scotum cum recentioribus Philosophis expresse convenire. In pluribus quidem id certo constabit; ast in reliquis nonnisi probabili quadam ratione ex illius principiis ducta idipsum conficiam et in quibusdam praeterea mihi haec venia danda est ut commonstrare sufficiat ipsum non longe abuisse a Neotericorum opinionibus aut eas saltem non reprobasse."

³*Dictionnaire de philosophie et de théologie scholastiques* (éd. Migne, Paris, 1856), col. 800.

⁴Duns Scot, *Opera omnia* (Edition Vivés, Paris, 1891), III, pp. 643-777. The authenticity of *De anima* is very doubtful; according to recent researches, the author is not Duns Scotus, but his disciple, Antoine André, O.F.M.

and especially on idology. In the chapter on 'Evidence,'⁵ there are some ideas which recall while forestalling them, those of Descartes, notably concerning dreams, sleep, and the certitude of the senses. One would say, in reading this author, as well as many others, that Descartes took from his predecessors, a host of particular theories, without modifying them otherwise than by giving them a different place in the vast organization of philosophy." Frequently F. Morin expresses similar views, especially when he expounds Scotistic philosophy on the plurality of forms,⁶ and when he commemorates the important place given to the *Ego* by the Franciscan Doctors previous to Descartes and modern psychologists.⁷ About the same period, T. H. Martin (1884),⁸ treating of the plurality of forms, observes that "on this capital point, the theory of the Subtle Doctor is perfectly acceptable in itself, and can be better reconciled with modern progress of science" than that of the Angelic Doctor. Among contemporary medievalists, Fr. Prosper de Martigne, O.M.C.,⁹ R. Sieberg,¹⁰ Fr. Parth. Minges, O.F.M.,¹¹ and more recently Mr. E. Bau-

⁵*Annotationes*, disp. 3, sect. 6, in Duns Scotus, *Opera omnia*, III, pp. 731-734.

⁶*Dictionnaire de philosophie et de théologie scholastique*, éd. II, col. 1303.

⁷*L.c.*, col. 1306: "The Franciscan School taught that the soul is known at the same time as the body, and some of its disciples went further and laid down, before Descartes, this important maxim that the first Ens known and that whose knowledge gives all other knowledge, is the soul, a fundamental truth, which in the seventeenth century served to organize all the minute renovations accomplished or attempted in the sciences since the fifteenth century. The famous saying of Descartes: *cogito, ergo sum*, is only its sovereign expression and it is also the renovation of the sciences condensed in a sort of philosophical decree which has only three words, but which contains a world of consequences! Now, the *cogito, ergo sum*, has already been murmured by the Franciscan School or at least by those who are attached to its principles. Duns Scotus glimpsed it, Occam guessed it, Nicholas of Cusa put it down as a fact."

⁸*Les Sciences et la Philosophie*, Essai 4: L'âme et la vie du corps, p. 220. Text cited by E. Pluzanski, *Essai sur la philosophie de Duns Scot* (Paris, 1887), Chap. 5, pp. 400-403.

⁹*La scholastique et la traditions franciscans* (Paris, 1888), Chap. 4, sect. 5, pp. 238-248 and Chap. 5, pp. 400-403.

¹⁰*Die Theologie des Joh. Duns Skotus* (Leipzig, 1900), pp. 108-109.

¹¹Art.: "Duns Scotus," in *The Catholic Encyclopedia* (New York, 1909), V, p. 198b: "His writings indeed contain many entirely modern ideas, e.g., the stress he lays on freedom in scientific and also in religious matters, upon the separateness of the objective world and of thought, the self-activity of the thinking subject, the dignity and value of personality." *L.c.* p. 197a: "With regard to memory, sensation and association, we find in Duns Scotus many modern views."

din,¹² professor at the University of Strassburg, and Fr. Bernard Jansen, S.J., in his comprehensive article *Auf dem Wege zur Wahrheit*,¹³ have also briefly recalled the striking modernity of several aspects of Scotistic psychology. What is still more remarkable, some writers, most distinguished yet by no means in sympathy with Scholastic thought or the Franciscan School, e.g., H. Siebeck,¹⁴ Heinz, Heimsoeth,¹⁵ M. Heidegger,¹⁶ do not hesitate to affirm that Scotistic thought is at the very beginning of modern psychology.

It is generally admitted that the psychology of Duns Scotus can, on more than one point, facilitate a reconciliation between Scholasticism and modern thought. But the problem has never been thoroughly sifted, probably because of the notable difficulty in comparing such different sciences as the medieval psychology and the mod-

¹²Art.: *La raison et la foi dans la philosophie du moyen âge* in *Revue des sciences religieuses* (Strasbourg, 1923), III, pp. 328-338. The author sometimes relies upon the *De rerum principiis* which is not by Duns Scotus, but by Vital de Four, O.F.M.

¹³In *Stimmen der Zeit* (Freiburg i B. 1926), Bd. III, pp. 251-265: "Neben dem Aufblühen des Thomismus in unsern Tagen hat die Erforschung und die Befruchtung durch die Franziskanerschule die grösste Bedeutung. . . . Mit ihrem Wirklichkeitsinn, ihrer Kritischen Einstellung, ihrer Betonung des Aktivismus, ihrer Hervorhebung der Selbstbestimmung des freien Willens sind die Franziskanerdenker berufen, gewissen Einseitigkeiten anderer Schulen zu steuern, an das Gesunde in den neuzeitlichen Richtungen anzuknüpfen und so die Kluft zwischen Scholastik und Nichtscholastik überbrücken zu helfen." *L.c.* p. 258: "Longpré arbeitet scharf die Stellung des Objektes im Prozess des Erkennens heraus und zeigt in durchschlagender Weise, wie antikanianisch Scotus denkt, wie tief er in der realistischen Abbildungstheorie der Scholastik verankert ist. Nicht einmal die Beipflichtung zur erkannten Wahrheit steht wie bei Descartes in der Gewalt des Verstandes. Unfehlbare, vom Willen unabhängige Gewissheit eignet dem Erkenntnisvermögen erstens in Bezug auf die Erfahrungstatsachen, zweitens in Bezug auf die eigenen Bewusstseinsstatsachen. Man meint, den Begründer des neuzeitlichen Rationalismus, den Erfinder der analytischen Geometrie, den Kritischen, mathematisierenden Verfasser des *Discours de la methode*, Descartes, zu hören. Mit Recht hebt Longpré wiederholt die Aktualität scotistischer Gedankengänge für die heutigen Erkenntnisfragen hervor."

¹⁴Cf. B. Geyer-Ueberweg, *Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie. Die patristische und scholastische Philosophie* (Berlin, 1928), p. 509.

¹⁵*Die sechs grossen Themen der abendländischen Metaphysik und der Ausgang des Mittelalters*, Darmstadt, 1922, p. 150: "In der Seelenauffassung des Duns Scotus liegt, wie schon Siebeck betont hat . . . der erste Beginn zur Psychologie der Renaissance und der ganzen Neuzeit."

¹⁶*Die Kategorien und Bedeutungslehre des Duns Scotus* (Tübingen, 1916), p. 101: "Hl Siebeck findet gerade bei Duns Scotus 'die Anfänge der neueren Psychologie.' . . . Er entdeckte erst wieder die psychische Objektwelt der inneren Erfahrung für die selbstständige Untersuchung."

ern;¹⁷ it is almost impossible at the present stage of Scotistic studies to treat the subject in a complete and definitive manner. Nevertheless, in the pages which follow, it is our hope to show at least the magnitude of the subject, to furnish materials to medievalists,¹⁸ otherwise difficult of access, and to open the way to deeper investigation in the future.

The psychology of Duns Scotus resembles modern psychology, especially in the careful attention it gives to psychological experience. Following St. Augustine,¹⁹ the Franciscan Doctors of the thirteenth century, and particularly the precursors of the Marian Doctor, St. Bonaventure, Peter Olivi,²⁰ Cardinal Matthew of Aquasparta and Vital de Four, had special regard for the notions of psychological experience. The attention to the real and concrete

which characterizes the Franciscan School, as Fr. Franciscan Val. M. Breton, O.F.M., has justly observed,²¹ Schoolmen and and the traditions and method of Robert Grosseteste and the Oxford School, by which they were Psychological teste and the Oxford School, by which they were Experience largely inspired, was their natural inheritance.

Much as he applied himself to the analysis of supernatural facts when he wrote the ecstatic life of St. Francis of Assisi and treated of the most elevated experimental ideas of contemplation,²² St. Bonaventure is far from despising the part and

¹⁷Cf. P. Jac. van der Veldt, O.F.M., in the *Antonianum* (Rome, 1930), V. pp. 122-3.

¹⁸Hence it will be necessary to quote lengthy texts in the course of this paper.

¹⁹Cf. B. Jansen, S.J., *Geist und Form der Philosophie des hl. Augustinus in Miscellanea Augustiniana* (Rotterdam, 1930), pp. 282-284; M. Grabmann, *Die Philosophie und Theologische Erkenntnislehre des Kard. Matthaeus von Aquasparta* (Wien, 1906), p. 174.

²⁰Cf., *Quaest. in II librum Sententiarum* (ed. B. Jansen, Quaracchi, 1926), III, p. 599.

²¹*La pensée franciscaine in the France Franciscaine* (Paris), VII, pp. 5-37.

²²B. Rosenmöller, *Religiöse Erkenntnislehre nach Bonaventura Beiträge zur Gesch. der Phil. des Mittelalters*, Bd. XXV, Hft. p. 314 (Münster i. W., 1925), pp. 192-198; Th. Carreras y Artau, *Els caràcters de la filosofia francescana é l'esperit de S. Francesc*, in *Franciscalia* (Barcelona-Sarria, 1928), p. 67: "L'empirisme de R. Bacon mancària de significació privat del seu coronament místic; i per altra banda el Doctor Serafic pot ostentar el títol d'experiment ador amb el mateix dret que l'autor de l'*Opus Majus* pes bé que la seva experiència s'hagi exercitat preferentment en els darrers graons del seu itinerari. Situada aquestes altures, també el Doctor Serafic com R. Bacon, troba insuficient l'argumentació per a assolir el coneixement de Deu aquest coneixement, con hern vist abans, sols pot aconseguir amb l'experiència o tast divi."

value of experience either external²³ or internal.²⁴ To the two ways which lead to God, and to the external reasons, the one, immediately and by mode of intuition,²⁵ *per viam simplicis intelligentiae, sive puro intuitu*, the other by means of discourse and of reasoning,²⁶ *per viam rationis*, the Seraphic Doctor adds a third, specifically Franciscan, the experimental way,²⁷ *per viam experientiae*. With remarkable penetration, St. Bonaventure describes also the experimental knowledge which the soul possesses about itself, and assigns to internal experience its contents and criteriological value.²⁸ On this subject his doctrine is firm and decidedly opposed to the psychology of Aristotle, as Fr. Boniface Luyckx, O.P., has pointed out in his monumental work on the Bonaventurian theory of cognition.²⁹ It is evident that Scotus remembered the delicate intuitions of the Seraphic Doctor. In the same spirit, Peter Olivi borrowed from

²³III *Sent.*, d. 14, a. 3, q. 2, concl. et ad 3 (Quaracchi, 1887), III, p. 322; *Sermones selecti*, serm. 4, n. 18, V. p. 572.

²⁴I. *Sent.*, d. 17, p. I, a. I, q. 4, I. p. 304b; III *Sent.*, d. 23, dub. 4, III, p. 504; Cf. S. Kampmann, *Philosophia angelico-seraphica* (Quaracchi, 1896), Psychol., c. 2, II, 478-479.

²⁵*Collationes in Hexaemeron*, ed. F. Delorme, O.F.M. (Quaracchi, 1931), Visio I, coll. 2, n. 31, p. 89.

²⁶*L.c.*, n. 28, p. 88.

²⁷*L.c.*, n. 30, p. 89: "Convertitur anima ad rationes aeternas per viam experientiae. Experitur quidem anima quod esse posterius est ab esse priori. Habitus enim cognoscuntur per privationes et sic non cognoscitur experimentaliter perfectum nisi per imperfectum nec rectum cognoscitur nisi per obliquum. Et haec etiam est via Augustini et omnium se convertentium."

²⁸III *Sent.*, d. 23, dub. 4, III, p. 504: "Cognitio qua anima cognoscit illud quod habet in se, est cognitio cujusdam experientiae; per hoc enim cognoscit aliquis se habere fidem, dum ad se ipsum introrsus ingrediens experitur utrum sit promptus ad credendum; sic de aliis habitutibus virtutum et aliis omnibus, quae latent introrsus. Quoniam igitur anima non potest habere experientiam, nisi de eo quod est in potestate sua et de eo quod respicit actum animae, cum experientia dicat usum alicujus potentiae, hinc est quod quando aliqua sic sunt in anima quod reddunt ejus potentiam habilem ad aliquod opus, vel circumstant alicui operi interiori, talia possunt cognosci ab ipsa anima certitudinaliter . . . Quando vero aliquo sic sunt in anima quod ipsa principaliter non respiciunt usum alicujus potentiae, sicut character vel sicut deformitas culpae praeteritae, vel quae sunt supra potestatem ipsius animae, sicut gratia in quantum reddit acceptum Deo, et caritas similiter; quia de talibus non potest habere anima experientiam, non potest habere certam notitiam. Ideo cum dicitur quod illa quae sunt essentialiter in anima, certitudinaliter cognoscuntur, hoc intelligitur de illis de quibus potest sumere experimentum, nisi per conjecturam non cognoscit nisi conjecturando." It is not without interest to note what St. Bonaventure thinks about the relation of the physical and of the moral, II *Sent.*, d. 14, p. 2, a. 2, q. 3, II *Sent.*, d. 33, a. 2, q. 1, II, p. 788.

²⁹*Die Erkenntnislehre Bonaventuras Beiträge zur Gesch. des Phil. Mittelalters*, Bd. XXIII, Aft. 314 (Münster i. W., 1923), pp. 175-179.

internal experience a subtle and weighty proof of human liberty,³⁰ as Fr. Bernard Jansen, S.J.,³¹ has observed on this point on several occasions. He is certainly unrivaled among the thirteenth-century Scholastics.³² Faithfully following this direction, Vital de Four, O.F.M. — the author of *De rerum principio*, edited under the name of Scotus — placed the foundation of certitude in the testimony of

³⁰*Quaest. in II librum Sent.*, quaest. 57, ed. Jansen, II, pp. 316–338.

³¹*L.c.* Prolog. II, p. XI: "Paris ponderis systematici et historici sunt argumenta quibus in q. 57 libertas voluntatis probatur. Tanta abundantia et varietate conspectuum eminent quantam vix apud scholasticos medii aevi, raro apud scholasticos decimi sexti et decimi septimi saeculi vel apud neoscholasticos aetatis nostrae invenies. Rationes enim, non solum ex considerationibus aprioristicis et metaphysicis, quibus scholastici abundant, hauriuntur, sed etiam, idque copiose et sagacissime ex observationibus introspectivis seu empiriopsychologicis ad mentem S. Augustini et modernorum philosophorum, quales raro idque jejune et abstracte solum apud scholasticos conspiciuntur. Haec autem omnia stilo tam vivido describuntur, ut quis sibi facile persuadeat auctorem has elucubraciones non ex libris hausisse sed proprius observationibus et analysi innixum psychologica personaliter elaborasse." B. Jansen, *Geist und Form der Phil. hl. Augustinus l.c.* p. 301: "Inbezug auf den Nachweis der Willensfreiheit lässt Olivi mit seiner modernen scharfsinnigen Analyse des Innenlebens weit hinter sich, was sich bei Thomas und den Thomisten findet."

³²B. Jansen, S.J., *Ein neuzeitlicher Anwalt der menschlichen Freiheit, aus dem XIII Jahrh.: Petrus Joh. Olivi*, in *Philosophisches Jahrbuch* (Fulda, 1918), Bd. 31, pp. 230–238, 382–408. Father Jansen, *Wege der Weltweisheit* (Freiburg i. B. 1924), pp. 139–140, has written a page on the modernity of the psychology of P. Olivi which we cite here, in spite of its length, for it embodies the thought of Duns Scotus as well as the synthesis of the provençal master: "Ausgeprägt ist auch sein Sinn und vor allem seine Schätzung der Erfahrung als Ausgangspunkt der Metaphysik. Wie aufmerksam weiss er den Schwingungen des eigenen und fremden Seelenlebens zu folgen, wie feinfühlig ist er für die zartesten Empfindungen und einfachsten Gedankenelemente, wie reich ist das daraus gewonnene Beobachtungsmaterial, wie eindringend die begrifflich verarbeitende Analyse! Modern sind auch mehrfache Beobachtungen über Assoziation und Nachbilder: aus ihnen erklärt er die Wahrnehmung eines leuchtenden Ringes beim Schwingen eines brennenden Holzschaites, das Weitersehen eines länger fixierten äusseren Gegenstandes nach Schliessung der Augen. In der gleichen Richtung liegen seine Erklärungen über die Verbindung (colligantia) der verschiedenen Seelenkräfte und das verwandte Klingen und Schwingen der einem und andern. Seine Andeutungen über Lokalisation im Gehirn erinnern mehr an Flechsig als an Gall: die vorderen Parteien sind vorzugsweise auf die Beobachtung äusserer Gegenstände eingestellt, die hinteren fördern die Versenkung in die den Sinnen abgewandte Innenwelt, während die mittleren der Verbindung beider dienen. Häufig verwendet er auch Tatsachen der Tierpsychologie für die Erschliessung menschlicher Vorgänge. Die Betonung der Gedächtnisbilder, die bei der Erinnerung das wahrgenommene Objekt vertreten, geht auf Augustinus zurück. Folgte er auch in der Annahme, das Herz sei das eigentliche Organ der Empfindung, der veralteten aristotelischen Ansicht, so anerkennt er doch nachdrücklich den bedeutungsvollen Zusammenhang der Nerven und des Gehirns mit den Sinnesvorgängen."

the conscience and in the apperception of the Ego.³³ With Roger Bacon, most of these doctrines find their definitive formula.³⁴ Unique, indeed, in the history of medieval thought is the fact that the *Opus Majus*³⁵ devotes a lengthy chapter to experimental cognition and excellently shows its prerogatives. Thus throughout an entire century the Franciscan School was famed for teaching the intuitions of St. Augustine and Robert Grosseteste, and in this way it prepared the way for Duns Scotus.

Like the other Scholastics³⁶ primarily a metaphysician, the Marian Doctor does not interest himself in the same degree as Roger Bacon in physical experience. Generally he even borrows his observations on this subject from Avicenna or Aristotle, as did most of the masters of the thirteenth century, as Father Fröbes, S.J., justly remarks.³⁷ One must, however, observe that Duns Scotus perceived very clearly the value of scientific induction. "The Scholastics," writes M. de Wulf,³⁸ "did not study experimental methods with the same care that the moderns give to them, but one finds in some, notably in John Duns Scotus, careful analyses of inductive methods,

³³*De rerum principio*, q. 15, n. 3, 7, 20, 25, found in Duns Scotus, *Opera omnia*, IV, pp. 548, 550, 558, 561. Cf., E. Baudin, art. cit., pp. 334-335; P. Zach van de Woestyne, O.F.M., *Cursus Philosophicus* (Malines, 1921), I, p. 239, nota 3; B. Geyser, *Zur Einführung in das Problem der Evidenz in der Scholastik in Festgabe zum Cl. Baeumker zum 70 Geburtstag Beiträge zur Gesch. der Phil. des Mittelalters*, Suppl. Bd. II (Münster i. W., 1923), pp. 161, 178-180. G. Sanseverino, *Philosophia Christiana*, *Dynamilogia*, c. 7, art. 23 (Naples, 1862), II, pp. 891-897, 900-909, was completely mistaken concerning these texts of the *De rerum principio* by seeing in the interior sense which they mention, a distinct faculty of the intelligence, whereas it is nothing else than an act, a perception of the mind; consequently, his criticisms are groundless. On this subject Mr. E. Gilson justly observes in the *Revue d'histoire franciscaine* (Paris, 1924), I, p. 114: "We find in the 15th question a magnificent exposition of the doctrine which recognizes in the soul the direct intuition of itself. . . . The text in question resumes with certain developments which could already be found in Peckham, Matthew of Aquasparta and St. Bonaventure, the pure doctrine of St. Augustine."

³⁴A. Little, "Roger Bacon," in *Proceedings of the British Academy* (London, 1928), XIV, pp. 30-33: "The claim of Bacon to modernity rests mainly on his advocacy of experimental science." Cf. Th. Carreras i Artau, art. cit., pp. 49-79; R. Carton, *L'expérience physique chez Roger Bacon* (Paris, 1924), *L'Expérience mystique de l'illumination intérieure chez Roger Bacon*, Paris, 1924.

³⁵*Opus Majus*, pars sexta, ed. John H. Bridges (Oxford-London, 1900), II, pp. 167-222.

³⁶Cf. C. Baeumker, *Geist und Form der mittelalterlichen Philosophie in Studien und Charakteristiken zur Geschichte der Philosophie, Beiträge zur Gesch. der Phil. Des Mittelalters*, Bd. XXV, Heft 1/2 (Münster i. W., 1928), p. 90.

³⁷In *Scholastik* (Freiburg i. B., 1931), VI, p. 101.

³⁸*Histoire de la philosophie médiévale* (Louvain, 1924), I, pp. 291-292.

or of ways which permit to pass from the observation of certain cases to the law which rules all cases." "Formed in the school of Aristotle," writes Fr. Raymond, O.M.C.,³⁹ "Duns Scotus knew on what solid basis ought to rest the fixity of operations to which experience manifests the harmonious and constant return. The objective concepts of nature, of causality, and of finality furnished him with a solid foundation, on which he erected with security the edifice of science." In this way⁴⁰ the Franciscan Doctor has really contributed to the philosophy of sciences, and in consequence, indirectly at least, to experimental psychology.

What renders his thought still more modern, is his philosophy of internal experience, and the attention which he pays to the data of conscience, as H. Siebeck⁴¹ has remarked. According to Scotus, psychological intuition is an immediate perception, the act of an interior sense by which the soul apprehends itself without any intermediate agent, as well as its operations and its states of conscience: *Quodam sensu, id est perceptione interiori experimur*.⁴² In this apperception the soul apprehends itself concretely. As an experienced intuition, as conscience, or light of our conscious acts, it renews itself in proportion as our thoughts and our acts of will succeed each other; it reveals the existence of the Ego, its ontological tendencies, and its immanent operations, but nothing beyond their presence and the assurance that they belong to the subject which experiences them. As Scotus has forcefully noted, anticipating thus the error of the modernists, the supernatural

³⁹*La théorie de l'induction. Duns Scot précurseur de Bacon*, in the *Etudes Franciscaines* (Paris, 1909), XXI, pp. 113-126, 270-279.

⁴⁰*Ox.* I, d. 3, q. 4, n. 9. IX, pp. 176-177; *Quaest. in Metaph.*, I, q. 5, & q. 4, VII, pp. 51-70. Cf. E. Longpré, O.F.M., *La Philosophie du B. Duns Scot* (Paris, 1924), p. 65.

⁴¹Cf., B. Geyser-Ueberweg, *l.c.* 508: "Von besonderer Bedeutung sei aber neben diesen Tatsachen (=der wieder verstärkte Einfluss Augustins) eine andere weniger beachtete, das gesteigerte Interesse nämlich für Gegenstände und die Methode des empirischen Psychologie;" B. Mastrius de Meldula, O.F.M.Conv., *Cursus Philosophicus. De anima* (Venice, 1688), Disp. 6, q. 6, art. 2, n. 199, III, p. 178.

⁴²*Ox.* 4, d. 43, q. 2, n. II, XX; Cf. Mastrius de Meldula, *l.c.* n. 199-201, III, p. 178; *R.P.* 4, d. 45, q. 3, n. 10, XXIV p. 574a: "Intellectus potest percipere actum meum intuitive vel abstractive intelligendo."

escapes the grasp of psychological experience.⁴³ Likewise, intuition does not give us the knowledge of the nature or even of the essence of the soul. The Marian Doctor teaches this explicitly⁴⁴ in opposition to the phenomenological school of Husserl. Incapable of cognizing its essence, *sub proprio et quidditativo conceptu*, in its present state, the soul only reaches its specific nature by the help of general concepts previously drawn from sensitive experience,⁴⁵ or at the very least, an impulse from outside is required to set in motion the mind's initial activity, analyzing, not its acts, but its proper essence.⁴⁶ But if this domain is excluded, very little escapes psychological intuition in the kingdom of the soul.⁴⁷ According to Duns Scotus, internal experience is a witness in favor of the existence of human liberty;⁴⁸

⁴³*Ox. Prol.*, 9. I, n. 13, VIII, 23; *Ox.* 3, d. 26, q. 1, n. 25, XV, p. 348; *Quod.* XIV, n. 7, XXV, pp. 11–12. Cf., P. Déodat de Basly, O.F.M., *Capitalia opera B. Joann. Duns Scoti* (Le Havre, 1908), I, pp. XXXVI–XLI.

⁴⁴Cf. B. Mastrius de Meldula, *Cursus Philosophicus*, De anima, d. 6, q. 6, a. I, n. 192–198, III pp. 176–178.

⁴⁵*Ox. Prol.* q. I, n. II, VIII, p. 21: "Non cognoscitur anima a nobis nec natura nostra pro statu isto nisi sub notione aliqua generali abstrabili a sensibilibus." *R. P.* 2, d. 3, q. 3, n. 14, XXII, p. 595: "Intellectus noster in statu isto habet immediate ordinem ad phantasmata et hinc est quod non per essentiam cognoscit anima nostra se." This does not concern the acts of the soul.

⁴⁶*Ox.* 2, d. 3, q. 8, n. 14, XII, pp. 195–196: "Non potest statim intelligere se nullo alio intellectu quia non potest statim moveri a se propter ordinem potentiarum ejus necessarium pro statu isto ad imaginabilia."

⁴⁷*Ox.* 4, d. 49, q. 10, n. 2, XXI, p. 318b: "Appetitus naturalis intellectus non est actus elicited ab eo, ergo sic erit de voluntate. Praeterea non experimur talem actum esse in nobis cum tamen inconveniens sit nobilissimos habitus naturaliter esse in nobis et latere, nos quod etiam verum est de operationibus." Cf. *R. P. Prol.*, q. 2, n. 7, XXII, p. 37a. On modern researches relative to the conscience see, A. Gemelli, O.F.M., *La coscienza secondo le piu recenti ricerche della filosofia sperimentale* in the *Rivista di filosofia neo-scolastica* (Milano, 1922), XIV, pp. 236–288.

⁴⁸*Quaest. in Metaph.* IX, q. 15, n. 5, VII, p. 609: "Quare voluntas illud vult? Nulla est alia causa nisi quia est voluntas. . . . Ad secundum a posteriori probatur: experitur enim qui vult se posse non velle sive nolle, juxta quod de libertate voluntatis alibi diffusius habetur." Cf. B. Mastrius de Meldula, *Cursus Philosophicus*, De anima, di 7, q. I, n. 7, III, p. 212b: "Cum Doctore dicendum est, quodlibet 16, nullam hujus rei assignari posse rationem a priori nisi quia voluntas est voluntas, nam scire esse et modus essendi sunt immediata ita agere et modus agendi; unde IX *Metaph.* q. ult. concludit voluntatis nostrae libertatem non nisi experientia et a posteriori posse efficaciter demonstrari." Even in face of the Supreme Good, the will is not determined: it can at least suspend its act. *Ox.* 4, d. 49, q. 10, n. 10, XXI, p. 333b: "Unumquodque objectum potest voluntas velle et nolle et a quolibet experiri in se ipso cum quis offert sibi aliquod bonum et etiam ostendit bonum ut bonum considerandum et volendum, potest se ab hoc avertere et nullum actum voluntatis circa hoc elicere."

it attests, against Plato, that ideas are not innate,⁴⁹ and assures us, in opposition to the pretensions of the ontologists, that the concept of God is neither simple nor primitive, nor anterior to other concepts.⁵⁰

It is in starting from the intuition of the acts of intellect and of will that we form for ourselves an analogical idea of the Infinite Being.⁵¹ In the same interior light, the natural order of psychological acts reveals itself: the intellect should precede the act of willing, but it is not required that the act of the will itself, as such, be known beforehand in its intimate and specific nature.⁵²

The same light attests also the return of the mind to the sensitive image that the Scholastics call *conversio ad phantasma*,⁵³ not less than the beneficent part of this natural collaboration of the imagination with the intellectual activity.⁵⁴ Likewise it reveals the intimate and profound synergy of the intelligence and of the act of willing in all operations of the psychological life.⁵⁵ Psychological

⁴⁹*Quaest. in Metaph.* I, q. 4, n. 9-10, VII, 56a; *Ox.* 3, d. 24, q. I, n. 12, XV, p. 43.

⁵⁰*R. P. I.*, d. 23, q. I, n. II, XXII, p. 266b: "Non experimur nos habere aliquem conceptum simpliciter simplicem de Deo quo distinguitur a non Deo, quia si habemus aliquem talem conceptum de Deo, totaliter a nobis cognosceretur." Cf. Gregorius Dev, O.F.M., *Ontologismus et Ven. D. Subtilis* (Jerusalem, 1903), pp. 15-22.

⁵¹*Quaest. in Metaph.* II, q. 3, n. 24, VII, p. 114a.

⁵²*Add. Magnae*, I, d. 10, q. 4, n. 2, XXII, p. 185b; *R. P. I.*, d. 10, q. 4, Vienna, ms. lat. 1153, fo. 45r: "Ad argumentum in oppositum, dico quod haec est absolute et simpliciter falsa: 'Quidquid producat per voluntatem est praecognitum: nam non oportet actum voluntatis intrinsecum, antequam ab ea eliciatur vel producat, esse praecognitum vel praecognosci nisi (ut) objectum tantum ut quilibet experitur in se,' etc.

⁵³*Add. Magnae*, I, d. 3, q. 5, n. 9, XXII, p. 109b; *R. P. I.*, d. 3, q. 5, Vienna, ms. lat. 1153, fo. 25r: "Tunc est una difficultas, si species manet in intellectu quando non intelligit et alia ab ista quae est in phantasmate, quare oportet ipsum in omni intellectione convertere ad phantasmata? Non videtur hoc esse necessarium, nam praesente activo et passivo potest sequi actio sufficienter cum ab aliis non deindeat; experimur autem quod oportet convertere ad phantasmata ad hoc ut intelligamus, quia aliter possemus intelligere organo indispósito."

⁵⁴*R. P.*, I, d. 3, q. 5, ms. cit., fo. 25v: "Hoc quilibet experitur in se: nam facta aequali intentione et aequaliter voluntate copulante virtute phantastica fatigata in organo, minus perfecte et intense intelligo; et quanto magis phantasiamur aliquod singulare alicujus universalis, dum nobis virtus phantastica non fatigetur, tanto clarius et perfectius intelligo." Cf. *R. P.* 2, d. 3, q. 5, n. 13, XXIII, pp. 140-141.

⁵⁵*Ox.* 2, d. 42, q. 4, n. 10, XIII, p. 461; *R. P.* 2, d. 42, q. 4, n. 14, XXIII, p. 221: "Si voluntas circa illud idem operatur circa quod intellectus firmatur intellectus in operatione sua. . . . Quod vero ita sit, patet per experimentum. Experimur enim hoc in omni potentia, quod ipsa fortius agit si voluntas complacet, et quando potentiae sunt distractae circa diversa objecta, imperfectius operantur."

Abstraction, experience warns us again of the fact that abstraction is an immanent operation of the mind, and that
an Immanent in this initial stage of cognition, the intellect is
Operation eminently active, and not determined by the object
of the Mind or by its substitute, the sensitive image.⁵⁶ With the same evidence, it assumes that the acquired habit collaborates actively and in a pleasing manner with the activity of the faculty which it perfects.⁵⁷ The distinction to be established between abstractive and intuitive cognition likewise rests largely on the testimony of this vital perception.⁵⁸ It is again the psychological intuition which positively establishes the incapacity of the mind to embrace at the same time a multitude of objects,⁵⁹ the imperfection and the limits of our knowledge,⁶⁰ not less than the succession of intellectual acts.⁶¹ Similarly, when it is a question of fixing the proper object of a faculty, it is from the very nature itself of the immanent act perceived by internal experience, and not precisely from the essence of this faculty, considered abstractly, that the psychologist sets out.⁶² Psychological intuition attests also that the natural appetite, either of the intelligence or of the will, is not an elicited act — since we have no consciousness of it whatever — but only as a passive and ontological inclination of the faculties them-

⁵⁶*Quaest. in Metaph.*, VII, q. 18, VIII, p. 458a; *Ox.* I, d. 3, q. 7, n. 20, IX, p. 361a; *Quod.* XV, n. 2, XXVI, p. 119a.

⁵⁷*Ox.* 2, d. 33, q. 1, n. 5, XV, p. 443; *Ox.* 1, d. 17, q. 3, n. 6, X, p. 59a.

⁵⁸*Quod.* VI, n. 7-8, XXV, pp. 243-4: "Ut melius copiat, distinguitur de duplici actu intellectus, et hoc loquendo de simplici apprehensione. Unus indifferenter potest esse respectu objecti existentis et non existentis et indifferenter etiam respectu objecti non realiter praesentis sicut et realiter praesentis: Istum actum frequenter experimur in nobis, quia universalialia sive quidditates rerum intelligimus aequae, sive habeant ex natura rei esse extra in aliquis supposito sive non. . . . Alius autem actus intelligendi, quem tamen non ita certitudinaliter experimur in nobis est; possibilis tamen est talis, qui scilicet praecis sit objecti praesentis ut praesentis, et existentis ut existentis." Cf. *R.P.* 2, d. 3, q. 3, n. 10, XXII, p. 592b.

⁵⁹*R.P.* 3, d. 14, q. 3, n. 5, XXIII, p. 356: "Experimur quod intellectus noster non se extendit simul actualiter in infinita nec extendere potest, imo valde indistincte intelligit plura simul actu si illa intelliguntur per diversas species."

⁶⁰*Ox.* 2, d. 3, q. 9, n. II, XII, p. 216a; *Ox.* 3, d. 14, q. 2, n. 20, XIV, p. 317.

⁶¹*Ox.* I, d. 3, q. 7, n. 20, IX, p. 361a: "Ad quaestionem respondes et dico quod intellectu actualis est aliquid in nobis, non perpetuum sed habens esse post non esse sicut experimur."

⁶²*Ox. Prolog.* q. 1, n. 13, VIII, p. 23: "Excepto actu quem experimur, concludimus potentiam et naturam, cujus iste actus est, illud respicere pro objecto quod percipimus attingi per actum, ita quod objectum potentiae non concluditur ex cognitione potentiae sed ex cognitione actus quem experimur."

selves.⁶³ Finally, it is to the daily experience of our aspirations toward the infinite,⁶⁴ that we owe the conviction that our destiny is not in created things, but in God alone. Thus, Scotus stresses time and again, and with fine precision, the contents of psychological experience.

The discussions of the great psychological problems led the Marian Doctor to insist more strongly on the criteriological value of internal experience. Intuition is an infallible criterion of the truth:⁶⁵ it is at the basis of all certitude, for it rigorously excludes doubt.⁶⁶ Thus M. Baudin has accurately observed⁶⁷ that it is before all, in the name of absolute veracity and of the primacy of psychological experience, that Duns Scotus⁶⁸ criticizes the ideological theories of Henry of Ghent, more or less tinted by the philosophical doubts of the neo-Platonists of the Academy. The mind, according to the Marian Doctor, has its own certitudes, and does not rise to them without the help of a special illumination. Primarily there is the certitude of first principles: their truth is perceived immediately from the grasping of the terms, by the light of a purely intellectual intuition.⁶⁹ In another order, there is the certitude of the truths of physical experience: the scientific induction, which lays open the nature of beings in the recurrence and the fixity of their effects, that accounts for them in a definite manner.⁷⁰ On a more elevated plane is placed the certitude of facts of consciousness, acts of intelligence, volitions and sentiments. Intuition supports this certitude irrefutably, above all, if it is a question of acts fully perceived.⁷¹ What is

⁶³Ox. 4, d. 49, q. 10, n. 2, XXI, p. 318.

⁶⁴*De primo rerum principio*, c. 4, n. 25 (sexta via), IV, p. 779; *Ox.*, 1, d. 2, q. 2, n. 31, VIII, p. 477; *Ox.* 4, d. 49, q. 12, n. 3, XXI, p. 440; *R.P.* 4, d. 49; q. 11, n. 3, XXIV, p. 676; *Quod.* VI, n. 9, XXV, p. 244.

⁶⁵*Ox.* 4, d. 49, q. 8, n. 5, XXI, p. 306b; *Ox.* Prol. q. 2, n. 12, VIII, p. 95b; *R.P.* 2, d. 3, q. 3, n. 11, XXII, p. 592a. Cf., C. Prezzolini, O.F.M., *Cursus Philosophiae ad mentem Doctoris Subtilis*, Rome, 1905, Psych. art. 7-8, II, pp. 250-257.

⁶⁶*Quod.* XVII, n. 11, XXVI, p. 220b: "Certitudo nata inesse intellectui de actu suo, excludens non tantum deceptionem sed etiam dubitationem," etc.

⁶⁷*La raison et la foi dans la philosophie du moyen âge*, I, c. 330.

⁶⁸*Ox.* 1, d. 3, q. 4, n. 10, IX, pp. 179-180.

⁶⁹*L.c.*, n. 9, 7, IX, p. 173. See on this subject the important dissertation of Hugo Cavelli, O.F.M., *De evidentia et certitudine in In Librum de anima*, disp. 3, sect. 6, in *Duns Scot Opera* III, pp. 731-734.

⁷⁰*L.c.*, n. 9, and 11, IX, pp. 176, 179b.

⁷¹*L.c.*, n. 10, IX, p. 179. Cf. *Quaest in Metaph.* 1, q. 4, n. 12, VIII, p. 58.

more, in the process of the elaboration of ideas, the psychological experience prevails over the external and the physical; for this last, dependent on the conditions of the environment and of the organ, is frequently subject to illusion; psychological intuition, on the contrary, always escapes error. Thus perhaps it is not certain that I see a white wall in the distance, for my organ of sight can be defective; but it is absolutely certain at least, that I see.⁷² Thanks to the primacy of the intuition and to the evidence of the first principles known intuitively in virtue of their very terms, the intelligence can judge critically of all the notions furnished by the senses, and can correct them if needed.⁷³ "It is therefore to the tribunal of the understanding," writes M. Vacant,⁷⁴ "that Duns Scotus appeals from the testimony of the senses. This tendency to raise the value of reason is manifest in him under all circumstances," and especially in his *Questions on Metaphysics*. It indicates, above all, we might add, the primordial value that Scotus gives to psychological intuition.

These views of the Marian Doctor are of the greatest interest; however, they do not represent the limit of his thought. The criticism which Scotus made of the Averroist thesis⁷⁵ on the unity of the intellect furnishes him indeed with the opportunity of formulating some new deductions. "Partisans of metaphysical pluralism," writes M. de Wulf,⁷⁶ "the Averroists recognized that each individual has his body and his sensitive soul; but they admit that the human species has only one solitary intelligent soul separated from the individual." Against this monopsychism, Scholasticism had to establish that man has a

Scotistic

Deductions from the Criticism of Averroës

⁷²*Op. Ox. L.c.*: "De tertiis cognoscibilibus, scilicet de actibus nostris, dico quod est certitudo de multis eorum sicut de principiis per se notis . . . Sicut est certitudo de vigilare, sicut de per se noto, ita etiam de multis aliis actibus qui sunt in potestate nostra, ut de me intelligere, de me audire, et sic de aliis qui sunt actus perfecti. Licet enim non sit certitudo quod videam, album extra positum vel in tali subjecto vel in organo et multis aliis viis, tamen certitudo est quod video," etc. Cf. *Ox.* 4, d. 43, q. 3, n. 10-11, XX, p. 40.

⁷³*Ox.*, 1, d. 3, q. 4, n. 11, IX, pp. 179-180.

⁷⁴*Etudes comparées sur la philosophie de S. Thomas D'Aquin et sur celle de Duns Scot* (Paris-Lyon, 1891), p. 82. Cf., R. Seeberg *Die Theologie des Joh. Duns Scotus* (Leipzig, 1900), p. 99.

⁷⁵*Lib.* 1, q. 4, n. 12-15, VII, pp. 58-60.

⁷⁶*Histoire de la philosophie médiévale*, 5 (Louvain, 1925), II, p. 93.

faculty of knowing irreducible to sensitive cognition; some immaterial cognitive acts which reveal in us the presence of a spiritual principle.⁷⁷ Duns Scotus places himself on the same ground with St. Bonaventure⁷⁸ and other Scholastics in order to confirm better his argument. He argues, first of all, against Jean de Pouilly and Godfrey de Fontaines,⁷⁹ that the proof will only be of conclusive and decisive value if the intellective faculty is not purely passive, but active; in other words, he notes that the Scholastic axiom *Propria operatio est a propria forma*, is convincing only if the intellective operation is really the fruit and the effect of a spontaneous vital activity.⁸⁰ If the intellect is purely passive, as the extreme Aristotelians say it is, nothing prevents its being completely received from the outside, and consequently the psychological monism of Averroës is neither overreached nor refuted. Furthermore, the Marian Doctor observes that the immateriality of the object perceived by a faculty proves the spirituality of this power only if the grasp of the object is accompanied by a conscious intuition. "One must not infer," says Scotus in the *Opus Oxoniense*,⁸¹ "the spirituality of the intellect from the conditions of the object toward which its act tends, excepting probably only by virtue of the reflection that we make on this very act of intellect as we have experienced it. A quantitative and extended element is incapable of reflex apperception and consequently the proof of the immateriality of the intellect can be finally grasped from this intuitive act."

⁷⁷*Ox.* 4, d. 43, q. 11, n. 9, XX, p. 39. Cf. H. de Montefortino, O.F.M. Ven. Jo. Duns Scot., *Summa theologia* (Nova ed. Roma, 1901), Pars 3, q. 76, a. 2, III, pp. 496-498. P. Christ. Krzarric, O.F.M., *La scuola francescana l'averroismo in Rivista di filosofia neoscolastica* (Milan, 1929), XXI, pp. 444-494.

⁷⁸*II Sent.*, d. 18, a. 2, q. 1, II, pp. 444-8. The Holy Doctor discreetly appeals to psychological experience, *l.c.* 447b: "Est etiam contra sensibilem experientiam, quoniam diversi homines diversas habent et contrarias cogitationes et affectiones." Also John Peckham, *Quaestiones tractantes de anima* (ed. H. Spettmann *Beiträge z. Gesch. der Phil. des Mittelalters*, Bd. XIX, hft 5.6, Münster i. W., 1918), Quaest. 4, p. 52: "Amplius experimento patet quod homo utitur intellectu quia percipit homo et intelligit se, fidem suam et justitiam: quae non potest attingere, nisi per aliquid sui nisi per intellectum, cum ista cognoscit omnia visione intellectuali."

⁷⁹*Ox. l.c.*; *R.P.* 4, d. 43, q. 2, n. 7, XXIV, pp. 490b-491.

⁸⁰*Ox. l.c.*, n. 6, XX, p. 38.

⁸¹*Ox. l.c.*, n. 9, XX, p. 40: "Non videtur sic posse probari nisi ex conditionibus objecti quod respicit ille actus, nisi forte ex reflexione, quia experimur nos reflecti super actum talis cognitionis: quantum autem non est super se reflexivum et ideo ab objecto hujus actus fit finaliter probatio antecedentis."

By these very penetrating preliminary declarations Scotus insinuates that, after all, the Averroistic thesis, so profoundly destructive of personality, clashes absolutely with the testimony of conscience and of psychological experience, and consequently, is false. He develops his argumentation in this direction. This point of view is unshakable; for, to deny the intuition of the Ego is to deny oneself. "*Homo formaliter intelligit: haec enim ita est manifesta quod qui negat eam non est homo: quilibet enim experitur in se intelligere.*"⁸² Thus speaks Scotus in his *Reportatio Parisiensis*.⁸³ We

have in ourselves, he adds, in a classic page of the *Opus Oxoniense*,⁸⁴ a certain knowledge of objects under an aspect such as cannot be the act of a sensitive faculty. We prove it thus: we experience indeed that we actually know the universal, thus we have consciousness of grasping the "Ens," or one of the aspects of being, under a more general notion than that contained in a sensitive object, and than the effort of the most perfect sensitive power can attain. We also experience that we know the relations which arise from the nature of things and from other objects which do not fall under the senses. We feel, moreover, by experience that we dis-

⁸²R.P. l.c. n. 8, XXIV, p. 491.

⁸³Duns Scotus adds, l.c.: "*Quilibet enim experitur in se intelligere et experitur in se quando intelligit quamdam operationem quae non est alicujus organi et ratio hujus est quia omne organum est alicujus determinati generis. . . . Sed experimur in nobis aliquam operationem et cognitionem quae est entis secundum rationem communiorem et universaliorem et secundum majorem ambitum ejus quam sit ratio sensibilis,*" etc.

⁸⁴Ox., l.c. n. 10-11, XX, p. 40: "*Experimur in nobis quod cognoscimus actu universale. Experimur enim quod cognoscimus ens vel qualitatem sub ratione aliqua communiore quam sit ratio primi objecti sensibilis, etiam respectu supremae sensitivae. Experimur etiam quod cognoscimus relationes consequentes naturas rerum, etiam non sensibilibus et experimur quod distinguimus omne genus sensibilibus ab aliquo quod non est illius generis. Experimur quod cognoscimus relationes rationis, quae sunt secundae intentiones, scilicet relationem universalis, generis, et speciei et oppositionis et aliarum intentionum logicalium. Experimur denique quod cognoscimus ignotum ex moto per discursum, ita quod non possumus dissentire evidentiae discursus nec cognitionis illatae; quodcumque istorum cognoscere est impossibile alicui sensitivae potentiae attribuere, ergo, etc. Si qui autem proterve neget illos actus inesse homini, non est cum eo ulterius disputandum sed dicendum sibi quod est brutum; sicut nec cum dicente: non video colorem ibi, non est disputandum sed dicendum sibi: tu indiges sensu, quia caecus es. Ita quodam sensu, id est, perceptione interiori, experimur istos actus in nobis; et ideo si quis istos neget, dicendum est eum non esse hominem, quia non habet illam visionem interiorum quam alii experiuntur se habere.*"

tinguish all that is contained in the category of the sensitive from what does not belong to it. In the same way we have the consciousness of knowing many relations of reason, and of elaborating logical concepts such as the universal, the genus, and the species. Besides, we experience that we know the act itself by which we perceive these diverse objects, and that, precisely as far as this act is immanent in us and really belongs to us. This is obtained by an interior reflection on the first act which apprehends the real. We perceive intuitively that we give our assent to complex judgments without the possibility of contradicting them, or without fear of error, as, for example, when it is a question of first principles. Finally, we experience that we go from the known to the unknown, thanks to reasoning, and that this passage is made in such a manner that it is impossible not to adhere to the evidence of the argumentation or to the evidence of the truth which is deduced therefrom.

It is impossible to attribute these diverse perceptions to a sensitive faculty. Consequently, if there is anyone who audaciously denies that these acts belong to man, it is not necessary to argue with him. We can simply tell him that he is not human; as it is useless to argue a long time with anyone who tells you, "I don't see color," but just show him that he is blind. Thus we experience by a sense and an interior perception that these acts are in us and belong to us. Hence, I repeat, if anyone can be found who denies this intuition, it will be necessary to tell him that he is no human being since he lacks this interior vision that all men are conscious of experiencing. Thus Duns Scotus analyzes with masterly skill the contents of psychological experience and stresses its victorious criticism of Averroism on the truth of the existence of conscience. The text of the *Opus Oxoniense* suffices to establish that the Marian Doctor is, after Pierre Olivi, the true philosopher of introspection and of psychological experience, in the Middle Ages.

This verification is of the highest significance. Modern by the constant stress which he lays on the observation of the facts of conscience; still more modern, because, following St. Augustine, Scotus places intellectual intuition at the basis and at the summit of intellectual life—which, in assuring the natural veracity of the spirit,

Scotistic Theory of
Intellectual Intuition
Versus the Kantian
and the Modern

makes possible the solution of the critical problem of knowledge, and brusquely shakes the idealistic apriorism of Kant⁸⁵ in the opinion of the greatest number of Neo-Scholastic philosophers. As Frs. Picard,⁸⁶ and Descoqs⁸⁷ have proved, Scotus permits a more direct and straightforward approach to the divers and very entangled philosophies of intuition enthroned by Descartes,⁸⁸ Pascal, Maine de Biran, Ravaisson,⁸⁹ and still more recently by H. Bergson,⁹⁰ Edouard Le Roy,⁹¹ and E. Husserl.⁹² This last master of the present day⁹³ "assigns as a primordial task to philosophy, the establishment of what he calls, to use again the vocabulary of Hegel, the phenomenology of the mind, that is to say, a scientific analysis of intellectual acts and essential ideas by means of which the mind conceives the world." This analysis should be made by intuition and description.⁹⁴ "For these descriptions the phenomenologist uses rational intuition as a very precise and objective instrument, in the same way as the experimentalist uses his eyes, with this difference, which is all to the advantage of the phenomenologist, that the observer, judging from the reality, can let himself be deceived by appearances while the phenomenologist never goes in his judgments

⁸⁵Cf. G. Dumesnil, *Le spiritualisme* (Paris, 1911).

⁸⁶*Le problème critique fondamental* (Paris, 1923), in *Archives de philosophie*, vol. I, cah. 2, pp. 52-4, 69-75.

⁸⁷*Institutiones metaphysicae generalis* (Paris, 1925), I, pp. 60-70.

⁸⁸Cf. E. Gilson, *Le cogito et la tradition augustinienne* in *Etudes sur le rôle de la pensée médiévale dans la formation du système cartésien*, Paris, 1930; F. Morin, *Dictionnaire de philosophie et de théologie scholastique*, Paris, 1856, I, col. 1506, and II, col. 1532; H. Heimsoeth, l.c. 155.

⁸⁹G. Picard, l.c. 52-54. Cf. J. Chevalier, *La science et le réel*, in *Où chercher le réel* (Paris, 1927), in the *Cahiers de la Nouvelle Journée*, Vol. IX, pp. 37-38.

⁹⁰Cf. J. Chevalier, *Bergson*, 4 (Paris, 1926), pp. 295-297.

⁹¹*La pensée intuitive. I. Au delà du discours* (Paris, 1929). On this book M. D. Roland-Gosselin, O.P., in *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* (Paris, 1931), XX, pp. 128-131. On the same theme and with the same tendency, J. Vialatoux, *Le discours et l'intuition* (Paris, 1930).

⁹²*Ideen zur reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie* (Halle a.d.S., 1928). On this work see M. D. Roland-Gosselin, in *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* (Paris, 1931), XX, pp. 116-118; cf. P. Mauritius Demuth, O.F.M., *Husserl*, in *Dritte Lektorenkonferenz des deutschen Franziskaner für Philosophie und Theologie* (Münster i. W., 1926), pp. 66-79; E. Levinas, *La théorie de l'intuition dans la phénoménologie de Husserl* (Paris, 1930).

⁹³Cf., M. D. Roland-Gosselin, in *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* (1920), IX, p. 196.

⁹⁴Cf., M. D. Roland-Gosselin, *loc. cit.* (1929), XIX, p. 303.

beyond the essence which he observes, and can never be deceived." Let us appreciate with sympathy and equity the profoundly intuitionistic tendencies of contemporary psychology since the seventeenth century! Then thus appears immediately and easily to what degree the thought of Scotus is modern and largely open to progressive adaptations.⁹⁵

The Scotistic philosophy of knowledge, direct and intuitive of the singular or of the individual, confers also very actual character on the psychology of the Marian Doctor, and brings it sensibly closer to the great trends of modern psychology. One must insist on this capital thesis, in which Kant on the one side and Scotus and the Franciscan School on the other, are opposed in a duel in which the whole critical problem of cognition is involved.

Thus it seems more and more apparent that Catholic philosophy is not satisfied with the exclusive abstractions of Aristotle and the Neo-Scholastics who are inspired by him.⁹⁶ In Italy, not only Fr. Emilio Chiochetti, O.F.M., the powerful antagonist of Benedetto Croce and of Signor Gentile,⁹⁷ but also Mgr. Sturzo,⁹⁸ Bishop of Piazza Armerina, desire to reinstate intuition in philosophical speculation. In France the brilliant professor of Grenoble, Mr. Jacques

⁹⁵That there are advantages in utilizing Husserl's *Logic and Phenomenology*, if complemented with the Augustinian and Cartesian experience of thought, is Mr. J. Geyser's opinion in his work, *Allgemeine Philosophie des Seins und der Natur* (Münster, i. W., 1915). On this point, see M. D. Roland-Gosselin, *loc. cit.* (1920); XX, p. 196; P. Ehrard Schlund, O.F.M., *Das Wertvolle und Bleibende in der Philosophie der Gegenwart*, in *Zweite Lektorenkonferenz der deutschen Franziskaner* (Münster i.W., 1924), pp. 37-38, and J. Geyser, *Eidologie oder Philosophie als Formerkenntnis. Ein Philosophisches Program* (Freiburg i.B. 1921). Recently E. Stein has compared St. Thomas of Aquin with Husserl, cf., *Husserl's Phaenomenologie und die Philosophie des hl. Thomas Aquin in Festschrift E. Husserl zum 70 Geburtstag gewidmet* (Halle a.d. Saale 1929). On this paper see E. Przywara, S.J., in *Stimmen der Zeit* (Freiburg i.B., 1930), Bd. pp. 120, 147, and especially S. Vanni-Rovighi in *Rivista di filosofia neo-scolastica* (Milano, 1930), XXII, pp. 491-494. On his side, Mr. Hans Lipps, *Untersuchungen zur Phaenomenologie der Erkenntnis*, 2 vols. (Bonn, 1927-1928), often refers to Duns Scotus, according to M. D. Roland-Gosselin, l.c. (1931), XX, pp. 118-119, but I have not these books at hand. For studying Scotus on this aspect and especially his logic, one may refer to Mr. Heidegger's essay, *Die Kategorien und Bedeutungslehre des Duns Skotus* (Tübingen, 1915), the value of which Msgr. M. Grabmann has estimated in *Die Entwicklung der Mittelalterlichen Sprachlogik* (Fulda, 1922), p. 32.

⁹⁶Cf., D. Mercier, *Psychologie* (Louvain-Paris, 1923), III, No. 171, pp. 37-39.

⁹⁷*La filosofia di Benedetto Croce* (Milano, 1924), 2, 39; *La filosofia di Giovanni Gentile* (Milano, 1925).

⁹⁸*Il pensiero dell'avvenire* (Trani, 1930). Cf. A. Levasti in *Il raguaglio dell'attività culturale e letteraria dei cattolici in Italia* (Firenze, 1931), pp. 59-64.

The Purely
Abstractive System
of Aristotle
Unsatisfactory to
Neo-Scholastics

Chevalier,⁹⁹ is applying himself at the present time to constitute a complete science of the real and of the individual. The studies of Frs. Picard,¹⁰⁰ Blaise Romeyer,¹⁰¹ and Descoqs, S.J.,¹⁰² tend to the same end. For a number of years, Mr. Maurice Blondel,¹⁰³ and after him, Signor Carmelo Ottaviano,¹⁰⁴ have

⁹⁹ *La science du réel*, in the *Cahiers de la nouvelle journée*, Vol. IX (Paris, 1927), 7-45: "On admet comme une chose allant de soi," he writes, "que l'entendement de l'homme est purement discursif, mais ce sont les Kantiens qui l'affirment. Pour eux le réel est suivant la définition de Kant, ce qui s'accorde en un contexte avec une perception suivant les lois qui règlent la marche de l'expérience: la cause non-sensible de nos représentations nous est entièrement inconnue et nous ne saurions la percevoir comme objet, parce qu'il faudrait pour cela une intuition intellectuelle dont l'entendement humain, astreint aux conditions de l'espace et du temps, est absolument incapable. Voilà ce qu'affirme Kant: mais voilà ce que nient tous les platoniciens, les augustinien, Descartes et Pascal, Ravaisson et Bergson, Newman et Maurice Blondel. Ils savent très bien, assurément, que nous ne possédons pas cette intuition pure et "originaire," ainsi que la dénomme Kant, cette intuition créatrice qui ne convient qu'à l'Être suprême, Dieu: mais ils ne concluent pas de là, comme le fait Kant, que toute intuition intellectuelle nous soit interdite. Ils reconnaissent au contraire au-dessus de la connaissance discursive, notionnelle et symbolique la connaissance intuitive, concrète et réelle, et que, pour n'être pas en nous parfaite, cette pensée n'en existe pas moins, qu'elle est le fond même de l'esprit, le lien solide qui rattache la pensée discursive à la réalité," etc. On Chevalier's efforts, read A. Etcheverry, S.I., in *Archives de Philosophie*, Vol. 5, Chap. 3 (Paris, 1928), pp. 29-38.

¹⁰⁰ *Le problème critique fondamental*, in *Archives de Philosophie*, Vol. 1, Chap. 2, (Paris, 1923).

¹⁰¹ B. Romeyer, S.I., *S. Thomas et notre connaissance de l'esprit humain*, in *Archives de Philosophie*, Vol. 6, Chap. 2 (Paris, 1928), and *Bulletin de Philosophie* in *Archives de Philosophie*, Vol. 2, Chap. 2 (Paris, 1924), pp. 14-22 and Vol. 5, Chap. 3 (Paris, 1928), pp. 13-14. Against the Reverend Fr. Maréchal, S.I., the Rd. Fr. Blaise Romeyer, l.c. 13-14, writes: "Ce qui nous paraît réellement manquer dans cette montée intellectuelle à partir des objets matériels jusqu'à Dieu, c'est la solidité du point de départ. Car d'après le P. Maréchal, même dans son mouvement de retour vers l'image et l'objet matériel, l'intelligence ne perçoit rien de cette image concrète ni de cet objet matériel, ce n'est point sa connaissance mais celle de la seule sensibilité qui atteint véritablement celle-là et celui-ci. Et donc la liaison intellectuelle reste impossible entre la forme abstraite et l'objet matériel d'où elle est abstraite. Toute attribution de prédicats abstraits à n'importe quel objet matériel et concret devient par là même entièrement inintelligible."

¹⁰² *Bulletin de métaphysique*, in *Archives de Philosophie*, Vol. 2, Chap. 2 (Paris, 1924), pp. 200-203 and Vol. 6, Chap. 4 (Paris, 1929), pp. 220-235.

¹⁰³ Cf., P. Archambault, *L'œuvre philosophique de M. Blondel* (Paris, 1928), in *Cahiers de la Nouvelle Journée*, Vol. 12; A. Etcheverry, S.I., in *Archives de Philosophie*, Vol. 6, Chap. 4 (Paris, 1929), pp. 33-42. On the positions of the "Ecole d'Aix," cf. H. Hurtin, *Vers Une science du réel* (Paris, 1930). This essay is mentioned by A. Etcheverry, l.c. Vol. 6, Chap. 2, Supplém. bibli. 2 (Paris, 1931), pp. 38-39.

¹⁰⁴ *Metafisica del Concreto* (Roma, 1929).

observed, in their effort to organize a realist integral philosophy, that beside the discursive and notional understanding there is a place for a concrete and intuitive cognition in mental life. Perhaps again the astonishing theory of the abstractive intuition of essence, recently circulated by Mr. Domet de Vorges and Mr. Maritain, but which has not resisted the criticisms of Fr. Picard,¹⁰⁵ and Fr. Descocs,¹⁰⁶ is an indication of the same tendency. All this indicates clearly that inside the Neo-Scholastic movement of the present time, more than one current seeks an outlet for the problems of cognition outside of the purely abstractive system of Aristotle, and finds no longer in this system, according to the witty saying of Frederick Morin: "*une borne éternelle* — an eternal limit." On the other hand, modern thought almost unanimously subscribes to psychological intuitionism, and follows the doctrinal movement which, since Nicholas of Cusa and Suarez,¹⁰⁷ carries away the mind toward the concrete. "Cartesianism," writes Jacques Chevalier,¹⁰⁸ "has placed itself in decided opposition to Aristotelianism, and nevertheless has not succeeded in ridding it of philosophical thought nor even, strictly speaking, scientific thought." Boutroux was certainly not wrong when he affirmed that, for Descartes, all science is knowledge of the individual; and it is on account of this that he is the initiator of modern philosophy; such is, indeed, the profound sense of the *cogito*: and Descartes himself has not failed to point out in his reply to the "instances" of Gassendi: "The error which is the most considerable is that this author supposes that the cognition of particular propositions should always be deducted from the universal, following the order of the syllogisms of dialectics: in this he shows that he knows very little of the fashion in which truth should be sought; for it is certain that in order to find it, one must always begin by particular notions to come later to the general." "There," says he again, "is the characteristic of our mind." "One must resign

¹⁰⁵ *Le problème critique fondamental*, pp. 27-30.

¹⁰⁶ *Essai critique sur l'hylémorphisme* (Paris, 1924), pp. 203-206.

¹⁰⁷ R. Jolivet, *La notion de substance. Essai historique et critique sur le développement des doctrines d'Aristote à nos jours* (Paris, 1929), pp. 110-111. On the thought of Suarez, G. Picard, *L'intelligible infraspécifique d'après S. Thomas et Suarez*, in *Archives de Philosophie*, Vol. 1, Chap. I (Paris, 1923), pp. 63-80.

¹⁰⁸ *Où chercher le réel*, l.c. 14.

oneself to the actual movement," writes Fr. Pedro Descoqs,¹⁰⁹ following Mr. G. Bruni¹¹⁰ and Fr. Bernard Jansen.¹¹¹ "It is decidedly for a more concrete philosophy that our contemporaries have shown their preference and one must take account of it."

Since this is the case, the modernity and the actuality of the psychology of Scotus, and of the Franciscan School in general, impose themselves upon every independent mind, as Fr. Descoqs¹¹² has discreetly observed.¹¹³ In the wake of St. Bonaventure,¹¹⁴ of Roger,¹¹⁵ of Cardinal Matthew of Aquasparta,¹¹⁶ and of Peter Olivi,¹¹⁷ the Marian Doctor has elaborated a most remarkable philosophy of intuitive and concrete cognition.¹¹⁸ According to St. Thomas Aquinas,¹¹⁹ "by a reflection on the phantasms, we form, for ourselves,

¹⁰⁹In *Archives de Philosophie*, Vol. 6, Chap. 4 (Paris, 1929), pp. 220-235.

¹¹⁰G. Bruni, *Riflessioni sulla scolastica* (Roma, 1927). Engl. translation by S. Zybura, *Progressive Scholasticism* (St. Louis, 1929).

¹¹¹*Augustinus und Kant*, in *Philosophisches Jahrbuch* (Fulda, 1930), XLIII, pp. 37-38.

¹¹²Cf. P. Descoqs, art. cit., 227. On the two main tendencies of modern philosophy, on the first, on the concrete, see Mgr. Olgiate, *Astrazione e concretezza in Rivista di filosofia neo-scolastica* (Milano, 1919), XI, pp. 101-109, on the other, on immanence and subjectivism, see E. Chiochetti, O.F.M., *Il criterio distintivo nella storia della filosofia*, *ibid.* (1927), XVIII, p. 397, see the conciliating reflexions of G. Bontadini, *Valutazione analitica e valutazione dialettica della filosofia moderna*, *ibid.* (1929), XXI, pp. 504-520.

¹¹³L.C. 228: "En accaillant ces manières depenser et philosopher toutes modernes et toutes concrètes, que fera-t-on d'autre, après tout, que de revenir à l'antiquité et de retrouver ce courant augustinien, volontariste et psychologue que le point de vue strictement métaphysique et ontologique de S. Thomas a trop rejeté dans l'ombre?"

¹¹⁴*II Sent.*, d. 3, p. 1, a. 2, q. 2, ad 5, II, 107: "Etsi sensus solum modo sit singularium, intellectus tamen potest esse non solum universalium sed etiam singularium." Cf. E. Gilson in *Revue d'histoire franciscaine* (Paris, 1924), I, p. 375. On Alex. of Halès, *Summa theol.*, Proleg., sect. 5, n. 63, Quaracchi (1926), L-LI.

¹¹⁵H. Hoffmans, *Une intuitioniste de la connaissance du XIIIe siècle*, in *Revue néo-scholastique* (Louvain, 1906), XIII, pp. 371-391.

¹¹⁶Cf. M. Grabmann, *Die Philosophische und Theologische Erkenntnislehre des Kard. Math. von Aquasparta* (Wien, 1906), *Theol. Studien der Les-Gesellschaft*, XIV, pp. 85-91; M. d'Aquasparta, *Quaestiones de fide et cognitione*, Quaracchi (1903), pp. 298-316.

¹¹⁷Cf. *Quaest.*, in *II Librum Sent.*, ed. Jansen., Quaracchi (1924), II, p. 617.

¹¹⁸M. de Wulf, *Hist. de la philosophie médiévale* (Louvain, 1924), II, p. 82. Excellent sketch in D. Sharp, *Franciscan Philosophy at Oxford* (Oxford, 1930), pp. 323-329.

¹¹⁹Cf. O. Lacombe, in *Revue Thomiste*, S. Maximin (1930), Nouvelle Série, XIII, p. 229; H. D. Simonin, O.P., *La connaissance humaine des singuliers matériels d'après les maîtres franciscains de la fin du XIIIe siècle in Mélanges Mandonnet* (Paris, 1930), II, pp. 289-290; M. D. Roland-Gosselin, *Peut-on parler d'intuition intellectuelle dans la philosophie thomiste?* in *Philosophia perennis. Festgabe Jos. Geyser zur 60 Geburtstag* (Regensburg, 1930), II, pp. 711-730: "Il va

from the singular, an indirect representation which suffices us." As interpreting Franciscan traditions, Duns Scotus adopts an opposite sentiment. In order to make possible the solution of the problem, he teaches primarily that the singular or the individual is perfectly intelligible in itself and directly,¹²⁰ for it is Ens and substance of the first order: *individua sunt maxime substantiae*.¹²¹ The idea may appear of mediocre interest to our own time, but it was not so in the thirteenth century when masters, as profoundly Augustinian as Henry of Ghent, upheld that God Himself could not know the singular Ens, except by the intermediary of the genus and of the species, matter being of itself an impenetrable nucleus without intelligible value.¹²²

Duns Scotus reacted against this current with extreme decision. Since it is impossible to quote here all his dicta on this point, let it suffice to reproduce the following text of the *Reportatio Parisiensis*.¹²³ "I say, then," he writes, "that every singular, to whatever genus it belongs, is of itself intelligible, although it may not be equally so to every intellect. Consequently, since the understanding is the faculty of the entire Ens, and since in the singular there is nothing which is not positively Ens, all that is in the singular Ens is intelligible by its very nature. Moreover, the individual in itself is endowed with unity; it is then intelligible by itself and directly." As an object of thought, the individual Ens is also the only reality which exists in fact. In order to reach its concrete and actual existence, and to give us an ideal representation, according to Duns Sco-

de soi également écrit ce dernier, l.c. 723, que le thomiste ne peut attribuer à l'intelligence une intuition du singulier matériel; l'intelligence n'atteint le singulier matériel, dit toujours S. Thomas, que d'une manière indirecte et par une sorte de réflexion sur l'idée puis sur l'image."

¹²⁰*R.P.* 2, d. 11, q. 2, n. 13, XXII, p. 675: Dico quod singulare quantum ad esse addit ad rem ultra speciem et sic quantum ad cognosci. The metaphysical basis of the scotistic thesis is the following: the individual adds to the essence or quiddity a positive determination; it is not included in the universal, *Ox.* 2, d. 3, q. 11, n. 9, XII, p. 276, *R.P.* 1, d. 36, q. 4, n. 17, XXIII, p. 454a: *R.P.* 2, d. 11, q. 2, n. 13, XXII, pp. 676-7 and n. 11, XXII, p. 674a. Thus adding a new degree of being to the specific nature, it appears that the individual becomes the object of thought, *proprie et primo intelligibile*. *R.P.* 2, d. 11, q. 2, n. 14, XXII, p. 677.

¹²¹Add. Magnae, I, d. 36, q. 4, n. 14, XXII, p. 452.

¹²²Add. Magnae, I, d. 36, q. 4, n. 6-25, XXII, pp. 448-457.

¹²³*R.P.* 3, d. 14, q. 3, n. 7, XXII, p. 357.

tus, two ways present themselves: the abstractive and the intuitive cognition.¹²⁴ The former is based on abstraction;¹²⁵ it does not reach its object in its existential reality, but in its ideal quiddity; this is the foundation of science in the Aristotelian sense of the word, thanks to the abstract concepts which it elaborates.¹²⁶ Intuitive cognition, on the contrary, is a direct view of the object: it touches immediately the thing itself in its concrete existence,¹²⁷ as well as the real and objective aspects of the Ens, which the Scholastics call *intentiones primae entis*.¹²⁸ In abstractive cognition, the intelligible species itself moves the intellect; in the intuitive cognition, on the contrary, it is the object, *res praesens in se*.¹²⁹

It is in this double fashion that the mind directly grasps the individual. In contradiction to Aristotle,¹³⁰ who excludes intuitive cognition from his system, Scotus establishes its existence by a very decided argument.¹³¹ He writes: "Conscience attests it positively.¹³² Moreover, intuitive cognition is in itself a more perfect manner of

¹²⁴*Ox.* 2, d. 3, q. 9, n. 6, XII, p. 212; *Ox.* 3, d. 14, q. 3, n. 4, XIV, p. 524; *R.P.* 2, d. 3, q. 3, n. 10, XXII, p. 592; *Quod.* VI, n. 7, XXV, pp. 243-4; *Quod.* XIII, n. 8-15, XXV, pp. 521-541; cf. B. Mastrius de Meldula, *Cursus Philosophicus*, De anima, disp. 6, q. 11, n. 328-345, III, pp. 204-208; H. Klug, O.M.C., *L'activité intellectuelle de l'âme selon le B. Duns Scot*, in *Etudes Franciscaines* (Paris, 1929), XLI, pp. 244-256.

¹²⁵*R.P.* 2, d. 3, q. 3, n. 10, XXII, p. 592.

¹²⁶*Quod.* VI, n. 7, XXV, p. 243b.

¹²⁷*R.P.* 2, d. 3, q. 3, n. 10, XXII, p. 592b: Alia est cognitio intuitiva seu visio quae est res in se; *Ox.* 4, d. 10, q. 8, n. 5, XVII, p. 285b: Videre importat intellectionem intuitivam. Cf. *Quaest. in Metaph.*, VII, q. 14, n. 4, VII, p. 436; II, q. 3, n. 19, VII, p. 110a; *R.P.* 4, d. 45, q. 3, n. 13, XXIV, p. 575b.

¹²⁸*Ox.* 1, d. 8, q. 4, n. 15, IX, p. 654.

¹²⁹*Ox.* 4, d. 49, q. 12, n. 6, XXI, p. 442: Actus abstractivus et intuitivus differunt specie quia aliud et aliud est ibi movens; hic enim movet species similis rei, ibi autem movet res praesens in se; *R.P.* 4, d. 49, q. 12, n. 9, XXIV, p. 680. B. Mastrius de Meldula departs on this point from the general teaching of the Scotist School, *Cursus Phil.*, De anima, d. 6, q. 7, art. 1, n. 203-4, III, p. 179.

¹³⁰*Quaest. in Metaph.*, VII, q. 15, n. 9, VII, p. 440: "Existencia per accidens semper concomitatur intellectionem quidditativam de qua loquitur Aristoteles ut plurimum quia de visione intellectuali nihil videtur locutus." Cf. *Ox.* 4, d. 49, q. ex lat., n. 20, XXI, p. 163.

¹³¹Naturally according to Scotus the angel is endowed with the intuitive knowledge, *R.P.* 2, d. 11, q. 2, n. 13, XXII, p. 676; *Ox.* 2, d. 9, q. 2, n. 34, XII, p. 507b; *Ox.* 4, d. 10, q. 8, n. 12, XVII, p. 293, same for the separate soul, *Ox.* 4, d. 49, q. 2, n. 12-13, XX, p. 305; *R.P.* 4, d. 49, q. 2, n. 18, XXIV, p. 565. Christ had the same knowledge during His earthly existence, *Ox.* 3, d. 14, q. 3, n. 4, 6-8, XIV, pp. 524, 527-8; He still holds it in His Eucharistic State, *Ox.* 4, d. 10, q. 5, n. 5, XVII, p. 259. Cf. B. Mastrius de Meldula, l.c. n. 205-208, III, pp. 179-180.

¹³²*Quod.* VI, n. 7, XXV, p. 243.

knowing than abstractive cognition: in intuition, the object is given as present in itself and not by the intermediary of a species which represents it imperfectly; under this heading, it is fitting to endow reason with the privilege of intuition, and this, so much the more because sense, which is an inferior cognitive faculty, enjoys it and reaches concretely its object.¹³³ Without intuition, the intellect would never have the impression of life, of the existing and of the concrete, for the abstract species represents precisely the quiddity of the object outside of all its actual conditions, and teaches us nothing about its existence."¹³⁴ "In effect," Scotus continues, "abstractive cognition represents equally, in an ideal manner, a thing that exists or that does not exist, an object present or not; accordingly, it is impossible to obtain by this means, cognition of a thing as far as it is existing and present to the subject which perceives it. It is necessary, then, that the intellect be endowed with intuition, otherwise it would not have any certitude of the existence of any object whatsoever: *alioquin intellectus non esset certus de aliqua existentia alicujus objecti*."¹³⁵

Furthermore, all the judgments of existence that we form and that express truths purely contingent *de facto*, are conditioned by the direct and intuitive view of terms united or separated by the intellect in the judgment. The abstract or universal concept, since it does not reflect the actual existence of objects, is incapable of signifying to the mind, that the terms — subject and predicate — are united or separated objectively. "It is not," adds Scotus,¹³⁶ "in the nature itself of these terms that the understanding finds the reason or the relation which establishes *de facto* these truths, for then these propositions would not be contingent, but necessary, as all that is taken from the nature of things." The attribution of the predicate to a singular subject supposes, then, the intellectual intuition of the concrete and of the existential. "Moreover," adds the Marian Doctor,¹³⁷ "without intuition, the intellective memory is lessened, for it would only conserve the intelligible species of universal concepts and

¹³³*Ox.* 2, d. 3, q. 9, n. 6, XII, p. 212b; *Quod.* VI, n. 8, XXV, p. 244a.

¹³⁴*Ox.* 4, d. 45, q. 2, n. 12, XX, p. 305.

¹³⁵*Ox.* l.c. XX, p. 305b.

¹³⁶*R.P.* 2, d. 11, q. 2, n. 11, XXII, p. 675a; *Ox.* 3, d. 14, q. 2, n. 6, XIV, p. 527; *Ox.* 4, d. 45, q. 3, n. 7, XX, p. 349a; *R.P.* 3, d. 14, q. 3, n. 12, XXIII, p. 359.

¹³⁷*Ox.* 3, d. 14, q. 3, n. 7, XIV, p. 528a.

not the representation of singular objects perceived in their concrete reality."

Finally, Scotus, always leaning on the fact that neither the sensitive image nor the universal idea that one extracts from it represent the existential reality, observes that the beatitude of heaven supposes quite another thing than a purely abstractive cognition. The

act of the Beatific Vision cannot consist in
The Beatific Vision a knowledge of this nature, but rather in
Not a Purely the vision face to face with the Infinite, in
Abstractive Cognition an intuition which terminates in the Being
 of God. The Franciscan Doctor stresses

this reason in his *Oxford Course*,¹³⁸ and in the *Reportatio Parisiensis*.¹³⁹ It appears, then, that according to the needs of theology and of philosophical reasoning, there exists a veritable intuitive cognition of the individual and of the concrete. There is even more, according to Scotus.¹⁴⁰ In spite of the impotence of reason to form for itself a distinct concept of the singularity and of the formal reason of the individuality in the actual state,¹⁴¹ a distinct cognition of singular essences is nevertheless possible, at least in a confused and imperfect manner. Without doubt Duns Scotus admits in a certain measure, with St. Thomas Aquinas, that the singular is indirectly reached by a reflection of the intellect on the singular species, and by the intermediary of the universal,¹⁴² but this mode of cognition

¹³⁸*Ox.* 2, d. 3, q. 9, n. 6, XII, p. 213a.

¹³⁹*R.P.* 2, d. 11, q. 2, n. 14, XXII, pp. 676-677.

¹⁴⁰"Non cognoscitur singulare solum per universale nec e contra, quia singulare ut sub propria ratione est proprie et primo intelligibile et in tali objecto primo et principaliter beatificatur creatura rationalis, puta in essentia divina ut haec singularis essentia, non sub ratione universalis et ideo utrumque potest proprie cognosci," *R.P.* 2, d. 11, q. 2, n. 14, XXII, pp. 676-677.

¹⁴¹*Quaest. in Metaph.*, VII, q. 15, n. 5, VII, p. 437; *R.P.* 3, d. 14, q. 3, n. 8, XXIII, p. 357; cf. H. Klug, *l.c.* XLI, pp. 256-260; B. Mastrius of Meldula, *Cursus Philosophicus*, De anima, d. 6, q. 7, a. 1, n. 208-216, III, pp. 180-182; The scotist thesis is thus enunciated: "Quoad cognitionem abstractivam dicendum est singulare materiale et sensibile, non solum absolute loquendo esse per se et directe intelligibile sed etiam a nobis pro statu isto proprio ac directo conceptu attingi ac proinde per propriam speciem, licet non ita propriam ut illud repraesentet sub propria ratione singularitatis"; *ibid.*, n. 214, p. 181. Duns Scotus' teaching is well explained in De anima, q. 22, n. 4-6 (ascribed to Scotus by tradition, but the author, according to my opinion, is Antoine André), in D. Scotus' *Opera* III, pp. 629-631, and on which Cavell has happily commented, *Annotationes in h.l.*, n. 11-24, *ibid.*, III, pp. 633-638.

¹⁴²*Quaest. in Metaph.*, VII, q. 15, n. 8, VII, p. 439. Cf., B. Mastrius of Meldula, *l.c.* d. 6, q. 7, a. 1, n. 220, III, p. 183: "Re vera quamvis ibi concedat Doctor dici posse singulare cognosci per reflexionem, longe tamen aliter id explicat ac faciat

is not perfect; above all, it is neither primitive¹⁴³ nor exclusive.¹⁴⁴ At the presentation of the sensible image which reflects the singular object and its concrete conditions, the intellect, before every reflex operation, seizes the object directly as an undetermined nature, and perceives in it the individual characters and the varied aspects which affect it, as numerical unity, existence apart, incommunicability.¹⁴⁵ In this manner, at least, the intellect conceives and distinguishes singular essences.¹⁴⁶

Thus speaks Scotus in the *Questions on Metaphysics*. The courses of Oxford and of Paris are more explicit.¹⁴⁷ In these courses the Franciscan Doctor teaches that cognition of singular essences cannot be doubted, since experience attests that the act of willing and desire are borne as much toward a singular object as toward a general good,¹⁴⁸ and that even this mode of knowing can create in the mind a special habit different from any other.¹⁴⁹ It

S. Thomas ut bene Ragusinus adnotavit loc. cit. cap. nono: nam D. Thomas vult absolute prius naturam percipi per speciem intelligibilem, deinde vero singulare per conversionem ad phantasma, a quibus species abstracta fuit, ut videre est, quaest. disp. De veritate, q. 2, art. 10, Scotus vero vult primo percipi singulare vagum, mox naturam ipsam a singularitate praecisam, demum retrogreditur reflectendo considerationem naturae ad circumstantias signatas et ipsam per ipsas determinando, individuum tandem signatum intelligit, quia est hic et nunc et in tali figura et magnitudine et ideo saltem singulare vagum directe concipitur apud Scotum quod S. Thomas negare videtur."

¹⁴³*De primo princ.*, c. 4, n. 17, IV, p. 773; *R.P.* 2, d. 3, q. 3, n. 15; ad aliud., XXII, pp. 595b-596.

¹⁴⁴Read on the subject, the masterly essay of B. Mastrius of Meldula, *Cursus Phil.*, *De anima*, d. 6, a. 2, q. 8, n. 236-270, III, pp. 186-193.

¹⁴⁵*Quaest. in Metaph.*, VII, q. 15, n. 8, VII, p. 439b: *Aliter exponitur etc.*; Cf. *Quaest. in Metaph.*, VII, q. 13, n. 24, VII, pp. 424b-425; *R.P.* 2, d. 12, q. 8, n. 10, XXIII, p. 40; *Ox.* 3, d. 14, q. 1, n. 4, XIV, p. 524, specially, *Ox.* 2, d. 9, q. 2, n. 13, XII, p. 444.

¹⁴⁶Cf. D. Sharp, l.c. 329: "The intellect in itself, then, has the power to know singulars. . . . Yet in its present life being hindered by the body, it can only vaguely apprehend them by grasping certain general first *intentiones* of the *haecceitas* such as numerical unity, independent existence and incommunicability." B. Mastrius de Meldula, l.c.n. 214, III, pp. 181-182. (Very important text.)

¹⁴⁷*Ox.* 4, d. 10, q. 8, n. 5, XVII, p. 285b: "De intelligere, loquendo de intellectione abstractiva, manifestum est quod noster intellectus potest intelligere corpus Christi; impossibile est enim aliquam complexionem concipere cujus extrema non concipitur: possibile est autem intellectum nostrum concipere hanc complexionem: Corpus Christi est in Eucharistia; alioquin non posset illam formare; ergo intellectus noster et istam complexionem et ejus extrema potest cognoscere et intelligere aliqua intellectione"; *R.P.* 4, d. 10, q. 9, n. 4, XXIV, a. 4.

¹⁴⁸*Ox.* 2, d. 42, q. 2, n. 7, XIII, p. 456b; *R.P.* 2, d. 42, q. 4, n. 10, XXIII, p. 219.

¹⁴⁹*Ox.* 2, d. 9, q. 2, n. 37, XII, p. 518b.

would have been interesting to see Scotus develop these outlines. The task, however, has been reserved for his school.

From this rapid sketch there follows a most interesting conclusion. The important affirmations of Scotus relative to intuitive cognition and to the direct science of the individual do not only establish in a most solid manner the realism of cognition, as de Wulf observes;¹⁵⁰ they also permit a fruitful reconciliation between the great currents of contemporary thought and Scholastic psychology. For this second reason the psychology of Scotus is at the present time more open to progress, and more actual, than the other great systems of the thirteenth century.

As it has been long proved, Scotus,¹⁵¹ following all the Franciscan masters, St. Bonaventure, Roger Bacon, William de la Mare, and Richard de Médiavilla,¹⁵² teaches the thesis of the plurality of forms in the composition of the human being.¹⁵³ According to this view, much more commonly accepted in the thirteenth century,

¹⁵⁰*Hist. de la phil. médiévale* (Louvain, 1925), II, p. 82: "Au point de vue, épistémologique la théorie que l'intelligence a une intuition de l'existant renforce le dogmatisme de la scolastique: elle explique le contact de l'intelligence avec le singulier autrement que le thomisme; elle montre toute la confiance que D. Scot a dans la raison."

¹⁵¹C. Frassen, *Philosophia academica Scoti*, De anima, d. 3, q. 4, ed. Eboræ, Rome, 1726, III, pp. 175-181; B. Mastrius de Meldula, *Cursus Phil.*, In libros de generatione, d. 5, q. 3, n. 78, art. 1, III, pp. 376-379, and In Physic. d. 2, q. 4, art. 1 and 2; n.n.58-82 (Venise, 1688), III, pp. 54-59; H. de Montefortino, *Ven. Jo. Duns Scoti Summa theologia* (nova ed. Rome, 1901), III, p. q. 76, art. 4, III, pp. 504-510; H. Cavelle, *In librum de anima*, disp. 1, sect. 4, in Duns Scotus, *Opera*, III, pp. 649-658; C. R. Harris, *Duns Scotus* (Oxford, 1927), I, pp. 155-168; D. Sharp, *l.c.* 311-314; P. Zach. van de Woestyne, O.F.M., *Cursus Philosophicus* (Malines, 1925), Psychol., 11, pp. 606-613 (excellent sketch). One must observe here that Duns Scotus against S. Bonaventure acknowledges pluralism of forms only in living beings; on the contrary in the other bodies the virtual permanence of form is sufficient to explain the chemical combinations. B. Mastrius de Meldula, *l.c.* n. 58, II, p. 54; P. Zach. van de Woestyne, O.F.M., *l.c.* Cosmologia, II, p. 150, note 1, H. de Montefortino, *l.c.* 3, p.q. 7, art. 5, III, pp. 510-515.

¹⁵²Cf. Prosp. de Martigné. *La Scolastique et les traditions franciscaines* (Paris, 1888), Chap. 4, sect. 3 and 4, pp. 198-237; Alex. Halès, *Summa Theol.*, Prolegomena, sect. 2, n. 50, Quaracchi (1928), II, XLV; H. Spettmann, *Die Psychologie des Joh. Pecham, Beiträge zur Geschichte der Phil. des Mittelalters*, Bd. XX, Hft. 6 (Münster i. W., 1919), pp. 23-29.

¹⁵³*Ox.* 4, d. 11, q. 3, n. 54-7, XVII, pp. 436-438: *R.P.* 4, d. 11, q. 3, n. 21-23, XXIII, p. 125.

as Mastrius de Meldula,^{153b} Fr. Paul Bottala, S.J.,¹⁵⁴ and Fr. Franz Ehrle (now Cardinal), have solidly established the soul, substantial form of the composition, does not give to the body the *esse corporeum*. This organic perfection comes from an informing principle of an inferior order, complete in itself, but subordinated to the intellective soul, called most often, by the Scotists *forma corporeitatis*, and by the disciples of St. Bonaventure *forma mixtionis*.

Does this opinion agree better with the tendencies of modern psychology and the data of experimental science than does the Aristotelian thesis of the unicity of form? Since strict science does not generally purpose to treat of "forms" in the metaphysical sense of the old Scholastics in order to find in them the final explanation of composed beings, but rather limits itself to describing the psychological phenomena and the contributions of conscience,^{154b} it is evident, by reason of this attitude of modern psychologists, that the terms of comparison between Scotus and our contemporaries, fail almost absolutely, and consequently, the question does not come under this viewpoint. But it is altogether different if one considers

^{153b}Cf. J. Fröbes, S.J., *Psychol. speculativa (Friburgi-Brisgoviae, 1927)*, De anima, l. 3, c. 3, II, pp. 322-3: "Praeter scholam Scotistarum plurimi alii: omni tempore sententia pluralitatis formarum communior fuit: ita expresse card. Ehrle. Ipse card. Zigliara, O. P. Psychol. 1876, concedit sententiam Scoti nedum scotistae sed fere omnes recentiores sequuntur."

¹⁵⁴*L.c.* In libros de gen. d. 5, q. 3, n. 78, III, p. 377: "Immerito hanc quaestionem de pluralitate formarum in composito aspernatur hic Auctor (Arriaga), in quo tot vires graves calamum adhibuerunt et integros de hac re tractatus lucubrarunt. Immerito etiam ait sententiam Scoti in scholis non invaluisse. Nonne viget in schola scotistarum? nonne in schola averroistarum, cum omnes medici, Philosophi saeculares omnes eam incunctanter tueantur, quoque eam Nominales tueantur? Anno istae non sunt scholae? Ex quatuor igitur scholis in dominio philosophico existentibus, Averroistarum, Thomistarum, Scotistarum et Nominalium tres fere nostram sectantur et petit Arriaga in quibus scholis invaluit. Tot denique habet asseclas ut Bannez ipse dicat," I De generatione, q. 8: "Quot quot theologi et physici et metaphysici sunt, contra D. Thomam conjurasse videntur," et inquit Arriaga nullam habere defensionem. "The Bonaventurian School acknowledges the pluralism, cf. Barth de Barberiis, O.M.C., *Cursus Phil. ad memtorem S. Bonaventurae* (Lyon, 1677), In Physic., I, tract. 4, De forma, q. 3, II, 145-153. Cf. P. Mingès, O.F.M., *Suarez und Duns Skotus*, in *Philosophisches Jahrbuch*, Fulda, 1919, XXXII, p. 339.

^{154b}Mr. Driesch has proposed a remarkable though not complete interpretation of the "Entelechy" or form, in his work, *La philosophie de l'organisme*, trad. of Mr. Kollmann (Paris, 1921). On the studies of this distinguished neovitalist, see A. Gemelli, O.F.M., *L'enigma della vita ed i nuovi orizzonti della biologia* (Firenze, 1910), 150-151, and Jelke in *Theologisches Literaturblatt* (Leipzig, 1921), XLII, p. 296. On the last edition of Mr. Driesch's book, *Die Philosophie des Organismus*, Leipzig, 1928, see Jelke, *ibid.*, 1929, L. pp. 217-218.

the pluralism of forms in its references to physics and especially to biology.¹⁵⁵ As is evident, the opinions are divided.^{155b} The disciples of St. Thomas, such as Cornoldi Liberatore, Sanseverino,¹⁵⁶ Cardinal Mercier, Mr. Beysens,¹⁵⁷ deny all scientific significance to the Franciscan thesis. In like manner, among the Franciscan writers, Fr.

¹⁵⁵*La lettre de Mgr. Czacki et le thomisme* (Paris-Poitiers, 1878), pp. 42-43: "Dans le cours du XVII^e siècle la doctrine contraire sur ce point au thomisme rigide devint la plus commune dans les écoles catholiques. Voici le témoignage d'un homme qui était sur le point en question, un thomiste mitigé. Le P. de Rhodes, S.J. a imprimé son ouvrage en 1671; or, en parlant de la doctrine contraire au thomisme, il dit: "Sic cum Scoto docet Aresius, Lessius, Coninck et nunc recentiores communius." Au XVIII^e siècle, la théorie scotiste fut reçue communément partout. Le P. Mayr, S.J., qui n'était pas contraire à la doctrine scolastique, dans son ouvrage qui parut en 1739, parle ainsi de la théorie contraire au péripatétisme: "Haec sententia, dit-il, apud recentiores est omnino communis ita ut extra scholam thomisticam multo pauciores oppositum doceant." "D'autre part, on ne peut pas ignorer que la théorie thomiste, depuis le commencement de notre siècle, a été éliminée presque partout de l'enseignement de la philosophie moderne." Le P. Zigliara, le plus modéré des thomistes nos jours, nous dit que non seulement Scot et les Scotistes mais "presque tous les philosophes modernes défendent le septième contraire au thomisme." "L'exagération la plus outrée de quelques néo-péripatéticiens ne saurait contester le fait si explicitement avoué par le loyal P. Zigliara."

^{155b}One may observe that in this matter, Scotus and his School, without rejecting the data of modern biology; cf. C. Frassen, *Philosophia academica Scoti*, ed. Eboræ (Rome, 1726). De anima, d. 3, q. 1, concl. 4, III, pp. 160-162, do not accept the aristotelian theory of successive animations, still held by Card. D. Mercier, *Psychologie* (11^e edit., Louvain, 1923), n. 278 II, pp. 337-341. They rather favor the thesis of the intellectual soul being created and infused in the body, if not at the moment of conception, at least very soon after. C. Prezzolini, O.F.M., *Cursus phil. ad mentem Doctoris Subtilis* (Rome, 1905), *Psychologia*, art. 2, II, pp. 39-41; S. Kampmann, O.F.M., *Philosophia angelico-Seraphica*, Quaracchi (1896), *Psychol. c.l.*, q. 4, quaestiu c. 3, art. 2, II, pp. 394-398; A. Breitung, S.J., *De conceptione Christi Domini*, in *Gregorianum* (Rome, 1924), V, pp. 391-423, 531-568, chiefly pp. 536-538, 554; R. Seeberg *Die Theologie des Joh. Duns Scotus* (Leipzig, 1900), p. 84. The scotistic opinion is very near the modern scientific theory, S. Kampmann, *l.c.* 396; J. Fröbes, S.J., *l.c.*, De anima, l. 3, c. 2, II, p. 278. — Duns Scotus, following William of Ware, strongly insists on the active coöperation of the female element in human conception, against the aristotelian thesis which considers the same element as purely passive, *Ox.* 3, d. 4, q. 1, n. 3, XIV, p. 183; *R.P.* 3, d. 4, q. 3, n. 5-8, XXIII, p. 274; B. Mastrius de Meldula, *Cursus Phil.*, In librum de generatione, d. 8, q. 2, art. 2, n. 21-35, III, pp. 432-434. This opinion harmonizes with the data of biology as exposed by Fr. Breitung, *l.c.* 406. Cf., F. Charbonnel, O.F.M., in *Revue Duns Scot* (Le Havre, 1911), IX, pp. 21-23; Prosper de Martigné, *l.c.*, 400: "Nous n'avons nulle envie de nous appesantir longuement sur ce sujet, encore moins de démontrer comment toutes ces découvertes viennent confirmer le sentiment du Docteur Subtil, il nous suffira de constater le fait qui selon nous se dégage de toutes ces découvertes: c'est que Duns Scot a eu raison d'attribuer un rôle actif aux deux principes de la génération."

¹⁵⁶*Elementa philosophiae christianae*, Naples, 1864-1868, *Anthropologia*, c. 2, art. 7, III, pp. 47-61.

¹⁵⁷Cf. Pl. Zach. van de Woestyne, *l.c.*, 607-608.

Placidus Lemos, O.F.M.,¹⁵⁸ at present titular Bishop of Pelusia, thinks that the pluralistic theory of forms does not facilitate an explanation of psychochemical phenomena which are at the basis of human life. This he holds without equivocation.

Nevertheless, the most general sentiment of modern philosophers is doubtlessly favorable to the thesis of Scotus. Mr. T. Martin¹⁵⁹ and Frederick Morin¹⁶⁰ have judged it to be in harmony with the progress of contemporary psychology. According to

Growing Fr. Prosper de Martigne, O.M.C.:¹⁶¹ "The natural
Admission of sciences present difficulties, and serious ones, to the
the Plurality opinion of the unity of forms" and "prepare a new
of Forms triumph for Duns Scotus." Mr. Marcel Monier¹⁶²

in a vigorous monograph presented in 1900 to a scientific Catholic Congress held in Munich, is not less affirmative: "We conclude," he writes, "in saying that the Scholastic theory of matter and form is not, as the prejudiced ones might believe, a game of ingenious words, but a doctrine which perfectly takes into account cosmic phenomena and in particular the essence of the human being. But to be in accordance with the acquired and certain data of modern biology, it is necessary to admit, as we have just done, the existence of a principle form, which is the spiritual soul, and also the existence of secondary forms. In a word, the theory of the plurality of forms, defended by the Franciscan School, is the only one found in agreement with biology. Moreover, the partisans of the Thomist theory must not have the illusion that the naturalists will ever consent to admit the unity of substantial form in man: to hold to this view is to dig a deeper abyss between the sciences of observation and the doctrine of the schools. Scholastics in philosophy, but observers of the laws of nature, we have seized upon the sole link which can unite the philosophers and the naturalists; we have given without fear our opinion, seeking the truth before all things, and caring little to which school they lead us."

¹⁵⁸*La vida organica en si misma y en sus manifestaciones* (Madrid, 1902), Congerencia 8, p. 226, note 1, et p. 254, note 1.

¹⁵⁹Cf. E. Pluzanski, *l.c.* 122.

¹⁶⁰*L.c.*, II, col. 1303-1305.

¹⁶¹*L.c.*, 239, 401.

¹⁶²"L'âme humaine et ses rapports avec l'organisme" in *Etudes franciscaines* (Paris, 1901), V, pp. 14-21. By the same author: "La théorie de la pluralité des formes et la chimie moderne," *ibid.*, pp. 393-398.

These declarations are as clear as they are remarkable. In a more or less formal fashion they have been brought up again at a quite recent date by Fr. Mendive,¹⁶³ Fr. Val. M. Breton, O.F.M.,¹⁶⁴ Fr. Hilaire de Barenton, O.M.C.,¹⁶⁵ Miss D. Sharp,¹⁶⁶ and Fr. Bernard Jansen, S.J.¹⁶⁷ In his criticism of Aristotelianism, so vivid that it tends to undermine the general thesis of Scholastic hylemorphism

and the distinction of act and potency, Mr. A. Perier¹⁶⁸ has not failed to raise against the Aristotelian explanation several grave difficulties. In his opinion, it explains neither generation, growth, nor life. The Scotist doctrine thenceforth appears more acceptable and more conformed to biological demands.

But what is still more important, the eminent psychologist, Fr. Fröbes, S.J., subscribes completely to the thesis of Scotus,¹⁶⁹ and that, first of all, in the name of experimental science: *Hoc enim solum cum scientia naturali apte componi videtur*.¹⁷⁰ His demonstration is of such authority that it is useless to insist longer on the subject. Once more the modernity of the psychology of Scotus is brought into full evidence.

¹⁶³Cf., P. Plac. H. Lemos, *l.c.* 254.

¹⁶⁴"La pensée franciscaine" in *France franciscaine* (Paris, 1924), VII, pp. 28-29.

¹⁶⁵Review of Périer's book in *Revue d'histoire franciscaine* (Paris, 1924), I, pp. 519-521.

¹⁶⁶*Franciscan philosophy at Oxford*, 313, note 1.

¹⁶⁷*Augustinus und Kant* in *Philosophisches Jahrbuch* (Fulda, 1930), XLIII, p. 39. In a letter of February 10, 1931, Fr. Jacq. Van der Veldt, O.F.M., professor of experimental psychology at St. Anthony's College (Rome) has written me: "Les données de la biologie semblent mieux pouvoir être expliquées en admettant une pluralité de formes."

¹⁶⁸*Matière et forme. Quelques objections contre l'aristotélisme ancien et moderne* (Paris, 1922). On that work, see Fr. Val.-M. Breton, O.F.M., in *La France Franciscaine* (Paris, 1925), VIII, pp. 179-180.

¹⁶⁹*Psychologia speculativa*, De anima, l. 3, c. 3, II, p. 323.

¹⁷⁰*L.c.* II, pp. 326-328. "Anima non conjungi videtur cum materia prima indeterminata sed cum corpore organisato, quod totum in unionem assumitur.—Argumentum. (1): *Ex experientia scientiae*. Secundum scientiam omnes proprietates physicae et chimicae elementorum sine notabilibus differentiis in organismo permanent, ut extra fuerant et postea in resolutione organismi elementa cum omnibus suis proprietatibus redeunt. Atqui hoc componi non potest cum opinione animam ex materia oblata solam materiam indeterminatam assumere atque eique omnes proprietates substantiales et accidentales tribuere. Ergo hoc scientiae contradicit. *Ad maj.* Manet pondus elementorum strictissime immutatum. Manent proprietates chimicae elementorum, affinitas et valentia atomorum eadem ac antea. Tota enim analysis chimica hoc supponit, elementa semper easdem actiones ostendere. in quacumque combinatione inveniantur. Sic effectus in partes organismi praedic

The Scotistic philosophy of ideas also reveals the actual character of Franciscan thought. It cannot be doubted that the psychology of the Marian Doctor favors largely the theory of ideas without images, recently shown by the school of Würzburg to be of value. As the first among the great Scholastics, Scotus described briefly but exactly the influence of latent ideas on the determinations of the act of willing.

Although several contemporary psychologists still refuse to subscribe to the theory of ideas without images,¹⁷¹ the thesis seems to be proved more and more decisively.¹⁷² Since the experimental

potest ex cognito effectu ejusdem in elementa extra posita. Tota functio physiologica cujuslibet partis organismi dependet ab atomica compositione et structura. Dressel (Der belebte und der unlebte Stoff.): X Omnis explicatio in physiologia in hoc supposito fundatur; principii vitalis solum est curare, ut materia apta in recto loco inveniatur; totus autem ejus effectus a natura chimica hujus materiae determinatur — In resolutione tandem organismi recurrit eadem elementa, quae olim ingressa sunt; immediate post mortem omnes partes organismi adhuc perfecte easdem qualitates ostendunt usque ad minima quas immediate antea ita ut accuratum momentum mortis determinari nequeat; quod ipsi adversarii fateri coguntur (Nys: Illusio?) identitatis accidentium initio perfecta est. — *Prob. min.* 1. Recte semper scientia ex paritate omnium proprietatum essentialium concludit substantiam corpoream eamdem esse. Nam substantia in se non videtur, sed ejus identitas vel diversitas ex solis accidentibus cognosci potest. Ideo Veteres jure ex apparenti diversitate ponderis concludebant substantiam mutatam esse. Ergo si scivissent et pondus et ceteras qualitates physicas et chemicas vel prorsus eadem manere vel solum accidentaliter mutari, prout ex diversa positione minimarum partium expectari liceret, etiam identitatem substantiae admisissent. (2) Speciatim in opinione adversa non explicatur quod anima, quando nutrimentum in substantiam vivam assumit, tot accidentia diversa (affinitates, pondus, proprietates physicas) illarum atomorum quas assumit, illico restituere possit, sicuti hoc in diversis partibus organismi conspicitur. Immo plurimae operationes informationi praevisae tunc inutiles fierent. Si pro composito nihil servatur, nisi sola materia prima, et anima illam mirabilem vim possidet ex se producendi artificiosam structuram organismi, quam materiae primae dat, cur omnino indiget certis elementis pro compositione, cur certo modo praeparatis? (Hoffmann) Natura igitur apparet ut rex, qui cum palatium sibi a civibus multis sumptibus praeparatum intrat, aedificium dirimeret statimque novum aedificaret et rebus novis prioribus simillimis exornaret. (3) Magis etiam incredibile est quod in momento mortis pro innumeris particulis organismi fidelissime reproducantur omnia accidentia, quae usque ad id tempus vi animae habuerant, quaeque cessante anima subito cessasse finguntur, ut a forma nova supervenienti mirabili arte et celeritate repetantur. Tale quid in causa naturali et quidem inferiori (formis elementaribus) esset singulare in mundo, ubi omnia secus lente explicantur."

¹⁷¹J. Fröbes, S.J., *Psychologia speculativa*, II, p. 10; E. Barbado, O.P., *Introduzione alla psicologia sperimentale* (Roma, 1930), c. 18, p. 319.

¹⁷²Cf. A. Gemelli, O.F.M., *Nuovi orizzonti della psicologia sperimentale* (Firenze, 1912, 2a ed. Milano, 1924); J. Geysler, *Lehrbuch der allgemeinen Psychologie* (Münster i.W. 1920), Chap. 11, sect. 5-7, n. 551-568, II, pp. 315-341; Chap. 12, sect. 4, II, pp. 362-366 and Chap. 15, sect. 2, II, pp. 441-455 (on the works of Fr. Lindworsky, S.J.), and chiefly J. Fröbes, S.J., *Lehrbuch der experimentellen Psychologie* (Freiburg i.B., 1917), Absch. III, Kap. 6, 2-4, I, pp. 402-416.

**Modern Acceptance
of the Theory of
Ideas Without
Images**

researches of Külpe¹⁷³ and of Binet on abstraction, and of Fr. Lindworsky, S.J., on reasoning and on the will, a great number of contemporary psychologists, among whom are found Kofka, Fr. Agostino Gemelli, O.F.M., and Fr. Fröbes, S.J., have accepted the conclusions of the school of Würzburg. According to these distinguished teachers, not only is the idea irreducible to the image or to sensation — as Scotus has already established,¹⁷⁴ but it even happens that the intellect exercises its conscious operation without being provoked or sustained by a corresponding image. The question is not without importance from the viewpoint of experimental psychology,¹⁷⁵ but it is perhaps of more interest to spiritualist philosophy and to mystical theology. "The interest of the *Nuovi Orizzonti*," writes Fr. Seraphinus Belmond, O.F.M.,¹⁷⁶ "comes from this remark of Fr. Gemelli, O.F.M., namely, that experimental psychology finds itself forced to render its ideal transcendence to the edifice of our cognition. To speak plainly, the nominalism of sensationalist systems has had its day." This new conclusion, so strongly supported by experimental psychology, harmonizes with little difficulty with the classic theses of Franciscan Augustinianism on the origin of ideas. According to St. Bonaventure, and the most illustrious of his disciples, Cardinal Matthew of Aquasparta, the whole series of concepts which have for object, God, the soul and the spiritual realities, is not drawn from sensible experiences;¹⁷⁷ it is easy to

¹⁷³On O. Külpe, cf. M. Grabmann, *Kritische Realismus*, O. Külpe und der Standpunkt der aristotelisch-scholastischen Philosophie (Münster i.W., 1916).

¹⁷⁴*Ox.* 4, d. 43, q. 1, n. 9, XX, p. 39; B. Mastrius de Meldula, *Cursus Phil.*, De anima, d. 6, q. 1, n. 1-4, III, p. 139.

¹⁷⁵J. Fröbes, *Lehrbuch etc.* 2, p. 407, and 1, p. 401. Cf. B. Jansen, S.J., *Wege der Weltweisheit*, p. 310.

¹⁷⁶*Images et concepts in Etudes Franciscaines* (Paris, 1914), XXXI, p. 226.

¹⁷⁷S. Bonav., II, *Sent.*, d. 39, a. 1, q. 2, II, p. 904; *Itinerarium mentis in Deum*, c. 3, n. 2, V, p. 303b. Cf. J. Peckam, *Quaestiones tractantes de anima*, ed. H. Spettmann (*Beiträge zur Gesch. der Phil. des Mittelalters*, Bd. XIX, Hft. 5/6, Münster i.W., 1918), Quaest. IX, pp. 83-88, asks himself the following question: *Utrum omnis cognitio intellectualis sit mediante phantasmate?*; Unfortunately the MS. is incomplete and offers no answer. Elsewhere, Peckam gives his opinion, *ibid.*, q. 25, ad. 4, p. 187: "Ad quantum dicendum quod substantiae spirituales dicuntur per se intelligibiles, quia species earum non indigent abstrahi mediante phantasmate, sicut de rebus corporalibus planum est. Omnia enim intelligibilia, cum intelliguntur ab anima, per aliquam impressionem et non per essentiam suam

understand, consequently, that psychological activity, at least the highest, is not conditioned or accompanied by an image of an inferior order.¹⁷⁸

With the ordinary penetration of his genius, Peter Olivi has formulated this conclusion in clear and decisive terms.¹⁷⁸ Several authorized Scotists, whether ancient or modern, such as James Malafossa,¹⁷⁹ B. Mastrius de Meldula,¹⁸⁰ Charles of St. Florian,¹⁸¹ Fr. Seraphinus Belmont,¹⁸² and Fr. Parth. Minges,¹⁸³ are of the same opinion that the psychology of Scotus leads logically to the affirmation of the theory of ideas without images, as the school of Würzburg proposes. This sentiment appears sufficiently supported, if one would consider

Scotistic View on the Rôle of the Sensible Image attentively what Scotus teaches on the rôle of the sensible image in the intellect, and the mediocre esteem which he bears, at least in the *Reportatio Parisiensis*,¹⁸⁴ toward the Aristotelian theory of the

nec per speciem phantasticam intelliguntur." Cf. S. Kampmann, *Philosophia angelico-seraphica*, Quaracchi 1896, *Criteriologia*, c.l., q. 3, II, pp. 693-694; E. Gilson, *La Philosophie de S. Bonaventure* (Paris, 1924), pp. 358-362.

¹⁷⁸ *Quaest. in secundum librum Sententiarum*, ed. Jansen, Quaracchi (1924). Quaest. 57, ad. 20, II, p. 365: "Ad 20 dicendum quod minor est simpliciter falsa. Secundum omnem enim statum, scilicet gloriae, innocentiae super se absque adjutorio alicujus phantasmatis, immo potius ad hoc phantasmata eas impediunt quam juvent, sicut in quaestione an anima possit se intelligere per se et immediate plenius habet tangi. Nec curo si Aristoteles et ejus sequaces contrarium dicant, quia sicut ibi plenius ostenditur, hoc non solum nobis aufert libertatem sed etiam multa alia nostrae fidei contraria in se includit." Olivi mentions here Quaest. 76, III, pp. 145-149, specially p. 146.

¹⁷⁹ *Super primum sententiarum Doctoris Subtilis Theologorum principis Johannis Scoti exactissima enarratio absolutissimaque expositio* (Padoue, 1560), I *Sent.*, d. 3, q. 1, fol. 111r. col. a; I *Sent.*, d. 3, q. 6, fol. 137v col. b-138r col. a; I *Sent.*, d. 3, q. 4, fol. 123v. col. b. The author died in 1562, see A. Bertoni, *Le B. Jean Duns Scot* (Levanto, 1917), pp. 481-482.

¹⁸⁰ *Cursus Phil.*, De anima, d. 6, q. 1, n. 4-8, 12, III, pp. 139-141, chiefly No. 7-8, p. 140, and d. 6, q. 4, art. 2, n. 93, III, p. 158.

¹⁸¹ *Philosophia Scoti recentioribus accommodata* (Milan, 1777), Logices, l. 1, sect. 1, art. 2, I, pp. 95-123. Important sketch.

¹⁸² *Images et concepts*, l.c. 226-233. Cf. X. C. Albanese, *La teoria delle idee senza immagini nelle psicologia di Scoto*, in *Studi francescani* (Arezzo, 1914), I, pp. 39-65. These two studies are founded on *De rerum principio* that the researches of Quaracchi have restored to Vital de Four, O.F.M.

¹⁸³ *Joan. Duns Scotus*, in *The Franciscan Educational Conference, Report of the Third Annual meeting* (Cincinnati, 1921), pp. 57-58. Cf. C. Prezolini, *Cursus Phil. ad mentem Doctoris Subtilis* (Roma, 1904), Psychol. art. 5, II, p. 156.

¹⁸⁴ *R.P.* 4, d. 45, q. 3, n. 13, XXIV, p. 575b: "Aristoteles non vocaret bene recordatum propter recordationem intellectus sed magis propter recordationem potentiarum inferiorum, sicut nec Aristoteles ponit intelligere sine phantasmate, quia ponit

phantasma. According to the Marian Doctor, no species interferes in the intellectual intuitive cognition. Scotus declares this many times, and his school is unanimous on this subject:¹⁸⁵ the real, in its existence, is then attained directly without an intermediary. In the order of abstractive cognition, on the contrary, the sensible image intervenes, but this collaboration is not an absolute necessity, based on the nature itself of the soul—otherwise, the intellect could never attain God and spiritual substances,¹⁸⁶ nor is it the consequence of original sin, since even if it is in the absolute power of the intellect to know without the help of the sensible image, it is none the less natural for the soul, united substantially to the body, to reach also the real by the way of the senses and of the imagination.¹⁸⁷ The fact is partly explained by original sin, and partly by the natural order of psychological powers established by divine Wisdom for the present state.¹⁸⁸ Besides, according to Scotus, as B. Mastrius of Meldula¹⁸⁹ correctly observes, this “conversion” of the image—whether the phantasm represents the object itself of which the intellect forms a concept, or a connected object—is required for perfect cognition. The Marian Doctor emphasizes too much this aspect of his teaching¹⁹⁰ that the historian and the interpreter of the Scotist system cannot pass it by in silence.

forte intellectum unum omnium nostrum non variari nisi penes phantasmata sicut Averroes videtur sibi imponere.”

¹⁸⁵*R.P.* 4, d. 45, q. 2, n. 20, XXIV, p. 567a: “Oportet ponere in cognitione intuitiva ipsam rem esse medium cognitionis”; B. Mastrius de Meldula, *Cursus Phil.*, De anima, d. 6, q. 4, art. 1, n. 72, III, p. 153 and art. 2, n. 106–116, III, pp. 159–161.

¹⁸⁶*R.P.* 4, d. 45, q. 4, n. 2, XXIV, p. 578b.

¹⁸⁷*R.P.* 4, d. 49, q. 11, n. 6, XXIV, p. 678a: “Ordo potentiarum in homine est naturalis, ideo naturale est voluntati quod compatiatur appetitui sensitivo, sicut naturale est intellectui, dum est modo in corpore quod moveatur in actu suo a Phantasmate.” Cf. H. Klug, art. cit., XLI, p. 22.

¹⁸⁸*Ox.* 2, d. 3, q. 8, n. 13, XII, 195: “Hoc non est ex natura nec ista causa est absolute naturalis sed est ex peccato sed etiam ex natura potentiarum pro statu isto, quidquid dicat Augustinus.” Cf. *Ox.* 2, d. 11, q. 1, n. 4, XII, p. 532; *Ox.* 1, d. 3, q. 3, n. 24, IX, p. 148; *Add. Magnae*, 1, d. 3, q. 5, n. 12, XXII, p. 110; *R.P.* 2, d. 3, q. 3, n. 14, XXII, p. 595; Hug. Cavellus, O.F.M., *Annotationes in librum Scoti de anima*, q. 19, in Duns Scotus’ *Opera*, III, pp. 595–598.

¹⁸⁹*Cursus Phil.*, De anima, d. 6, q. 1, n. 8, III, p. 140.

¹⁹⁰*Ox.* 4, d. 45, q. 1, n. 6, XX, p. 272: “Dico quod si species intelligibiles in conjuncto non sufficit sine phantasmate, hoc non est quod phantasma requiratur ibi tanquam principium aliquod actus intelligendi sed praecise requiritur ad intellectionem propter connexionem potentiarum superiorum et inferiorum in agendo: si quidem superior non perfecte operatur circa aliquod objectum nisi inferiores, quae possunt operari, operentur circa idem.” Cf. *R.P.* 4, d. 45, q. 2, n. 9, XXIV,

Scotus has examined finally, with circumspection, the Aristotelian axiom so often invoked in the present discussion: "Images are to the intellect what sensible notions are to the senses." The comparison, he thinks, is only worth while when it is a question of the point of departure of cognition: the first intellectual representations are drawn from sensible experience, but once acquired, the activity can display itself and form other concepts without a constant recourse to the sensible image.¹⁹¹ It is easy to glimpse what this doctrine¹⁹² and the teaching of Scotus on the psychological intuition of the ego, explained in the foregoing, imply; these conclusions have been drawn without fail by the disciples of the Marian Doctor in the course of ages. Mastrius of Meldula,¹⁹³ following Hugo Cavella,

p. 560b; *Ox.* 2, d. 42, q. 4, n. 10-11, XIII, p. 460: A. Hicquey, O.F.M., *Com in op. Ox.* lib. 4, d. 45, in Duns Scotus, *Opera*, XX, pp. 277-278, According to Scotus the image strengthens the intellectual representation and thus confers an occasional perfectio, *Ox.*, l.c. n. 6, XX, p. 272: "Est tamen aliqua perfectio quam phantasma tribuit intellectioni per hoc quod intendit speciem intelligibilem regulariter in qualibet intellectione." Cf. A. Hicquey, *Com. in h.l.*, n. 21, XX, p. 277.

¹⁹¹*Ox.* 1, d. 3, q. 2, n. 19, IX, p. 37; *Ox.* 4, d. 45, q. 1, n. 6, XX, p. 273.

¹⁹²In many passages Duns Scotus seems to assert that all knowledge on earth is strictly conditioned by the sensible image, *Ox.* 2, d. 11, q. 1, n. 4, XII, p. 532b; *Ox.* 4, d. 45, q. 3, n. 20, XX, p. 366a; Therefore many Scotists maintain that the "phantasma" constantly and strictly interferes in mental activity, as H. de Montefortino, O.F.M., *Ven. Jo. Duns Scoti Summa theologia* (nov. ed. Roma, 1901), 3p. q. 84, art. 7, III, pp. 675-680.

¹⁹³*Cursus Phil.*, De anima, d. 6, q. 6, n. 199-200, III, p. 178: "Dicendum nobis videtur in hac ardua difficultate praedictis non obstantibus intellectum actus suos intuitive cognoscere posse saltem per aliam reflexam cognitionem, illosque species proprias intellectui imprimere ratione quarum actibus transactis recordatur intellectus se hoc vel illud intellexisse et idem pariter dicendum videtur de actibus voluntatis. Ita insinuat Doctor, 4, d. 49, q. 8, c, and d. 43, q. 2, et respondet, ubi fuse probat nos experiri in nobismetipsis actus hujusmodi intelligendi et volendi per solam positionem horum actuum *absque recurso ad aliquod materiale*, and d. 45, q. 3, ubi sub litt. c, ex necessitate materiae intellectivae ostendit actum intelligendi vel volendi imprimere suam speciem in intellectu. Mayron. q. 19, prologi idem tenet, Tataretus, p. Phys. q. prima, quarto sciendum, Lichetus, 2d. 3, q. 8, ad solutionem. Et probatur efficaciter quia revera experimur in nobis hujusmodi actus adeo evidenter ut si quis hoc neget experimentum non amplius homo est appellandus, ait Doctor, sed brutum; at haec cognitio experimentalis non videtur nisi intuitiva cognitio de actu sibi inhaerente ac intime conjuncto et quidem id experimur, ut dicebamus, per solam actuum positionem *absque recurso ad aliquod materiale* objectum aliumve effectum sensibilem." *Ibid.*, n. 201, III, p. 178: "Advertendum tamen est in hac re, quod notavit Mayronis, p.d. 3, q. 9, in ead. quaest. et Arriaga, disp. 4, De anima, num., 205 Ubi tenet nostrum assertum: esto intellectus actus suos cognoscat intuitive, dum eos in se experitur, adhuc tamen ita confuse et imperfecte eos cognoscit ut nisi de eorum existentia, vix de aliquo alio praedicato rationem reddere possumus, sicut quando colorem eminens videmus, unde subdit discrimen inter cognitionem horum actuum et cognitionem Dei, Ange-

O.F.M., is in agreement; and as the psychology of Peter Olivi¹⁹⁴ suggests (resembling in this the Scotist doctrine), the primitive cognitions which the soul acquires from its acts, such as they are perceived by intuition, are obtained most probably, according to Scotus, without recourse to a previous sensible representation.¹⁹⁵ Moreover, the coöperation of the image with the active intellect being in a great part a consequence of our present fallen state, it follows that man, in the state of innocence, and the Blessed Virgin herself, because of the privilege of her Immaculate Conception, were most probably freed from this strict dependence;¹⁹⁶ it is the same for the separate soul which can thus acquire new knowledge in the world beyond¹⁹⁷ — a thesis which Anthony Hicquey, O.F.M.,¹⁹⁸ following Scotus, has developed with most remarkable force, and in virtue of metaphysical principles the application of which opens large perspectives. In this important view of Scotus it is clear that even in our actual state, representations purely intellectual are not impossible, whether it is a question of imperfect cognitions or of derived

lorum et aliarum substantiarum: haec enim non confuse cognoscimus, secus vero actus nostros quos sine discursu immediate, valde tamen confuse novimus," etc.

¹⁹⁴*Quaest. in sec. librum Sent.*, id. Jansen, Quaracchi (1926), *Quaest.*, 76, III, pp. 146-147.

¹⁹⁵H. de Montefortino, *l.c.* Pars 3, p. 87, art. 1, III, p. 742, follows very closely Mastrius de Meldula; having established that the soul acknowledges itself only by general concepts originating from sensible experience, he continues: "Sciendum tamen ad hoc ut cognoscatur causa per effectus, signatum per signum, anima ex ejus operationibus oportere aliquam cognitionem de signato, de causa, de anima praecedere: satis tamen esse indeterminatam et generalem et quasi habitualement, quae cognitio specificatur usque ad quod 'quid est' per propriam essentiam."

¹⁹⁶Cf. Mastrius de Meldula, *l.c.* n. 7, III, p. 140; Hug. Cavellus, O.F.M., *Annot. in libr. de anima Scoti*, q. 18, n. 10-12, in Scotus' Op. III, pp. 597-8. Cf. F. Charbonnel, *Le grand drame de la création* (Paris, 1909), pp. 179-183. St. Bonaventure's School also maintains this opinion, B. de Barberiis, O.M.C., *Cursus Theol. ad mentem Ser. Doct. S. Bonaventurae* (Lyon, 1687), De Incarnatione, d. 13, q. 3, n. 268, III, p. 101. In the mystical state the mind can act without images according to Scotus, Ox. 2, d. 11, q. 1, n. 4, XII, 532b and St. Bonaventure, cf. B. de Barberiis, *Cursus Phil. ad mentem S. Bonaventurae* (Lyon, 1677), De anima, p. 3, Tract. 2, q. 1, n. 501, III, p. 406. Cf. H. Cavellus, *Annot. in libr. de anima*, q. 18, n. 8, *l.c.* 596.

¹⁹⁷Ox. 4, d. 45, q. 2, n. 8, XX, pp. 302-303; R.P. 4, d. 45, q. 2, n. 16-21, XXIV, pp. 564-567.

¹⁹⁸*Comm. in IV Librum Sent. D. Scoti* 4, d. 45, q. 2, n. 16-20, in Scotus' *Opera* XX, pp. 290-294, chiefly n. 20, p. 293.

ideas, as Mastrius de Meldula¹⁹⁹ says, in agreement with several disciples of Scotus, particularly James Malafossa.²⁰⁰

These deductions appear very logical and conformed to the profound tendencies of Scotistic psychology. To them we must add the important statements of Scotus. In the *Questions on Metaphysics*,²⁰¹ he affirms in explicit terms that the intellect knows many objects

¹⁹⁹*Cursus Phil.*, De anima, d. 6, q. 1, n. 8, III, p. 140: "Unum hic advertendum est in dictis Doctoris, quod ait operante intellectu circa suum objectum abstractum necessario cooperari debere phantasiam circa phantasma illi correspondens hanc addit particulam" si utraque habeat operationem perfectam; ita loquitur, I, d. 3, q. 3, "sed restat"; quod magis declarans in 4, d. 45, q. 1, ad 3 pro opin. inquit: "Operatio phantasiae requiritur ad intellectionem propter connectionem potentiarum superiorum et inferiorum in agendo: si quidem superior non perfecte operatur circa aliquod objectum nisi inferiores quae possunt operari, operentur circa idem et haec est ratio quare distractio potentiarum animae circa diversa objecta impediunt operationes earum." "Ex quibus videtur colligi posse de mente Doctoris posse intellectum interdum, adeptis semel speciebus, elicere aliquam intellectionem valde tamen, tenuem et remissa circa objectum abstractum absque cooperatione phantasiae circa phantasma correspondens et forte hac de causa quam plures Scotistae tenuerunt intellectum non semper phantasmatis indigere in secunda motione pro quo Bargius, p.d.3, q. 6, duas adducit Scoti auctoritates, unam in 4, d. 45 q. 1, ad prim. princ. et alteram in 1, d. 3, q. 4 in corpore quaesiti valde expressas." *Ibid.* n. 5, III, p. 140.

²⁰⁰*L.c.* 1, d. 3, q. 1, fol. Mr. col. a: "Vigerius hic notat quod antequam habemus actum intelligendi praerequiritur tres species: una in sensu exteriori et alia in sensu interiori et alia in intellectu, quae dicitur species intelligibilis. Et si quis arguerat: multa intelliguntur quae nullam istarum trium specierum habeant, responde ad hoc ut scis: haec materia in quaest 6, hujus dist. pertractabitur. Pro clara notitia hujus responsionis nota tria: Primam: est quod intellectus dupliciter movetur ad intelligendum aliquid, scilicet prima et secunda motione. Prima motio est ad producendum speciem intelligibilem, secunda est ad producendum actum intelligendi: unde phantasma et intellectus producant speciem intelligibilem et post in secunda motione intellectus et species intelligibilis producant intellectionem. Secundum: illa comparatio Aristotelis in III De anima habet veritatem in prima motione et non in secunda: sicut enim sensus non potest sentire sine sensibili, sic intellectus agens non potest producere speciem intelligibilem sine phantasmate. Tertium dictum. Postquam est producta species intelligibilis in intellectu, quae dicitur prima motio, potest deinde intellectus totum objectum resolvere in omnes vel in aliquos suos conceptus et in ista secunda motione phantasma nihil agere habet." *L.c.* fol. 110 v. col. b: "Potest confirmari per id quod habet Scotus in 4, d. 45, q. 1, ubi glossans illam auctoritatem Philosophi in III De anima quod scilicet": estne necesse intelligentem phantasma speculari? "Dicit quod hoc est verum quantum ad acquisitionem intellectionis et hoc primam et primae": *L.c.* I, Sent., d. 3, q. 6, fol. 137v. col. b-138, r.a; Having quoted *Ox.* 4, d. 45, q. 1, n. 6, ad primum, XX, p. 273, and *Ox.* 1, d. 3, q. 4, n. 8, respondeo, IX, p. 174a, Malafossa adds: "Similem sententiam habet Scotus in 1 Metaphys. q. quarta et Ant. Andreas, 1, Metaph., q. 5 idem dicit. Vult ergo Scotus quod post primam intellectionem simplicem sine recurso ad sensus possit intelligere componere et discurrere." Cf. I, Sent., d. 3, q. 4, fol. 124r.a.

²⁰¹*Quaest. in Metaph.* II, q. 3, n. 14, and n. 16, VII, pp. 106-107. This text can be read in the best mss. and is not an addition.

of which it has no sensible representations. In the *Opus Oxoniense*, he adds that the mind can fix itself on a purely abstract idea, and apply it to distinct objects without actually considering the sensible image whence it has drawn it, although this effort may be of short duration.²⁰² He teaches again that if the intellect depends on sensible experience from its starting point, *prima immutatio*, it frees itself from this necessity in its subsequent acts.²⁰³ No one will doubt that these outlines of the psychology of Scotus have a modern trend: they permit an easy integration into traditional philosophy of the fertile results already obtained by the school of Würzburg and its best representatives.

The modernity and the adaptability of Scotistic thought are also revealed in the observations of the Marian Doctor on obscure perceptions and on the influence that they exercise on the decisions of the act of willing. Mastrius of Meldula drew the attention of philosophers to them in the seventeenth century. It is more opportune to recall them today after so many researches on the subconscious and on immanence. Thus Scotus remarks in treating of judgment and of formal truth, that in intuitive perception of a proposition evident in itself, the intellect apprehends the veracity of its assent in an unperceived reflex act.²⁰⁴ Elsewhere he notes how intellectual representations, conserved in the memory, but almost totally forgotten, as well as the intentions of the act of willing virtually influence the acts of the other powers.²⁰⁵ Similarly he remarks that images and impressions, received without the mind giving its full

²⁰²*Ox.* 1, d. 3, q. 2, n. 19, ad primum dico, IX, p. 37; *Ox.* 1, d. 3, q. 3, n. 26-27, IX, p. 159; *Ox.* 1, d. 8, q. 3, n. 13, IX, p. 592. Cf. *Ox.* 1, d. 3, q. 4, n. 22, IX, p. 191a.

²⁰³*Ox.* 4, d. 45, q. 1, n. 6, XX, p. 273a; *Ox.* 1, d. 3, q. 2, n. 19, IX, p. 37: "Dico quod illa comparatio Philosophi—Phantasmata se habent ad intellectum sicut sensibilia ad sensum—debet intelligi in quantum ad primam motionem intellectus ab objecto, ibi enim phantasmata cum intellectu cum intellectu agente habent vicem primi objecti moventis, sed non habet intelligi quantum ad omnem actum sequentem motionem primam." Cf., F. Morin, *l.c.* I, col. 788-790.

²⁰⁴*Quaest. in Metaph.* II, q. 3, n. 7, VII, p. 339: "Posset dici quod ibi est alius actus et reflexus sed imperceptus quia simul tempore."

²⁰⁵*Ox.* 4, d. 6, q. 6, n. 4, XVI, 580a; *R.P.* 4, d. 6, q. 6, n. 10, XXIII, p. 634.

attention, do not remain without influence.²⁰⁶ But what is most remarkable,²⁰⁷ Scotus closely studies the influence of latent ideas on the terminations of the act of willing. According to the Scholastic system, and to the Marian Doctor himself, it is the will which awakens the intellect to the consideration of the object; but the will itself could not be set in action without previous knowledge. Precisely, says Scotus, the will does not blindly exercise its dominion, because alongside the clear ideas, we find in the mind also intellectual representations almost unperceived; the will can find delight in them and, consequently, increase their value of solicitation. It is easy to see at once how the process of psychological life is always under the direction of the idea.²⁰⁸ Without doubt, Scotus reveals himself here as a clever and very modern psychologist: in his pages is found in substance the doctrine proposed with so much certainty by the best Catholic psychologists of the present day, Fr. Agostino Gemelli, O.F.M.,²⁰⁹ and Mr. E. Baudin.²¹⁰

²⁰⁶*Ox.* 2, d. 9, q. 2, n. 21, XII, p. 458b.

²⁰⁷Cf. R. Seeberg, *Die Theologie des Joh. Duns Scotus* (Leipzig, 1900), pp. 93-94; J. Carreras y Artau, *Essayo sobre el voluntarismo* de J. Duns Scot (Gerona, 1923), p. 20; E. Longpré, *La philosophie du B. Duns Scot* (Paris, 1924); B. Mastrius de Meldula, *Cursus Phil.*, de anima, d. 7, q. 7, art. 2, n. 191, III, p. 252.

²⁰⁸*R.P.* 2, d. 42, q. 4, n. 13-15, XXIII, p. 220: "Praemitto tres propositiones, ex quibus patet propositum: quarum prima est quod una intellectione existente in intellectu, multae possunt esse indistinctae et imperfectae. Hoc patet in exemplo de visu: quia omnia quae obijciuntur oculo sub una pyramide videt, una tamen est visio perfecta illius scilicet puncti in cono pyramidis; unde illud super quod cadit axis pyramidis videtur distincte; aliorum in illa pyramide sunt plures visiones indistinctae; sed si hoc est possibile in sensu, multo magis in intellectu. Secunda est quod intellectionem inexistentem, licet non cognitam ut objectum, potest voluntas velle et complacere sibi in illa . . . Tertia propositio est quod voluntate complacente in aliqua intellectione ipsa intenditur et firmatur; voluntate autem non complacente et nolente intellectionem ipsa remittitur et debilitatur ita quod voluntas, intellectionem inexistentem volens, intendit et nolens remittit . . . Ex his ad propositum ex prima propositione, si intellectio una sit perfecta, non tamen ita quod nullam aliam compatiatur secum, tunc cum illa possunt esse multae intellectiones imperfectae in intellectu. Ex secunda propositione voluntas potest complacere in intellectione existente in intellectu, licet non fuerit cognita objective; ergo potest complacere in intellectione imperfecta alicujus objecti. Ex tertia propositione, voluntate complacente in aliqua intellectione intendit eam et firmat: ergo, illa quae prius fuit remissa, per illam intentionem fit perfecta et firmata et voluntate non complacente in alia, alia intellectu remittitur aut desinit esse, et sic dicitur voluntas avertere intellectum ab una intellectione et convertere ipsum ad intellectionem alterius objecti . . .," cf., *Ox.* 2, d. 42, q. 4, n. 10-11, XIII, pp. 460-461 (Beautiful Text); *Ox.* 1, d. 6, q. 1, n. 8, IX, p. 514a; *R.P.* 4, d. 45, q. 2, n. 7, XXIV, p. 559.

²⁰⁹*La coscienza secondo le piu recenti ricerche*, l.c. 273-281.

²¹⁰*Psychologie* (Paris, 1919), pp. 107-118.

There are other aspects of Scotistic psychology that are not less real in our own times. One of the principal merits of Scotus is to have reintegrated the idea of activity and spontaneity into medieval philosophy, as Fr. Morin²¹¹ has rightly observed.

Modernity of Aristotelianism had a profound tendency to accentuate the passive character of intellectual and
Other Scotistic accentuate the passive character of intellectual and
Tenets voluntary operations; at the time of Scotus the

teaching of Jean de Pouilly, of Godfrey de Fontaines, and of Thomas of Sutton aided in verifying the fact.²¹² Moreover, according to this system, created substances are never immediately operative; they only act by the medium of really distinct faculties, active only in virtue of the subject which they affect. Naturally the great Augustinian current of the thirteenth century did not subscribe to these Aristotelian theses. St. Bonaventure,²¹³ Roger Bacon,²¹⁴ and Roger Marston,²¹⁵ did not hesitate to regard substance as endowed with activity, and for his part, Peter Olivi affirmed vigorously the eminently active character of spiritual faculties.²¹⁶

Formed in the school of these masters, Duns Scotus took up all their affirmations. With more metaphysical and dialectic vigor than his predecessors, he applied himself to prove convincingly that the substance of the Ens is endowed immediately with activity and with productivity.²¹⁷ This great thesis not only received the approval of the

²¹¹*Dictionnaire de philosophie et de théologie scolastique* (Paris, 1856), II, pp. 872-874. Cf. E. Longpré, *La philosophie du B. Duns Scot* (Paris, 1924), pp. 275-276.

²¹²Cf. F. Pelster, *Thomas von Sutton*, in *Zeitschrift für Kath. Theol.* (Innsbruck, 1922), pp. 376-378.

²¹³*Sent.*, d. 13, art. 2, q. 2, ad 6, II, p. 322.

²¹⁴*Opus Majus*, ed. J. H. Bridges (Oxford, 1900), II, pp. 408-409. Cf. H. Luguët, *Essai d'analyse et de critique sur le texte inédit du traité de l'âme de Jean de la Rochelle* (Paris, 1875), p. 228: "Telle est la conclusion à laquelle aboutit Duns Scot. Le doit-il à Bae con qui douait toute substance d'activité? Il serait curieux de rechercher la filiation de cette idée dont on a fait trop facilement honneur à Leibniz."

²¹⁵*Quod. 2*, q. 21, Florence, Bibli. Laurenziana, cod. Comv. Sopp. 123, fol. 147r.

²¹⁶*Quaest. in II librum Sent.*, ed. Jansen, Quaracchi (1924), Quaest. 58, II, pp. 409-517, and quaest., 74, Quaracchi (1926), III, pp. 119-122.

²¹⁷*Ox. 4*, d. 12, q. 3, n. 10-12, XIV, pp. 588-9; *ibid.*, n. 11: "Videtur valde inconueniens quod ens perfectissimum secundum genus inter creata, careat actione ita quod forma ejus non possit esse principium immediatum et proximum productivum alicujus actionis." Cf. *R.P. 4*, d. 12, q. 3, n. 3-7, XXIV, pp. 152-3; *Quaest. in metaph.*, IX, q. 7, n. 2, VII, p. 564.

Scotist School, and particularly of Anthony Hicquey, Immediate Activity and Productivity of the Ens O.F.M.,²¹⁸ but it also obtained the commendation of several eminent Scholastics, such as Gabriel Biel, Hurtado, and Suarez.²¹⁹ After this initial affirmation, the Marian Doctor was able easily to sustain against Aristotelianism, the eminently active character of psychic life. In his opinion, every vital act implies primarily a force which displays itself from the inside.²²⁰ Sensation henceforth is not purely passive, although the collaboration of the object be required by mode of a synergetic and subordinate cause.²²¹ The vegetative powers of the soul²²² are active likewise, and, by a more just title, the spiritual faculties, the intellect²²³ and the will.²²⁴ The Marian Doctor skillfully stresses this original character of the understanding²²⁵ in claiming especially the authority of St. August-

²¹⁸*Com. in Opus Ox.* in h.l., n. 2, XVII, p. 582: "Quod si substantia non sit activa immediate, nihil potest in virtute ejus causare, quia quod non est activum ex se nequit communicare actionem aut virtutem agendi in aliis."

²¹⁹Cf. P. Casanova, O.F.M., *Cursus phil. ad mentem D. Bonaventurae et Scoti* (Madrid, 1894), *Ontologia*, c. 4, a. 2, sect. 2, n. 265-272, I, pp. 515-521.

²²⁰Cf. Mastrius de Meldula, *Cursus phil.*, *De anima*, d. 2, a. 2, q. 2, n. 27-40, III, pp. 47-49.

²²¹*Ox.* 1, d. 3, q. 7, n. 24, IX, p. 369b: "Concedo quod istam imaginem quae est sensatio non causat corpus in spiritu ut totalis causa sed anima causat in se mira celeritate, non tamen ut tota causa sed ipsa et objectum." Cf. B. Mastrius de Meldula, *Cursus phil.*, *De anima*, d. 4, q. 2, n. 12-18, III, pp. 65-66; H. Cavellus, *Annot. in librum De anima Scoti*, q. 12, n. 13-16, in *Scotus' Opera*, III, pp. 543-4, and chiefly, disp. 2, sect. 1, *ibid.*, III, pp. 688-692. On the activity of the sensible faculties according to the Seraphic Doctor, E. Gilson, *La philosophie de S. Bonaventure* (Paris, 1924), pp. 339-343.

²²²*Quaest. in Metaph.* IX, q. 14, n. 12-13, VII, pp. 591-592. Cf. B. Mastrius de Meldula, *Cursus phil.*, *In libro de generatione*, d. 8, q. 1, III, pp. 428-429.

²²³Cf. B. Mastrius de Meldula, *l.c.* *De anima* d. 6, q. 2, n. 13-27, III, pp. 141-143.

²²⁴Cf. Mastrius de Meldula, *l.c.* d. 7, q. 1, n. 3, III, p. 212; H. Heimsoeth, *l.c.* 150.

²²⁵*Ox.* 1, d. 3, q. 7, n. 20, IX, p. 361; *Quod.* XV, n. 2-6, XXVI, pp. 119-122: "Aliqua intellectio in nobis est nova, ut experitur quilibet et est forma absoluta, ut dictum est in quaestione de hoc habita. Omni autem forma absoluta, cum sit terminus actionis, habet aliquod principium activum per quod accepit esse; igitur respectu intellectionis nostrae novae est aliquod activum principium; illud est intrinsecum supposito intelligenti," etc. Cf. H. De Montefortino, *Ven. J. Duns Scoti Summa theol.* (ed. nova, Roma, 1901), Pars, 3, q. 79, art. 2, III, pp. 573-576.

tine.²²⁶ The mind is an activity; abstraction, analysis, comparison, synthesis, and judgment are irreducible to the mechanism of "phantasms" and of sensations.²²⁷ The object, or its sensitive and intelligible representations, concur in the act of thinking, but it is always as a secondary agent.²²⁸ Its causal influence is always subordinated to the superior activity of the mind.²²⁹ As is fitting to a free power, the will is also intrinsically active.²³⁰ The teaching of the Marian Doctor on this subject is sufficiently known, hence we shall be spared further explanation.²³¹

This profound tendency of the psychology of Scotus to accentuate the active part of psychic life is not without significance.

²²⁶Quodl. XV., n. 6 and 8, XXVI, pp. 121b, 140.

²²⁷Ox. 1, d. 3, q. 7, n. 10, IX, p. 349: "Quomodo intellectus discurret syllogizando vel argumentando si phantasma causat omnem intellectionem. Non enim videtur intelligibile quomodo phantasma decurrentia causant omnem discursum. Item quomodo causabuntur intentiones logicales vel relationes rationis? Si enim phantasma causat omnem intellectionem, quaecumque causata ab eo erit realis, quia illa dicitur esse realis intellectio quae causatur immediate a re . . . Item quomodo reflectetur intellectus supra actum suum et hoc quomodo erit in potestate potentiae reflectendo," etc. Cf. *Quaest. in Metaph.*, IX, q. 14, n. 13, VII, p. 592; *Quod.* XV, n. 9, XXVI, p. 140.

²²⁸Ox. 1, d. 3, q. 8, n. 3, IX, p. 401: "In utraque motione (intellectus) obiectum est movens secundarium." Cf. H. Klug, art. cit. (1929), XLI, pp. 517-520.

²²⁹Ox. 1, d. 3, q. 8, n. 2, IX, p. 399: "Respondeo quod pars intellectiva habet principalem causalitatem respectu cognitionem modo nobis naturaliter convenientium. . . . Videtur intelligibile naturaliter a nobis intellectuum species in intellectu esse quasi instrumentum ipsius intellectus, non motum ab intellectu ut agat, quasi scilicet aliquid respiciat ab intellectu; sed quo intellectus utitur ad suam actionem, ut puta quando intellectus agit, species illa tanquam minus principale agens coagit ad idem ut ad effectum communem." Cf. H. de Montefortino, *Ven. J. Duns Scoti Summa theol.* (ed. nova, Roma, 1901), Pars 3, q. 79, art. 3, III, pp. 583-585 — In the *Quod.* XV, n. 13-20, XXVI, pp. 144-153, Duns Scotus does not decide if the passible intellect is granted with activity, but elsewhere he inclines for the affirmative, *Ox.* 1, d. 3, q. 7, n. 37, IX, p. 387. It is active in this accidental and relative meaning, that in all actual knowledge, the passible intellect, not really distinct from memory, is informed by the intelligible species which effectively coöperates with the act of thought, *Quod.* XV, n. 20, XXVI, p. 153a. Cf. H. Klug, art. cit. (1929), XLI, pp. 245-256, 250 St. Bonaventure affirms the activity of the passible intellect, II *Sent.*, d. 24, p. 1, art. 2, q. 4, ad 5, II, p. 571; E. Gilson, *La philosophie de S. Bonaventure* (Paris, 1924), pp. 351-352.

²³⁰*Quaest. in Metaph.* IX, q. 14, n. 13, VII, p. 592: "De appetitu intellectivo tenetur quod simpliciter est activus."

²³¹*R.P.* 2, d. 25, q. 1, n. 20, XXIII, p. 127: "Dico ad quaestionem quod nihil creatum aliud a voluntate est causa totalis actus volendi in voluntate." *Quod.* XVI, n. 15, XXVI, p. 199a: "Ipsamet est tale activum quod seipsam determinat in agendo"; *R.P.* 3, d. 17, q. 2, n. 4, XXIII, p. 376a: "Non potest esse voluntas nisi sit domina sui actus et ita est domina voluntas sui actus." Cf. P. Minges, *Joannis Duns Scoti Doctrina philosophica et theologica quoad res praecipuas proposita et exposita*, Quaracchi (1930), I, pp. 272-351.

Not only does it permit a sufficiently extended criticism of the "sensualism" of Condillac, and the other philosophies which exaggerate the passivity of the understanding²³² — G. Sanseverino²³³ himself has not hesitated to recognize and to use fully the Scotistic psychology — but it is also of modern trend, and in keeping with the most accredited doctrines of the present day. "All psychic life," writes an eminent modern psychologist, Mr. E. Baudin,²³⁴ "is only an activity. It is true biologically, for all the vital processes are only movements; it is also true psychologically, for psychic life is pure dynamism. The activity of thought in particular does not yield in any way to the activities of action properly so called; to think is always to act. Thought is an original activity, with a special dynamism; to wish to explain²³⁵ thought by the *sensata* will always be equivalent to wish to explain the blacksmith's work by the iron which he forges . . . what dominates in the forge is the blacksmith and his activity. What is dominant in the intellectual forge is equally the mind and its activity." "In the same way," he adds,²³⁶ "biologically the will appears as an independent force which regulates the use of our other forces. . . . It realizes in us an effective monarchy, which in the best cases is absolute. Psychologically, the will appears as the function of autodetermination which the attentive analysis of the act of willing has revealed to us." Has not Scotus exactly formulated these remarkable views of modern psychology?

It is equally permitted to believe that the great affirmations of Scotus, on the individual and its intelligible and moral value, favor notably a reconciliation between Scholastic philosophy and the tendencies of contemporary psychology.

As Mr. Jacques Chevalier has observed, "philosophical specula-

²³²*Philosophia christiana* (Naples, 1862), *Dynamilogia*, c. 7, art. 13, II, pp. 692-709.

²³³*L.c.* art. 14, II, pp. 709-946, chiefly pp. 726, 730-732, 735-738: "In antecessum mente reputemus Sensistas hac in re per cum Aegidis ejusque discipulis consentire, qui etsi intellectum sensu tota specie discriminarent nihilominus unicum principium intellectionis esse phantasma ab intellectu agente illuminatum dictitabant. . . . Cum res ita se habeat, nos sane juvat Sensistas iisdem armis conficere, que Scotus, S. Thomam aliosque doctores secutus, adversus Aegidianos, intellectionem ab unica phantasmatis actione repetentes, adhibuit." Having cited *Ox.* 1, d. 3, q. 7, n. 10, IX, p. 349, he adds: "Pauca, sed egregia verba Scoti haec sunt."

²³⁴*Psychologie* (Paris, 1919), p. 532. Read chiefly, pp. 333-338.

²³⁵*L.c.* 337.

²³⁶*L.c.* 582.

tion, issuing from Greek and Aristotelian thought, scarcely concerned itself otherwise than with the universal and the general." "From the universe, such as Aristotle reconstructed it with his concepts," writes the eminent Professor of Grenoble,²³⁷ "the individual happens to be finally banished: all that is not necessary and universal in it, form or species, finds itself relegated to the domain of the accidental, hence of the unintelligible and of the perishable. In the universe thus conceived, we have only to deal with genera and species, with types or with laws, in a word with formal essences, analogous to those which one finds in logic and mathematics, the two sciences best known to the Greeks, the method of which they extended to the rest of the real. We do not meet in their system a single individual: for God Himself, the Supreme Individual, dwells a stranger in this world which tends toward Him, but which He has not made, which He can neither know, nor love, owing to the danger of falling from His high place." The thoughts and formulas of Aris-

totle, more or less profoundly modified were shared by many Scholastics.²³⁸ The Franciscan School, notwithstanding, has never accepted them; on the contrary, following Roger Bacon,²³⁹ it has strongly reacted against the Aristotelian trends, and it is one of the merits of Duns Scotus to have reintegrated the individual in the domain of the intelligible, and consequently, at least in a certain measure, of science.

The philosophy of intuitive and concrete cognition of the singular previously explained, proves this sufficiently. It affirms that the individual, the direct object of thought, is *Being* of the first order: *Individuum est verissime ens et unum*;²⁴⁰ it also maintains that matter itself falls directly under the grasp of the intellect. The Scotistic philosophy restores completely to the individual, and even to the material singular, its intelligible value. The important thesis of Scotus on the activity of the thinking subject, the spontaneity of

²³⁷ *La science du réel*, l.c. 11.

²³⁸ *L.c.* 13.

²³⁹ *Communium naturalium*, lib. 1, pars. 2 (ed. Steele, Oxford, s.a.), pp. 94-5: "absoluta natura individui longe major est et melior quam relata, quia habet esse per se et absolute et ideo singulare est nobilius quam suum universale." Cf. R. Carton, *L'expérience physique chez Roger Bacon* (Paris, 1924), pp. 68-9; D. Sharp, *Franciscan Philosophy at Oxford* (Oxford, 1930), pp. 169-170.

²⁴⁰ *Quaest. in Metaph.* VII, q. 13, n. 17, VII, p. 417a.

the act of willing, his concept of personality which appears in his system as *sui juris*, a possession of self, the nature that it effects from all actual dependence naturally postulated in the place of another Ens, are not less convincing evidence of the moral value that the Franciscan Doctor recognizes in the human person.²⁴¹ Hence, Mr. E. Gilson²⁴² writes correctly: "The care of assuring as completely as possible the originality of the individual, is closely related in Duns Scotus to his conception of the primacy of the will and to his doctrine of liberty."

Furthermore, Scotus rejects the Aristotelian thesis of individuation by matter²⁴³ — and this attitude, so profoundly Augustinian and traditional, is of considerable significance.²⁴⁴ The soul, for this reason, is individualized and limited by the exterior, neither by the affected matter of quantity in the actual state,²⁴⁵ nor after its earthly existence, because of its relation to the body;²⁴⁶ it is, on the contrary, individualized and limited by the interior²⁴⁷ because of the ultimate reality which fixes and contracts its nature and renders every singular being numerically one and indivisible — a positive

²⁴¹*Ox.* 3, d. 1, q. 1, n. 17, XIV, p. 45a: "Ad personalitatem requiritur ultima solutio sive negatio dependentiae actualis et aptitudinalis ad personam ulterius naturae"; *R.P.* 3, d. 1, q. 1, n. 5-9, XXIII, pp. 236-238. Cf. Fr. Zach, van de Woestyne, O.F.M., *Cursus Phil.* (Malines, 1921), I, pp. 532-534.

²⁴²*La philosophie du Moyen-Age* (Paris, 1925), p. 240.

²⁴³*R.P.* 2, d. 12, q. 4, XXIII, pp. 20-25. Cf. Fr. Zach. van de Woestyne, O.F.M., *l.c.* I, pp. 527-532; D. Sharp, *l.c.*, pp. 296-306; and J. Assenmacher, *Die Geschichte des Individuationsprinzips in der Scholastik* (Leipzig, 1926), pp. 58-71.

²⁴⁴E. Gilson, *La philosophie au Moyen-Age*, p. 259: "La solution du problème de l'individuation que Duns Scot nous propose est tout à fait digne de remarque. Il est évident que l'individuation jouit dans le scotisme d'un degré de réalité bien supérieure à celui que lui reconnaissait le thomisme."

²⁴⁵*R.P.* 2, d. 12, q. 4, XXIII pp. 20-25.

²⁴⁶*R.P.* 2, d. 3, q. 1, n. 5, XXII, p. 581a: Duns Scotus has also established the impossibility of placing the principle of individuation in a relation, *Quaest. in Metaph.* VII, q. 13, n. 2-3, VII, pp. 404b-405a.

²⁴⁷*R.P.* 2, d. 12, q. 8, n. 2, XXIII, p. 37: Hoc singulare est aliquid in se et ad se; igitur hoc erit per intrinsecum, non autem per negationem; probatum est prius; et addo quod ipsa negatio est ejusdem rationis in multis, igitur est quaerendum per hic est hoc "non dividi, quia 'non dividi in plura' est ejusdem rationis in quolibet individuo. Ita dico quod istud intrinsecum non potest esse ens rationis, quia hujusmodi res necessario requiritur ad existentiam rei extra animam, nec potest esse illud natura, nec pars naturae, nec etiam accidens; igitur aliquid intrinsecum individuo sed extrinsecum naturae et per se determinans naturam ad hoc individuum," etc. *Ibid.*, n. 2-5, and n. 8, XXIII, 37, 39; *Ox.* 2, d. 3, q. 7, n. 4, XII, p. 161a; *Ox.* 2, d. 3, q. 6, n. 15, XII, p. 144.

and last determination which Scotus justly calls "hæcceity."²⁴⁸ From this fact, the multiplication of the spiritual and immaterial individual in the interior of the same species, is metaphysically possible, and it is given for a fact in the angelic world. Thus, under all its aspects, the individual is brought into prominence in the philosophy of Scotus.

These psychological and metaphysical outlines are of the highest importance, and their magnificent scientific potentiality cannot escape the historian. Recent medievalists of every shade have declared this time and again, e.g., Fr. Testimony of Medievalists Morin,²⁴⁹ Endres,²⁵⁰ M. Heidegger,²⁵¹ H. Heimsoeth,²⁵² and especially the eminent critic and philosopher, Fr. Erich Przywara, S.J.²⁵³ Following Scotus and Suarez, Dr. Jos. Geyser,²⁵⁴ and even Max Scheller himself, also repudiate the Aristotelian theory of individuation by matter, and it is indeed the authentic teaching of the Marian Doctor and of St. Bon-

²⁴⁸R.P. 2, d. 12, q. 5, n. 14, XXIII, p. 32.

²⁴⁹*Dictionnaire de Philosophie et de théologie scolastique* (Paris, 1856), I, col. 1303-1304.

²⁵⁰*Geschichte der mittelalterlichen Philosophie* (München, 1908), p. 154.

²⁵¹M. Heidegger, *l.c.* 12, pp. 177-178: "Für das Eigenrecht individualisierender Wissenschaften hat erst die moderne Logik Grundlegender geschaffen und die hierher gehörigen Probleme aufgedeckt."

²⁵²*Die sechs grossen Thernen der abendländischen Metaphysik und die Ausgang des Mittelalters* (Darmstadt, 1922), pp. 248-251. Read also J. Assenmacher, *l.c.* 68.

²⁵³*Griechische, patristische, scolastische und neuzeitliche Philosophie in Gottesgeheimnis der Welt* (München, 1927), p. 117: "Wenn es der Ruhm neuzeitlicher Wissenschaft und Lebensauffassung überhaupt ist, dass sie die unbeirrbare Andacht zur Kleinsten individuellen Besonderung gelernt, ganz im Gegensatz zur antiken Entwertung des Individuellen—ich frage also: wenn wir, und mit recht, stolz sind auf die ganz ungeahnte Entwicklung von Technik und Kultur, die allein dieser empirischen Forschung ihr Dasein dankt, müssen wir dann nicht folgerichtig die Ehre dem erweisen, der zuerst in schoepferischer Weiterarbeit an die Stelle der alten Entwertung des Individuellen die neue positive Wertung setzte, indem er das Individuelle aus seiner Verbannung in die Materie erloeste: dem vielverkannten Duns Scotus." Cf. *Kantischer und Katholischer Geistestypus*, in *Stimmen der Zeit* (Freiburg i. B., 1926), Bd. 106/107, pp. 169-170.

²⁵⁴Cf. L. Baur, *J. Geyser als Mataphysiker in Philosophia Perennis. Festgabe J. Geyser zum 60 Geburtstag* (Regensburg, 1930), II, pp. 1186-1187: "Während Thomas das Prinzip der Individuation mit Aristoteles in der Beziehung der Form zur Materie und so auch der Seele zu ihrem Leib sucht, nimmt Geyser—ähnlich wie Scheler—an, dass die im Menschen lebende Seele, dass jede Geistige Person in ihrem eigenem Wesen und Sein (unmittelbar) von individueller Bestimmtheit ist." Cf. M. Roland-Gosselin in *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* (Paris, 1920), IX, p. 198.

aventure that the Rev. Fr. Blasius Romeyer, S.J.,²⁵⁵ would introduce forcibly and in opposition to the formal text and age-old tradition, into the system of St. Thomas Aquinas, in order to modernize it. This almost general favor for Scotistic psychology of the individual is very well explained: modern psychology of quite concrete tendency, still more the positive sciences, as Fr. Eucken,²⁵⁶ H. Heimsoeth and Dr. Papillault²⁵⁷ have observed, have henceforth reintegrated the individual in the domain of thought and observation. This movement at one and the same time has rendered the psychology of Scotus more actual than ever.²⁵⁸

Lastly, let us point out the views of the Marian Doctor on the synergetic activity of the psychological powers in mental life. Before Scotus, the great Provençal philosopher, Peter Olivi, had analyzed penetratingly what the Franciscan masters, and after them, Suarez, have justly called the natural "*colligantia*" of the faculties of the soul.²⁵⁹ Scotus, a disciple of St. Augustine, and at the same time an attentive observer of life, according to R. Sieberg,²⁶⁰ has not failed to bring into prominence the unity of the interior life, and consequently, the mutual assistance of the powers of the soul.²⁶¹ Interpreting the Augustinian consubstantialism professed by St. Bonaventure, he rejects, indeed, the real distinction that Scholastic Aristotelianism introduces between the substance of the soul and its faculties, and between the powers themselves.²⁶² In his opinion, the

²⁵⁵S. Thomas et notre connaissance de l'esprit humain, *Archives de philosophie*, vol. 6, chap. 2 (Paris, 1928), pp. 25-48.

²⁵⁶*Geistige Stroemungen der Gegenwart* (Leipzig, 1916), p. 275.

²⁵⁷*Science française et scolastique allemande*, in *Revue anthropologique* (Paris, 1916), p. 265, partly reproduced by the *Revue du Clergé français* (Paris, 1917), an. 23, vol. 89, pp. 179-184.

²⁵⁸We cannot fail to note here the delicate touch with which Scotus has set off the Sacred Humanity of Christ: no theologian has equaled his genius and his heart. R. Seeberg, *l.c.*, 273, and F. Imle, *Der Geist des heilig. Franziskus und seiner Stiftung* (Mergentheim, 1921), pp. 236-250.

²⁵⁹Cf. B. Jansen, S.I., *Erkenntnislehre Olivis* (Berlin, 1921), pp. 76-90.

²⁶⁰*Die Theologie des Joh. Duns Scotus*, p. 109.

²⁶¹Cf. P. Mingès, O.F.M., *Jo. Duns Scoti doctrina philosophica et theologica quoad res praecipuas proposita*, etc. I, pp. 141-3, 331-2; H. de Montefortino, *Ven. Jo. Duns Scoti Summa theol.* (nova ed. Roma, 1901), Pars 3, q. 77, art. 4, III, pp. 542-545; E. Longpré, *La philosophie du B. Duns Scot* (Paris, 1924), pp. 225-226.

²⁶²*R.P.* 2, d. 16, q. 1, n. 2-4, XXIII, pp. 67-70.

faculties differ only formally but not absolutely;²⁶³ they are not engrafted on the soul like accidents that affect a substance,²⁶⁴ but identify themselves ontologically with the essence of the soul.²⁶⁵ These views on the fundamental unity of the intellectual life make it possible to outline more precisely the reciprocal influence of the psychological faculties. With admirable good sense, Duns Scotus has not neglected to do so, especially in the *Reportatio Parisiensis*, where he observes that the final reason of the "*colligantia potentiarum*" is found in the essential unity of the "Ego" and of the psychic faculties.²⁶⁶ It is in virtue of the connection of these powers that²⁶⁷ an excessive joy excludes sorrow in one and the same subject, that the

²⁶³L.c. n. 18-19, XXIII, p. 74: "Non sunt potentiae idem formaliter vel quidditative inter se nec etiam cum essentia animae nec tamen sunt res aliae, sed idem identitate. Ideo talia habent distinctionem secundum ratione formales."

²⁶⁴On this subject P. Olivi, *Quaest. in secundum librum Sent.*, ed. Jansen Quaracchi (1924), quaest. 54, II, pp. 248-252.

²⁶⁵B. Mastrius de Meldula, *Cursus Phil.* De anima, d. 2, q. 1, art. 1-2, III, pp. 42-46. It is easy to see that Duns Scotus, on this subject, departs from the modern psychology which since Descartes and Bossuet himself subscribes to the nominalist theory and places only a logical distinction between the faculties and the soul. Cf., J. Fröbes, S.J., *Psychologis speculativa* (Friburgi B. 1927), II, p. 229; C. Sanseverino, *Philosophia christiana*, *Dynamilogia* (Naples, 1862), c.l., art. 1, I, p. 323; Prosper de Martigné, l.c. 408-410. The Marian Doctor equally objects to the Cartesian theory identifying the soul and its operations. A. Fioravanti, O.F.M., *La distinzione tra l'anima e le sue facoltà nella dottrina del Ven. Giov. Duns Scoto in Studi Francescani* (Arezzo, 1914), I, pp. 235-244, chiefly p. 243: "Si e detto che questa dottrina sa di cartesianismo. Nulla pero di piu falso. Cartesio infatti insegna che l'anima è il pensiero — e per pensiero intende tutta l'attività cosciente: idee, sensazioni, volizioni. Scoto invece nega che l'anima sia una cosa stessa colla sua operazione e afferma solo che e una cosa stessa realmente identica colle sue facoltà."

²⁶⁶R.P. 4, d. 45, q. 2, n. 9; XXIV, p. 560b: "Quando anima est conjuncta, quidquid ipsa intelligit secundum intellectum phantasiatur actu illud idem secundum phantasiam, nec hoc propter aliquam imperfectionem majorem quam habet in intelligendo quando est conjuncta quam quando est separata, sed propter naturalem ordinem, connexionem et concordiam istarum potentiarum in agendo circa idem, quando est conjuncta. Fundatur enim in eodem esse animae ut partes virtuales, et ideo ad operationem perfectam alicujus potentiae omnes potentiae concurrunt coagendo circa idem objectum, quia quaelibet nata est intendere actum alterius propter concomitantiam earum naturalem: sicut voluntas facilius inclinatur ad volendum illud quod appetit appetitus, non propter aliud quam propter earum ordinem naturalem in agendo, sicut intellectus maxime inclinatur ad intelligendum id phantasiabile, quod tunc actu phantasiatur propter eamden causam," etc.

²⁶⁷Cf., R.P. 3, d. 15, q. 1, n. 11, XXIII, p. 36; Ox. 3d, d. 15, q. 1, n. 35, XIV, pp. 615b-616a.

soul cannot simultaneously apply itself with equally sustained attention to several objects,²⁶⁸ but works more easily and with more pleasure, when all the powers tend in common toward an identical object.²⁶⁹ For this reason the will is inclined naturally to "will" what the intellect proposes and what appears more agreeable to reason.²⁷⁰ To explain how the will applies the intellect and makes the inferior powers act, several Scholastics, inspired by St. Thomas,²⁷¹ affirm the existence of a motion or transient physical quality, imprinted by the will on the faculty in motion. Scotus regards this opinion as not improbable, but he believes it too difficult to understand, and does not admit it.²⁷² The sympathy, or better, "the natural connection" of the powers suffices to explain this mechanism outside of any physical determination—this the celebrated Mastrius de Meldula,²⁷³ exposes amply and accurately. These exact and suggestive outlines make us realize once more the actuality of the psychology of Scotus—above all, if we bear in mind that modern

²⁶⁸*Ox.* 4, d. 45, q. 2, n. 9, XX, p. 560b.

²⁶⁹*R.P.* 2, d. 42, q. 4, n. 14, XXIII, p. 221a.

²⁷⁰*Ox.* 2, d. 6, q. 2, n. 8, XII, p. 354a. Cf. P. Minges, l.c. 331–332.

²⁷¹Cf. Joan. de S. Thomas, O.P., *Philosophia naturalis*, Pars. 3, De anima, q. 12, art. 6 (Paris, 1883), III, pp. 551–562.

²⁷²*R.P.* 2, d. 42, q. 4, n. 16, XXIII, pp. 222: "Aliter posset dici quod voluntas habet immediatam actionem super intellectum, sed hoc est difficilius videre"; *Ox.* 4, d. 42, q. 4, n. 12, XIII, p. 462.

²⁷³*Cursus Phil.*, De anima, d. 7, q. 7, art. 2, n. 194–199, III, pp. 252–253, chiefly n. 198: "Quia doctor ipse, loc. cit. ait esse difficile hoc defendere praestat absolute asserere ad hoc ut aliae potentiae moveantur ex imperio voluntatis, nec motionem physicam esse necessariam, nec concursum simultaneum (=conimbricenses), sed sufficere radicationem et conjunctionem in eadem anima, ratione cuius per naturalem sympathiam ipsa efficaciter imperante applicantur immediate ad operandum: ita Doctor ibidem significat (*Ox.* 4, d. 42, q. 4, n. 10–12, XIII, pp. 460–462; *R.P.* ibid. n. 13–17, XXIII, pp. 220–2). Et probatur, quia in nostra sententia colligatio longe major intercedit inter potentias animae ad invicem et radicatio in tertio, quam in Thomistarum opinione: illi siquidem realiter animae potentias ab invicem distinguunt ac ab anima ipsa atque ideo quasi accidentali nexu eas colligare videntur; at secundum nos et inter se et cum anima realiter identificantur et adeo colligantur et radicanantur in anima ut ipsa re vera dicatur principium quod omnium operationum viventis et ipsae solum rationes operandi seu principia quibus, ex disp. 3, q. 1, art. 2; ergo licet in Thomistarum opinione necessaria foret motio illa physica inferioris potentiae a superiori vel saltem concursus simultaneus hujus cum illa ad ejus operationem ut eam movere et determinare dicatur ad operandum medio imperio ob realem distinctionem quam inter illas potentias ponunt, tamen apud nos illam absolute negantes, neque illa motio physica est necessaria, neque simultaneus ille concursus, sed si sufficit radicatio cuius per naturalem sympathiam, operante potentia superiori, etiam inferior, quae illi subordinata manet, moveatur ad operandum."

thought, since the seventeenth century, has banished the system of real distinctions from the domain of psychology.

It is possible to trace still further the modernity and the adaptability of Scotistic thought. The Marian Doctor, for example, has acutely studied the sensitive and the intellectual memory, following St. Augustine and the Franciscan School:²⁷⁴ This fact is

significant at the present time, in view of the searching analysis of Henry Bergson.²⁷⁵ Thus, most of

Further
Adaptability
of Scotistic
Thought

the contemporary psychologists, and Fr. Fröbes, S.J.,²⁷⁶ himself, teach that the will is not determined, in all cases, by the final practical judgment of the intellect. Such is the classical thesis of the

Scotistic School.²⁷⁷ The Franciscan masters have also accentuated the place of the nervous system in sensation,²⁷⁸ in opposition to the Aristotelian opinion which regards the heart as the seat of sensibility. This tendency is in harmony with the opinion generally admitted today. Since the seventeenth century especially, the spiritualist philosophy closely investigated by Pascal, Fénelon, and Maine de Biran, has been applied to analyze the aspirations of the human

²⁷⁴The principal texts of Duns Scotus are found in H. de Montefortino, *Ven. Jo. Duns Scoti Summa Theologica* (nova ed. Roma, 1901), Pars 3, q. 79, art. 6 and 7, III, pp. 594-604, and Fr. Parth. Minges, O.F.M., *Jo. Duns Scoti doctrina philosophica et theologica*, etc., I, pp. 193-207. On the Scotistic doctrine, H. Cavelle, O.F.M., *In librum de anima*, d. 3, sect. 2, in Duns Scotus, *Opera*, III, pp. 723-725; B. Mastrius de Meldula, *Cursus Phil.*, De Anima, d. 6, q. 4, art., n. 78 and 83-95, III, pp. 155-158; H. Klug, art. ct. 1929, XLI, pp. 520-538.

²⁷⁵Cf. J. Chevalier, Bergson (Paris, 1926), pp. 144-190.

²⁷⁶*Psychologia spiritualis*, Psych, rationalis, l. 2, c. 2, Thesis 18, II, pp. 201-207. The author writes, p. 203: "Hanc sententiam extremam (plurium Thomistarum) maxime in thesi impugnamus asserentes illam cum vera libertate conjungi non posse. Sic plurimi auctores: teste Suarezio jam Henric. Gandavensis et Scotus; ipse Suraez, Vasquez, Ruiz; Mastrius hanc sententiam communem dicit extra scholam Thomisticam inter recentiores. Ex recentioribus Tongiorgi, Palmieri, Lahousse, Gutberlet, Mendive, Schifini, T. Pesch, generatim ut fatetur Sanseverino "maxima pars recentiorum philosophorum."

²⁷⁷B. Mastrius de Meldula, *Cursus Phil.*, De anima, d. 7, q. 3, art. 3, n. 40-64, III, pp. 222-225.

²⁷⁸Cf. *De anima*, q. 2, n. 2 (ordinarily attributed to Duns Scotus, but which belongs to Antoine André), in Scotus' *Opera*, III, p. 481: "Dicendum quod caro non est organum tactus sed aliquid intracarnem: vel nervum, vel aliquid loco nervi extensum corpori." *Ibid.*, q. 10, n. 4, III, pp. 524-5: "Organum sensus communis habet ortum a corde sed in cerebro habet suum complementum." Cf. H. Cavelle *Annot. in librum De anima*, q. 2 and q. 10, in Scotus' *Opera*, III, pp. 482-483, 526-527.

soul toward the Infinite;²⁷⁹ but the Marian Doctor has preceded it in this path.²⁸⁰ Is this not more than sufficient to conclude that Scotus is the most modern and the most actual of medieval psychologists?

After this rapid exposition it is nevertheless well to observe that both the medievalists and the modern disciples of Scotus must not exaggerate the modernity of Scotistic psychology and its power of adaptation to contemporary thought. The fatal equivocations produced by undue comparisons between the voluntarist psychology of the Augustinian and Franciscan School and actual pragmatism, are indeed of recent date,²⁸¹ and what is worse, there are some who apply themselves superficially to prolong the misunderstanding despite the protestations of the best informed medievalists,²⁸² and the teachers in the Franciscan School. Consequently, it becomes necessary to note, at least briefly, the principal lines of demarcation between Scotus and modern psychology, and to establish also that, if the progressive thought of the Marian Doctor

²⁷⁹Cf. J. Chevalier, *Pascal* (Paris, 1924), p. 343; E. Przywara, S.I., *Wende zum Menschen in Stimmen der Zeit* (Freiburg i. B., 1930), CXIX, pp. 6-7.

²⁸⁰Cf., R.P. 3, d. 14, q. 2, n. 12, XXIII, p. 348: "Cum dicitur quod intellectus anima Christi videret Verbum sub ratione infiniti, concedo quod sic facit minimus intellectus si quietetur: non enim potest quietari nisi in infinito sub ratione infiniti, quia quilibet intellectus est totius entis; ideo non quietatur nisi in illo objecto in quo est quodlibet objectum suum quantum potest esse; sed solum in essentia divina sunt omnia intelligibilia eminenter. Et confirmo hoc quia nullus intellectus beatus satiabitur nisi in videndo Deum Trinum et ista est maxima infinitas quod sit unitas in substantia et trinitas in personis." Cf. *Ox.* 1, d. 1, q. 1, n. 3, VIII, pp. 300b-301a; *Ox.* 3, d. 14, q. 2, n. 6, XIV, p. 500, etc.

²⁸¹Cf. P. Minges, O.F.M., *Ist Duns Scotus indeterminist?* in *Beitraege zur Gesch. der Phil. des Mittelalters*, Bd. V, Hft. 4 (Münster i. W., 1905), p. 138.

²⁸²M. de Wulf, *Hist. de la philosophie médiévale* (Louvain, 1924), I, n. 180, p. 283: "Les discussions (sur le primat du connaitre et du vouloir) sont nées d'une opposition à la doctrine de saint Augustin qui donne au vouloir un rôle prépondérant dans la vie psychique. Elles n'ont donc aucune portée épistémologique." Of the same, *Introduction à la philosophie néo-scolastique* (Louvain, 1904), pp. 183-184: "Le primat d'une faculté sur une autre s'entend depuis Kant dans un sens spécial et donne à un système philosophique une orientation critériologique nettement dessinée. Il n'est pas permis de transposer cette formule dans l'histoire de la philosophie médiévale sans en changer la signification." This opposition clearly appears when Kant's and Fichte's, Wundt's and Muensterberg's contemporary voluntarism has been exposed. Cf. L. Stein, *Philosophische Stroemungen der Gegenwart* (Stuttgart, 1908), pp. 8-11, 25-32.

and his voluntarist attitude itself²⁸³ made it easy to agree in many problems with Scholastic philosophy and the intellectual currents of the present day, it will not sacrifice a single one of the fundamental theses of spiritualist psychology,²⁸³ but, on the contrary, will defend them vigorously, erecting solid ramparts against the multi-form errors issuing from Kantianism and Idealism. This very summary exposition of Scotistic thought on that score establishes anew, in its own way, the actuality of Scotistic psychology.

With all the Scholastics, Scotus, indeed, affirms the substantiality of the soul (opposed to the universal mobilism of Heraclitus), the principles²⁸⁴ of which he justly criticizes. He also rejects the psychological phenomenism which sees in the Ego an outlet of phenomena without a permanent substratum, or a bundle of perceptions, united only by means of association.²⁸⁵ For him the soul is Being, then Activity:²⁸⁶ incontestably it is the most perfect of substantial

²⁸³Despite the irreducible differences between Scotus's voluntarism and actual voluntarist tendencies, one may think that a psychology from Augustinian and Scotistic inspiration greatly favors the desired reconciliation with modern thought; at least, it corrects the serious inconveniences of Aristotelian intellectualism, by the fact that it throws into the background the will and heart. Fr. P. Mingès has rightly observed this. "Joannes Duns Scotus," in *The Franciscan Educational Conference, Report of the Third Annual Meeting* (Cincinnati, 1921), p. 55. The fact is very sensible if one considers M. Scheler's philosophy. "Ce philosophe," écrit le R. P. Kremer, "*La philosophie de Marx Scheler. Son analyse de la sympathie et de l'amour*," in *Revue néo-scholastique de philosophie* (Louvain, 1927), XXVIII, pp. 166-178, a esquissé malgré les obscurités d'une pensée souvent compliquée et les lourdeurs d'une langue abstraite, une psychologie réellement vivante, qui ne redoute pas les réalités spirituelles." It is worth considering the voluntaristic orientation of this doctrine. His theory on love openly reaches the conception called "extatique" by Rd. Fr. Rousselot. Now, this conception as formulated by St. Bernard, is classical among the Franciscan Scholars, especially Scotus. J. Carreras y Artau, *Ensayo sobre el voluntarismo di J. Duns Scot* (Gerona, 1923), pp. 62-65. For this reason, without doubt, Fr. Benedikt Goelz, O.F.M., "Max Scheler," in *Dritte Lektorenkonferenz der deutschen Franziskaner für Philosophie und Theologie* (Muenster i.W., 1926), p. 81, writes: "Für die Franziskanerschulen hat die Frage: sind die tatsächlichen Grundanschauungen Schelers für den Katholischen Philosophen annehmbar oder nicht?, noch insofern eine besondere Bedeutung, als Scheler in einigen Punkten den Augustinismus bevorzugt, der auch der älteren Franziscanerschule zum Teil das Gepräge gegeben hat."

²⁸⁴Cf. M. de Wulf, *Hist. de la Philosophie médiévale* (Louvain, 1925), II, n. 316, p. 76.

²⁸⁵Cf., *Ox.* 1, d. 3, q. 4, n. 5, IX, p. 168a; *Ox.* 1, d. 3, q. 5, n. 8-11, IX, pp. 217-218.

²⁸⁶On these systems and the "Aktualitätspsychologie," see J. Fröbes, *Psychologia speculativa*, Lib. 3, c. 1 (Freburgii B., 1927), II, pp. 236-7; J. Geysler, *Lehrbuch der allgemeinen Psychologie* (Münster i.W., 1920), I, pp. 270-280.

forms.²⁸⁷ According to traditional philosophy, the decisive proof of psychological substantialism rests on the testimony of the conscience, which in each vital activity grasps concretely the subject which acts and attests the permanence and the identity of the Ego in the various psychic acts.²⁸⁸ On this subject Scotus has precisely furnished very important indications, especially, when he studies psychological experience, and treats of recollection and intellectual memory.²⁸⁹ The Neo-Scholastic movement and the spiritualist philosophy would not be justified if they forgot it. Similarly, the Franciscan Doctor shows forth not without penetration, the spirituality and the immateriality of the soul,²⁹⁰ and vigorously maintains human individuality against Averroist monopsychism.²⁹¹ Following all the Scholastics, he affirms the substantial unity of the human composition,²⁹² but understanding the mode of union in the traditional sense of the Franciscan School and conformably to the theory of the plurality of forms. His principles in this matter have justified his disciples, especially the famous Fortunatus de Brescia, O.F.M.,²⁹³ to criticize sharply the occasionalism of Malebranche and the pre-established harmony of Leibnitz.

It is also equally impossible not to recall in a few words the wide

²⁸⁷*Ox.* 2, d. 16, q. 1, n. 6, XII, p. 26b: "Est anima immediatum principium formale essendi et immediatum principium operandi; sed non similiter se habet ad causam formalem (esse) et ad effectivam (operari): non enim oportet quod habens formam sit semper in actu secundo." Cf. *R.P.* 2, d. 16, q. 1, n. 15, XXIII, p. 169.

²⁸⁸*Ox.* 1, d. 2, q. 7, n. 40, VIII, p. 589. Cf. P. Mingès, O.F.M., *Joannis Duns Scoti doctrina philosophica et theologica*, etc., I, p. 116.

²⁸⁹Cf. D. Mercier, *Psychologie* (Louvain, 1923), II, n. 248, pp. 244-246.

²⁹⁰*R.P.* 4, d. 45, q. 3, n. 2-5, 7-13, XXIV, pp. 568-570, 571-575; *Ox. ibid.*, n. 4, XX, p. 326: "Hoc supposito tanquam certo quod possit nobis inesse actus cognoscendi praeteritum in quantum praeteritum ut objectum, addo quod ille actus, qui dicitur recordari, non est cujuscumque praeteriti immediate sed tantum alicujus actus praeteriti, qui infuit ipsi supposito recordanti, et qui fuit in ipso actus humanus, ad excludendum actus vegetativae et casuales sive generaliter imperceptibiles; non enim recordor ejus quod est te sedisse, nisi quia recordor me vidisse vel nosse te sedisse."

²⁹¹Cf. *Ox.* 4, d. 43, q. 2, n. 5, XX, p. 36; *R.P.* 4, d. 45, q. 3, n. 5, XXIV, p. 570; *Ox.* 2, d. 16, q. 1, n. 2, XIII, p. 24a; *Ox.* 2, d. 3, q. 6, n. 7, XII, p. 132a.

²⁹²*Ox.* 4, d. 43, q. 2, n. 5, XX, p. 37. Cf. Fr. Zach. van de Woestyne, l.c. I, pp. 531-532.

²⁹³*Ox.* 4, d. 43, q. 2, n. 4-13, XX, pp. 36-43. Cf. C. Prezzolini, l.c. *Psychologia*, c. 2, art. 2, II, pp. 58-63. Logically Duns Scotus asserts that sensation depends on the compound and not only on the mind, according to Descartes, *Ox.* 4, d. 44, q. 2, n. 6, XX, p. 217.

Scotus Opposed to Contemporary Idealism

gap which exists between Scotus and contemporary idealism. According to this theory so widespread, the mind decrees and constructs the exterior object according to the play of *a priori* forms: this projection is its transcendental function, in the Kantian sense of the word. Now that the psychology of the Marian Doctor has here a real value, a fervent disciple of St. Thomas Aquinas, G. Sanseverino,²⁹⁴ has not hesitated to borrow from Scotus, the principles of the remarkable thesis in which he opposes Hegel and Fichte. As it appears from a simple reading of the works of Scotus,²⁹⁵ and as Fr. Bernard Jansen, S.J.,²⁹⁶ has already observed in our own time, the Franciscan Doctor violently attacks the thesis that grants to the object only a terminative causality in the genesis of the idea; contrary to Henri de Gand, Peter Olivi, Pierre de Trabibus and William of Nottingham, he maintains the causal influence of the object on the cognitive faculty.²⁹⁷ Doubtlessly, in the act of knowing, the activity of the thinking subject prevails²⁹⁸—Scotus says this in a most positive way as has been noted before—however, this spontaneity of the intellect is limited; it exacts the collaboration of the senses and of the sensory data; at least at the awakening and at the starting point of cognition, and the concourse of the object. The causal activity of this last is required for safeguarding the objectivity of knowledge, the *similitudo objecti*.²⁹⁹ Therefore Scotus thinks, with a well-balanced

²⁹⁴*Philosophia mentis methodice tractata atque ad usus academicas accomodata* (Brixiae, 1711). *Metaphysica*, p. 2, sect. 2, n. 153–160, II, pp. 195–206 (against Malebranche) and sect. 3, n. 160–281, II, pp. 206–309 (against Leibniz). This last dissertation is remarkable.

²⁹⁵*Philosophia christiana*, *Dynamilogia* (Naples, 1862), Pars spec. c. 7, art. 17 and 18, II, pp. 746–780, especially pp. 756–764, 768–780: “Scotus ad hanc opinionem refellendam multa eaque maximi ponderis argumenta elucubravit quae hic exponere operae pretium est.”

²⁹⁶Cf. *Ox.* i, d. 3, q. 7, n. 2, and n. 20, IX, pp. 337, 361. Cf. H. de Montefortino, *Ven. Jo. Duns Scoti Summa Theologica* (nova ed. Roma, 1901). Pars. 3, q. 79, art. 2 (bis), III, pp. 576–583.

²⁹⁷*Die Erkenntnislehre Olivis* (Berlin, 1921), pp. 48–63, chiefly pp. 60–61. Cf. H. Klug, art. cit. (1929), XLI, p. 8, note 1.

²⁹⁸*Ox.* l.c. n. 3, IX, p. 338. Cf., *R.P.* 4, d. 10, q. 5, n. 4, XXIV, p. 78b: “Non requiritur ad dependentiam actionis quod dependeat ad objectum in quantum terminatur eam sed in quantum objectum causat eam,” etc.

²⁹⁹Cf. B. Mastrius de Meldula, *Cursus Phil.* De anima, d. 5, q. 2, art. 2, n. 18–26, III, pp. 142–144; *Ox.* 1, d. 3, q. 8, n. 3, IX, p. 401.

mind that has won the admiration of Macedo,³⁰⁰ that the action of the object and that of the subject coördinate.³⁰¹ Just as in human generation, the father and mother are the completely active causes, at one and the same time independent and synergetic, so in the production of cognition, the subject and the object are two complete causes, in their order, which act synergetically.³⁰² "Thus," writes Mr. Baudin,³⁰³ "Duns Scotus expressly refuses to accept illimited spontaneity which has to profess absolute idealism: he refutes even the principle such as he finds it in Henri de Gand, who taught that cognition owes everything to the subject." "If this were true," says Scotus, "if the soul were the all-sufficient cause of its cognitions, if it alone furnished them matter and form, it would not cease to produce and to represent, since nothing could prevent it: it must always think, and the fact is, it does not." God alone, indeed, is the infinite intellectuality;³⁰⁴ who, then, would not recognize in this criticism, so just and so desirous of safeguarding the divine transcendence,³⁰⁵ a very actual value, at this present time, when so many battles are fought around idealism?

It is not less opportune to observe that the Scotistic philosophy of freedom is profoundly opposed to the determinist tendencies that inspire several contemporary systems. For this reason it has been

³⁰⁰*Ox.* 1, d. 3, q. 7, n. 20, IX, p. 361b: "Tunc actus non esset similitudo objecti, nec distingueretur essentialiter propter distinctionem objecti, quia essentialis distinctio non est ab eo quod non est causa, nec esset simpliciter perfectior intellectio perfectioris intelligibilis, posito aequali conatu hinc inde ex parte intellectus." *Ibid.*, q. 8, n. 3-4, IX, p. 401. Cf. *Quod.* XV, n. 9, XXVI, p. 141a.

³⁰¹*Collat. doctrinae*, coll. 2, diff. 3, Padoue, 1671, II, pp. 113-114. Cf. E. Longpré, O.F.M., *La Philosophie du B. Duns Scot* (Paris, 1924), p. 202: "Non solum hic acuminis sed etiam prudentiae specimen Scotus praebeuit in sentiendo, medium tenens. Non attribuit objecto totam causalitatem nec totam causalitatem nec totam potentiae assignavit; suam cuique partem reliquit ut etiam iustitiam in sentiendo exerceret: extrema quae sunt vitiosa et periculosa vitavit," etc.

³⁰²*Ox. l.c.* IX, pp. 361b-362a: "Si ergo nec anima sola nec objectum solum sit causa totalis intellectionis actualis et ista sola videantur requiri ad intellectionem, sequitur quod ista duo sunt causa integra respectu notitiae genitae. Et ista est sententia Augustini."

³⁰³*Ox. l.c.* n. 21, IX, p. 362; *Quod.* XV, n. 8-12, XXVI, pp. 140-144.

³⁰⁴*La raison et la foi dans la philosophie du moyen âge* in *Revue des sciences religieuses* (Strasbourg, 1923), III, p. 330, note 1.

³⁰⁵*Ox. l.c.* n. 20, IX, p. 361: "Videtur etiam quod tunc esset infinita activitas in intellectu, in quantum est activus respectu omnium intelligibilium . . . et ita habens (intellectiones) infinitas ut totalis causa, est infinitum in perfectione," etc.

extensively utilized by the apologists of the Scotus, an Enemy counter-reformation.³⁰⁶ It is not less suitable of Modern to the needs of the present day, in the great Determinism battle that rages around the soul and human liberty. Likewise, if it is true, as Mr. Dumesnil³⁰⁷ writes, "that in the works of the German successors of Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, and Schopenhauer, the subject, by whatever name it may be called — the 'Ego,' the 'Absolute,' the 'Reason,' or the 'Unconscious' — keeps an impersonal character, and that the doctrine of personality holds only a subordinate and unimportant place with these philosophers," the present value of an individualist philosophy like that of Duns Scotus, where the Ego and the personality are placed in all their strength,³⁰⁸ urges itself upon all impartial minds. But what is more notable, the two great antinomies that Kant has created, on the one hand, between the understanding and transcendent reason, and on the other, between sensation and understanding, are brilliantly overcome in the philosophy of the Marian Doctor. By placing in the Ens the proper object of the intellect and attributing to the transcendental concepts a representative value and a common intelligibility or of univocal content, whatever may be the objects to which they are applied, Scotus has brought together the two extremes of being — the world and God — and at the same time by direct and univocal application of these transcendental notions, surpassed Kantian agnosticism. The solution of the second antinomy is offered not less surely by the Scotistic psychology of intuition, and of direct knowledge of the singular. For Kant, the "matter" of the judgments is furnished by sensibility,

³⁰⁶Cf. Sanseverino, *l.c.* pp. 762-763: "Verum pantheismum qui hac doctrina continetur, Scotus duobus argumentis luculentius demonstravit. Quorum primum est quod si anima esset unicum efficiens suae intellectionis, actio intellectiva ejus infinita foret. . . . Alterum argumentum est quod si intellectio ab objecto minime penderet, ipsa, ut ostendimus, speciem suam ab objecto minime acciperet neque una intellectio ab alia ob diversitatem objecti distingueretur. Jam si res ita se haberet, diversitas scientiarum non a diversitate objectorum sed a sola vi intellectiva animae oriretur, quippe quod nihil aliud praeter intellectum atque objectum intelligibile ad actus intellectivi effectiorem concurrere sumi potest. Atqui pantheismus transcendentalis, totus quantus est, hoc falso fundamento nititur scilicet quod principium omnium et diversarum scientiarum in solo subjecto agnoscendum est. . . ." Sanseverino cites, *Ox.* 1, d. 3, q. 7, n. 20, Videtur etiam, etc. Similiter non, etc., IX, p. 361b.

³⁰⁷Cf. E. Longpré, *La Philosophie de Duns Scot*, pp. 188-9.

³⁰⁸*La sophistique contemporaine* (Paris, 1912), p. 4.

and the "form" comes from the ideas or the *a priori* syntheses. In other words, there is a solution of continuity between the object of sensibility and the object of reason, and consequently, the objectivity and the formal unity of the concept are compromised irretrievably. On the contrary, for Scotus there is rigorous unity: the mind, indeed, does not only attain the "exclusive intelligible," but it grasps also by intuition, and in a direct manner, the matter itself of the judgments, namely, the singular and material object, and all that is the object of experience and sensibility. Thus, thanks to an intuition of the concrete and existential Ens, all the order of concepts is solidly anchored to the real, and brought back to unity. Evidently, these two great theses refute Kantianism in its fundamentals.³⁰⁹ What a book could be written on this subject, to make known, under all its aspects, the value and the actuality of the psychology of Scotus!

"The views of the Subtle Doctor," M. l'Abbé Vacant³¹⁰ wrote in

³⁰⁹E. Przywara, *Kantischer und Katholischer Geistestypus*, in *Stimmen der Zeit* (Freiburg i. B., 1924), Bd. 106/107, pp. 169-170: "Nach Thomistischer Auffassung, die mir die antike Entwertung des Individuums uebernimmt, ist die Wesensform des individuellen Menschen der Allgemein-Mensch, die *natura humana* qua talis. Mithin gruendet alle Verschiedenheit der Einzelmenschen allein im Körper. Es fehlt also der Lehre nicht bloss einer qualitativen Gleichheit der Menschenseelen, sondern auch einer quantitativen Selbigkeit. Denn wenn wir von den verschiedenen Koerpern absehen, so ist nicht einzusehen, warum die eine menschliche Natur an sich, der eine, ueberall gleiche Allgemein-Mensch in einer Mehrzahl vorhanden sein sollte. Wenn die Menschenseelen grundsatzlich der eine ueberall gleiche Allgemein-Mensch sind, wodurch unterscheiden sie sich von einander, wenn sie ohne Leib gedacht werden? Hier wird sichtbar, wie die Lehre von der qualitativen Gleichheit der Menschenseelen in gefaehrlicher Nachbarschaft steht zu der Lehre der arabischen Aristoteliker von dem einen Intellekt, der allen Menschen gemeinsam ist. Dieser arabische, allen gemeinsame eine Intellekt ist aber in gleichfalls folgerichtigem Aristotelismus der Intellekt schlechthin, d.h., Gott. Wenn wir diese unterirdischen Verknuepfungen beobachten, gewinnen wir erst die rechte Schaetzung des grossen Dienstes, den Duns Skotus mit seinem neuen Individuationsprinzip dem Thomismus geleistet; wie er ihm die Wege freimachte für jene geklaerte Erbsuendelehre, die die letzten Spuren einer irgendwie scheinhafte Suende beseitigte und sie einzig und allein in die freiwillige Gnadenberaubtheit verlegte, so schnitt er auch jene letzten Faeden, die den Thomismus noch mit dem arabischen Aristotelismus verbanden, denn wenn — wie Skotus lehrt — die Individualitaet in der Seele selber begruendet ist, so schwindet die letzte moeglichkeit jene gefaehrlichen Gleichsetzung des Allgemein-Menschen mit Gott."

³¹⁰Cf. Belmond, *Dieu, existence et cognoscibilité* (Paris, 1913), p. 267, P. Symphorien de Mons, O.M.C., "La distinction formelle de Duns Scot et les universaux" in *Etudes Franciscaines* (Paris, 1910), XXIII, pp. 249-250, and Déodat de Basly, O.F.M., *Capitalia Opera B. Joannis Duns Scoti* (Le Havre, 1908). Introd. pp. XXXVII-XXXIX, have mentioned the value of many Scotistic theories against Kantianism.

1898, "are still living, and after six centuries of controversy, the problems which he discussed have not lost their actuality."

The foregoing pages have been written to establish in the clearest way possible, the truth of this declaration. May they attract the attention of psychologists and medievalists to the doctrine of Blessed Duns Scotus, in the pure and simple interest of truth and scientific progress. Above schools and systems, there is truth, there is also the contemporary mind which searches laboriously for light in the confusion of the most contradictory syntheses where the great theses of spiritualist philosophy disappear. Issuing from the ardent heart of Francis of Assisi, therefore, welcoming, sympathetic, and completely tending toward action, Franciscan thought has an intellectual mission proper to itself: to open wide the ways which allow of happy reconciliations between the great currents of modern thought, and which will finally lead to the peaceful possession of truth. In the accomplishment of this great duty, there is no better guide than the great Doctor of Christ the King and of the Blessed Virgin — Blessed Duns Scotus.

⁸¹¹"D'où vient que Duns Scot ne conçoit pas la volonté comme S. Thomas d'Aquin," in *Compte-rendu du IVème Congrès scientifique international des Catholiques* (Fribourg, 1898), p. 644.

FREUD'S PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY

FR. HYACINTH BARNHARDT, O.F.M., Ph.D.

Psychoanalysis is a term to be found today on everyone's lips. Its originator is Sigmund Freud, born of Jewish parents in 1856 at Freiberg in Moravia. Psychoanalysis, according to Freud himself, has come to have two meanings: (a) a particular method of treating nervous disorders, and (b) the science of unconscious mental processes.¹ During the brief period of its existence psychoanalysis has received the greatest opposition as well as the greatest praise. Y. Delage, one of the outstanding French biologists, writing in 1916, says that psychoanalysis is itself a psychosis.²

Opinions on Psychoanalysis In the same article he suggests that the secret law of psychoanalysts is to satisfy their own erotomania. On the other hand, however, Freud has spoken of three cultural epochs that have dominated the world: the Copernican revolution, Darwinism and his own achievements in directing attention to the unconscious.³ Numerous enthusiastic admirers have lauded Freud and have ranked his new discovery with the monumental discoveries of Galileo and Newton. Thus, Barbara Low says: "It would seem that this new psychological knowledge and method will ultimately have to be reckoned along with the great epoch-making discoveries of the past — for instance, Newton's Theory of Gravitation, or the Darwinian Theory, and may go further than these in the extent of its application."⁴ A few years later, Stanley Hall, an outstanding American pioneer in experimental psychology, lauds the commencement of Freud's theory as an important date in the history of psychology. ". . . Freudian mechanisms enable us to explore the vast regions of psychic life below the conscious surfaces. Nothing since Aristotle's categories has gone deeper or, in my opinion, is destined to have such far-reaching

¹Freud, "Psychoanalysis," *Encyclopædia Britannica* (14th Ed.), Vol. XVIII, p. 673.

²Delage, *Une psychose nouvelle: la psychanalyse*, Mercure de France, Sept., 1916.

³Cf. Freud, *Introduction to Psychoanalysis*. Authorized translation by G. Stanley Hall, pp. 246, 247.

⁴Barbara Low, *A Brief Account of the Freudian Theory*.

influence and results."⁵ Oscar Pfister, a Swiss Pastor, calls Freud "the Christopher Columbus of the Unconscious."⁶

What, then, is this new doctrine propounded by Freud? In the beginning it was merely a new branch of therapeutics. The passage of time, however, has seen it outdistance its early domain to become a method of psychological analysis, and a general system of psychology and of philosophy. Every science, it is said, has a system of metaphysics behind it, and Freud basing himself on the unconscious wishes to offer a system of metaphysics that will be an adequate explanation of every branch of knowledge: religion, morality, the history of art, social and pedagogical problems.

As De La Vaissière remarks, an exposition of psychoanalysis involves the recital of the life story of its inventor.⁷ In early life Freud was undetermined whether to follow law or medicine. He decided in favor of medicine although he felt no particular attraction for this field. His work under the physiologist Brücke and at the Institute of Cerebral Anatomy failed to fix his attention which was even then becoming attracted to the study of nervous disorders.

Between 1880-1882, Joseph Breuer, a Viennese physician, made the discovery of a new procedure for relieving patients suffering from hysteria.

Shortly afterward Breuer communicated this discovery to Freud, but it seems to have made no particular impression on him at the time and, certainly, received no acclaim from the medical profession in general. In 1884, the dream of Freud's life was realized; he went to Paris to study under Charcot at the Salpêtrière. At that time Charcot was demonstrating how hysterical symptoms could be produced and made to disappear by suggestion. Following his sojourn in Paris (which lasted till the summer of 1886), he returned to Vienna and in spite of violent opposition continued to make extensive use of hypnotism in treating his patients. In 1889, he went to Nancy to observe the experiments of Bernheim. One experiment in particular seems to have intrigued him. A patient of Bernheim, while in a hypnotic sleep, was ordered to open an um-

⁵G. Stanley Hall, *Life and Confessions of a Psychologist*, pp. 11-12.

⁶*La Psychanalyse au service des éducateurs*, p. 87.

⁷Cf. De La Vaissière, S.J., *La Théorie Psychanalytique de Freud*. Archives de Philosophie. Vol. III, Cahier I, p. 13.

brella five minutes after becoming consciously awake. At the appointed time the patient seized an umbrella standing in the corner and opened it. When questioned concerning this act he replied that he didn't know why he did it and added in confusion that he merely wanted to see whether it belonged to him or not. Under pressure from Bernheim, however, he was led to recall his hypnotic state and the command actually given at that time.

It seems evident that these French masters were influential in continuing a train of thought that had been originally awakened in Freud by the discovery of Breuer. Many of the master ideas later to be developed by Freud would seem to owe their origin to this sojourn in France, although Freud himself repudiates this and claims his early indebtedness is wholly due to Breuer. Breuer's Collaborating with Breuer 1895 this as it may, Breuer and Freud collaborated in the production of a work entitled *Studien über Hysterie*. In this work the incident that had happened to Breuer is related and an attempt made to explain it. Breuer's patient, a girl, showed hysterical symptoms in the form of a strong repugnance for drinking from any sort of vessel. For six weeks she had taken no liquid except the juice squeezed from fruits. The idea occurred to Breuer that these symptoms might be connected with impressions which she had previously undergone during a period of excitement. During a hypnotic sleep she recounted the disgust she had formerly experienced when she beheld her governess' dog drinking from a glass. Through politeness at that time she suppressed the expression of her repugnance. Now, however, she lives again that experience and permits the outward expression of her sentiments of disgust, with the result that the hysterical symptoms were definitely cured. This method has been called Breuer's "cathartic method," because of this "abreaction," the neurotic phenomena are made to disappear by bringing back to consciousness the remembrance of the morbid fact which had caused them to appear.

Here, then, we have come to a discovery of prime importance for the therapeutic treatment of hysterical patients, as well as for psychology in general. The experiences of Charcot and Bernheim had convinced Freud that "hysterical ailments have, at least partially,

a psychic origin; the true motives of our acts are not always known; meanwhile, certain processes permit them to be revealed to consciousness."⁸ United with this the full import of Breuer's discovery was commencing to dawn on him. Suppressed emotions remain present in the realm of the unconscious and retain a dynamic power that may express themselves in mental disarrangements and even under the guise of physical symptoms. There is, therefore, a psychic factor active in neurotic patients although they remain entirely unconscious of its existence. Thus was born Freud's important contribution concerning the "dynamic unconscious."

Freud continued treating neurotic and psychoneurotic patients, employing the new method he had learned, but he soon found that there were numerous patients who could not be hypnotized. This difficulty led him to experiment on a new method which has become known as the method of "free (or accidental) associations." Instead of the element of suggestion that was always present when the psychiatrist worked on a hypnotized patient, the idea of permitting the patient to express freely whatever came to his mind was instituted. The results gained from this special technique led Freud to postulate three phases of our psychic life, viz., the state of consciousness, of preconsciousness and of unconsciousness, all of which are dynamically effective. The conscious state is the state wherein we are aware of psychic activity. The preconscious state is subject to ready recall because there is no hindrance from the censor. The unconscious is a state of the psyche in which we remain entirely unaware of any psychic influence; in fact, it is a state that is completely inaccessible to consciousness except when discovered through the psychoanalytic process. The unconscious is that which has been pushed out of consciousness, and remains dynamically latent.

This notion of repression is heralded as the corner stone of psychoanalytic building. Once repressed, the unconscious idea resists being brought back into consciousness. This psychic force has been named the "resistance." The resistance is quite as unconscious as the morbid idea — the resistance is part of the illness and is mani-

⁸De La Vaissière, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

fested only by its effects.⁹ Resistances, therefore, "Resistances" are defined as "mental forces opposed to the subject's becoming aware of certain parts of his mind."¹⁰ By chance, almost, Freud was led to believe that these thwarting influences, impulses, resistances, are exactly the same as those which, under a different aspect, we call repressions.¹¹ There is, according to this view, a directive power which causes certain impressions, sentiments, to be repressed into the realm of the unconscious, and which seem to stand guard over them in order to prevent them from emerging into conscious presence. Taking advantage of a term that was frequently employed and fully understood by everyone during the Great War, Freud has named this controlling force the *censor*. It is Freud's opinion that since the unconscious remains dynamic, there is a struggle to emerge into full consciousness, but, on account of the vigilance of the censor, there arises a "conflict" which becomes instrumental in provoking neurotic manifestations. Certain instinctual impulses are excluded from consciousness by the function of the censorship. These repressed impulses are not always rendered powerless by this process. They often succeed in making their influence felt by circuitous paths, and the indirect or substitutive gratification of repressed impulses is what constitutes neurotic symptoms.¹²

In the treatment of neuroses Freud found that when his patients were allowed to follow the method of free associations they continually kept intruding their dreams upon his attention. "My patients," he says, "after I had obliged them to inform me of all the ideas and thoughts which came to them in connection with the given theme, related their dreams, and this taught me that a dream may be linked into the psychic concatenation which must be followed backwards into the memory from the pathological idea as a starting point. The next step was to treat the dream as a symptom, and to apply to it the method of interpretation which had been worked out for such symptoms."¹³ His findings in this study have

⁹Cf. Wittels, *Sigmund Freud*, pp. 93-95.

¹⁰Jones, Ernest, *Psychoanalysis*, p. 13.

¹¹Jones, *ibid.*

¹²*Encyc. Brit.*, XVIII, p. 673.

¹³Freud, *Interpretation of Dreams*. Authorized translation by A. A. Brill, p. 373.

confirmed his former theory in such a way that he refers to dreams as the "*via regia*" to the unconscious.

The explanation for dreams generally accepted was that they were instigated by physiological factors, *viz.*, that kinesthetic impressions, internal or external sensations, might arouse certain cerebral cells to activity during the general inactivity of the rest of the organism. By reason of insufficient intellectual control, these imaginative representations are objectivated in a way utterly incompatible with the realities of wakeful attention. The dream, there-

Freud's fore, though fantastic, is developed on an intellec-
Explanation tual frame. Freud changes all this. He advances
of Dreams the theory that dreams are definitely psychical, not
 physiological, in their origin, and that they involve
no intellectual operation whatever. "The psychic activity in dream formation resolves itself into two functions—the provision of the dream thought and the transformation of these into dream content."¹⁴ We must distinguish, then, between the real dream thoughts (or latent content) and the manifest content. The manifest content is the part of the dream that we can remember on awakening, whereas the latent content is the hidden group of ideas that have been changed, modified, and distorted before being admitted to the conscious level. The provision of dream thoughts is made by the unconscious mind which possesses vast stores of repressed desires. The latent content has its abode in the unconscious and is generally a repressed wish which in most cases, if we are to believe Freud, goes back to childhood. These tendencies, although repressed, have never lost their power. Their dynamic forces, weakened by repression, need some new impulse to give them strength to make their presence felt. Thus, according to Freud, the events of the previous day are generally the instigators of the dream process. Sentiments or emotions of some kind have interested us during the day, but owing to lack of interest at the time or to an act of repression we have banished them into the unconscious. There with their fresh vigor they unite with another unconscious impulse and struggle to rise to the surface of consciousness.

The opinion had long been prevalent that dreams were not con-

¹⁴Freud, *op. cit.*, p. 401.

ducive to sound, healthful sleep. Freud's theory changes this to claim that dreams are in reality the guardians of sleep. In fact, the wish to sleep is the real cause of dreams.

Are All Dreams Wish-fulfillments? Through the medium of various analyses he has reached the opinion that every dream represents a wish-fulfillment. In the case of

children it is plainly evident that there are dreams of this pure wish type. "My nephew of twenty-two months had been given the task of congratulating me upon my birthday, and of handing me, as a present, a little basket of cherries, which at that time of the year were not yet in season. It seemed difficult for him, for he repeated again and again: 'Cherries in it,' and could not be induced to let the little basket go out of his hand. But he knew how to secure his compensation. . . . On the day after the birthday, he awakened joyfully with the information which could have had its origin only in a dream: 'Herman eat up all the cherries.'"¹⁵ "Another dream, which the picturesque beauty of the Aüssée inspired in my daughter, at that time three and a quarter years old, is equally straightforward. The little one had crossed the lake for the first time, and the trip had passed too quickly for her. She did not want to leave the boat at the landing, and cried bitterly. The next morning she told us: 'Last night I was sailing on the lake.'"¹⁶ The dreams of children, therefore, are, for the most part, the simple fulfillment of wishes. Even with adults this plain satisfaction of a desire is sometimes present. Freud cites a dream of his own in which thirst caused by eating anchovies before retiring was satisfied during sleep by the dream method. In the vast majority of adult dreams, however, the matter is much more complicated. Dreams often offer a pronounced absurdity and lack of logical connection that seem to render it impossible to explain them as wish-fulfillments. For example, a girl patient relates that she dearly loves her sister's little son, yet she dreamed of seeing him lying dead in a coffin, and she experienced no feeling of sorrow. Can such a dream really be the fulfillment of a wish? Yes, replied Freud, because "the dream only concealed her wish to see the man she loved again."¹⁷ Analysis had

¹⁵Freud, *op. cit.*, p. 111.

¹⁶Freud, *op. cit.*, p. 110.

¹⁷Freud, *op. cit.*, p. 367.

brought forth the following details. The girl had become estranged from her lover, yet she made every effort to see him on as many occasions as possible. When one of her sister's children had died, he came to the house to offer his condolences. Thus, there is the thought that if this other child should die, her old-time lover would come again and her desire to see him would be satisfied. In this way, an unconscious wish was gratified in a substitutive way.

This demonstrates that there is a certain amount of dream work going on in every dream process. The unconscious wish is often too startling to pass the vigilance of the censor. In fact, it is due to the weakened vigilance of the censor that dreams occur, for if the same psychic forces were active during the night as during the day the dream would never be realized. It is the wish to sleep that effects a compromise. The unconscious desires assume a disguise which enables them to pass from the unconscious to the preconscious. The processes involved in this elaboration are chiefly condensation and displacement. Through condensation different persons or places may be fused together as if on a composite photograph. Frequently enough elements are taken from each and fused together, or elements common to both are removed. This mechanism of fusion holds good in both directions so that one element in the manifest content may be connected with several elements in the latent content and vice versa. In displacement there is a reversal of values, and that which has been most violently repressed will emerge most quietly in an innocently disguised form. Thus the accent of signification, or the psychological accent, is transferred from where it originally belonged to a point of less importance. There is also the process of dramatization which means that the latent ideas are expressed in terms of action. A still further process, called the process of secondary elaboration, goes on even after the primary elaboration has entered consciousness. This process continues even after waking so that a dream written down immediately on awakening will differ considerably from a later remembrance of the same dream.

Freud, after establishing that a dream is always the fulfillment of a wish, goes on to say that "the wishes represented in the dream as fulfilled are not always actual wishes. They may also be dead, discarded, covered and repressed wishes, which we must nevertheless

credit with a sort of continuous existence on account of their reappearance in the dream."¹⁸ This reappearance may occur long afterward. In fact, Freud holds that "the wish manifested in the dream must be an infantile one."¹⁹ The possibility of an infantile desire remaining active in adult life need cause no difficulty if we accept the dictum of Freud that "the unconscious wishes always to

remain active. . . . Nothing can be brought to an end in the unconscious; nothing can cease or be forgotten."²⁰ A still bolder conclusion suggested by Freud is that the vast majority of adult dreams are the fulfillment of repressed infantile, sexual desires.

Here, too, a compromise is made with the censor through the employment of a system of symbolism which is the language of the manifest content of the dream and can only be translated back into its real meaning by a psychoanalytic interpretation. Freud writes that "the number of things which are represented symbolically is not great. The human body as a whole, parents, children, brothers and sisters, birth, death, nakedness—and one thing more," *viz.*, "what pertains to the sexual life."²¹ Emperors, kings, queens, princes, houses, hats, trees, sticks, daggers, water, etc., have special significance in this regard. Here we may recall the all-important place that Freud gives to the sexual factors in the development of all neuroses and of the majority of adult dreams.

It is, perhaps, convenient to mention at this time the Freudian ideas concerning the phases of infantile sexuality. According to psychoanalysis the sexual instinct is a complicated one. It is made up of various components that have to fuse into an entity before it assumes the form that we ordinarily understand by sex activity. During the course of growth various difficulties may arise, such as errors in development, fixations or arrests at certain stages, perverse regressions, etc. The sexual instinct, according to Freud, is active from the day of birth (if not

¹⁸Freud, *op. cit.*, p. 211.

¹⁹Freud, *op. cit.*, p. 439.

²⁰Freud, *ibid.*

²¹Freud, *Introductory Lectures to Psychoanalysis*. Authorized translation by Joan Riviere, pp. 128, 129.

even during the intrauterine period) and continues till death. Much surprise has been manifested that sexual activity should be referred even to the days of infancy. Freud, during his Course of Lectures at Clark University (Worcester, Mass.), in 1909, said that it seemed more remarkable to him that the presence of sexual tendencies in early childhood had not been marked and admitted by everyone. He intimates that blindness on this point comes from the wish not to see.²²

Psychoanalysis teaches that there are two periods in life when the development of these sexual tendencies manifests itself. The first is the period covering the early years of childhood till the fifth year. Then there is a period of latency extending till the time of puberty when the sexual development is again to be gone through. It is customary to divide infantile sexuality into pregenital, consisting of the oral and the analsadistic stages, and the genital. Pregenital sexuality is characterized by autoerotism and pansexualism, and knows nothing of the distinctions between the sexes.²³ The oral stage includes the various forms of sucking and swallowing. In the beginning the oralerotic impulses and the nutritional impulses cannot be distinguished because the actions involved are the same. Soon, however, it is seen that sucking has acquired a sexual significance of its own which is quite independent of hunger. "Sucking for nourishment becomes the point of departure from which the whole sexual life develops."²⁴ The anal phase is marked by a lively interest and curiosity in the excretory processes. There is, likewise, the presence of that "rough, noisy, obstreperous, and often cruel behavior which parents find so trying."²⁵ The final stage of this period is the genital phase. "The erotogenic zones of the body are not all equally capable of yielding enjoyment; it is therefore an important experience when . . . the infant finds the way from the pleasure of sucking to onanism."²⁶

²²Cf. Lecture IV.

²³Cf. Wittels, *op. cit.*, p. 125.

²⁴Freud, *op. cit.*, p. 264.

²⁵Jones, *op. cit.*, p. 55.

²⁶Freud, *op. cit.*, p. 264.

These various instinctive activities have separate objects or goals toward which they are directed.

In the first, or autoerotic one, there is, strictly speaking, no object; the child seeks for gratification in its own body, but there is hardly any sense of "I" and "it" in the proceeding. In the second stage, the narcissistic one, the ego has developed and is taken as the object of the instinct; one might say that the child loves itself, a capacity it never entirely gives up. The third stage is the critical one. Here the child seeks in the outer world for objects not only of its affection, but also of its conscious and unconscious sexual phantasies. It is inevitable that this should at first relate to those nearest to it, the members of its own family. Difficulties arise, however, when the phantasies (and often acts) indulged in with members of its own generation begin to be transferred to those of the old generation, principally the parents. This constitutes the Oedipus complex in which there is a sexual attitude on the part of the child toward the parent of the opposite sex together with rivalry toward the one of its own; commonly enough there is also present an inverted Oedipus complex where the reverse of this holds. This complex Freud regards as the central one in the whole unconscious; on the way in which the child deals with it depends more than on anything else its future character and temperament as well as any neurosis it may at any time develop. It is the most characteristic and important finding in all psychoanalysis. . . . All other conclusions of psychoanalytical theory are grouped around this complex, and by the truth of this finding psychoanalysis stands or falls.²⁷

We have given prominence to this rather lengthy citation because it summarizes in plain, succinct terms the far-reaching consequences claimed for psychoanalysis by its supporters. They claim that it furnishes the key to the understanding of an immense number of adult problems. The same author gives a partial list of such problems. "Every adult problem in the realm of sexuality, friction and difficulties in marriage, inadequacies in the conjugal relations, the inner meaning of such social problems as the causes of prostitution or the emotions about birth control, all jealousy, rivalry, and conflicts between the sexes, the origin of the various perverse practices and attitudes and endless similar problems, all are capable of full explanation only in the light of our newly gained knowledge concerning the early stages in the development of this complicated instinct.²⁸ If this be so, the importance of psychoanalysis lies not so much in its therapeutical applications as in its extensive psychological implications.

Another field too little studied by former psychologists has been made the subject of deep investigation by Freud, *viz.*, the many

²⁷Jones, *op. cit.*, pp. 56, 57.

²⁸Jones, *op. cit.*, p. 58.

peculiar and unexplained little errors that happen to us in the course of our daily lives. There are many little acts that at the time may cause us embarrassment, e.g., slips of tongue or of the pen, the mislaying of an object, the forgetting of a person's name, etc. These trifling occurrences may be conveniently grouped as follows: A. *Motor*: (1) making a mistake in carrying out an intended purpose, whether in speech, writing, or any other action; (2) carrying out an unintended purpose, "accidentally" doing something one had not really meant to do. B. *Sensory*: (1) simple failure, such as forgetting, overlooking, etc.; (2) erroneous perception, an error in memory, in vision, etc.²⁹ Are we to say that these occurrences are too trifling and insignificant to demand any explanation? Shall we say that many of them are merely mechanical and are caused by the automatic expenditure of excess nervous energy; that in their more pronounced form they are outward manifestations of emotion, or the indirect manifestation of satisfaction or impatience; that we slip up on some act because we are fatigued, indisposed, overexcited, distracted? These current explanations were not satisfactory to Freud for many reasons. He claimed that all these acts were full of meaning and by no means so insignificant as we generally feel them to be. He felt, moreover, that all such explanations, though, perhaps, partially true, were useless in explaining why one particular mechanical act was performed in preference to another, why one lapse should be committed instead of another. It is incontestable that psychoanalysis has given great importance to these discredited acts. There is no reason to believe that there is more of the element of chance in psychology than in physiology, physics, or chemistry. Psychoanalysis seeks in all these acts a definite cause and the presence of meaningful phenomena.

A person who commits an act which shows an error in mental functioning views his blunder from the point of view of his conscious intention. Let us take the following simple example from Freud: "A stubborn error of this sort is said once to have crept into a Social-Democratic newspaper, where, in the account of a festivity, the following words were printed: Among those present was His Highness, the

²⁹Cf. Jones, *op. cit.*, p. 66.

'Clown Prince.' The next day a correction was attempted. The newspaper apologized and said: 'The sentence should, of course, have read 'the CROW-Prince.''³⁰ Here evidently was the presence of a blunder that was not consciously intended. But viewing this from the point of view of the blunder itself we can see a meaning in it if we interpret it as showing what might have been unconsciously present in the mind of one politically biased against the Crown Prince. In the same way when we forget a person's name we actually do what we might pretend to do if we really wanted to show that person little consideration. To mislay an object, or to break something by accidentally letting it fall, would be our actual procedure if we wanted to rid ourselves of these things. Freud relates the story of a client of his whose feelings had cooled toward his wife. One day she gave him a book. He thanked her for this attention and promised to read it, but he mislaid the book. Several months later his mother was taken ill and his wife eagerly engaged herself in nursing her mother-in-law. One evening he came home filled with enthusiasm and gratitude for his wife. He immediately walked to a drawer in his desk, opened it without any definite intention, and there found the book he had so often searched for. Freud concludes this by saying: "With the cessation of the motive, the inability to find the mislaid object also came to an end."³¹ Therefore, in a general way it seems that a disturbing tendency is always present when a seeming error has been committed. The act itself is the result of a compromise, of an interference between two opposed tendencies. When the error is committed there are always two intentions present: the one to which our wills adhere, and the other betrayed by the error. The former is present to consciousness, the latter (the disturbing tendency) may be conscious or it may be wholly unconscious. The frequency of these daily errors wherein the disturbing tendency is unknown to us demonstrates the presence of an unconscious activity, of a dynamic unconscious that is singularly active.

The theories contained in this outline of the psychoanalytic findings concerning dreams and the errors of daily life are of the utmost

³⁰Freud, *Introd. Lect.*, pp. 23, 24.

³¹Freud, *op. cit.*, p. 37.

importance because they lead to the claim that the border line between normal and abnormal cases is very hard to determine. "It was while tracing back the abnormal to the normal state that Professor Freud found how faint the line of demarcation was between the normal and the neurotic person, and that the psychopathologic mechanisms so glaringly observed in the psychoneuroses and the psychoses could usually be demonstrated to a lesser degree in normal persons. This led to a study of the faulty actions of everyday life. . . . With great ingenuity and penetration the author throws much light on the complex problems of human behavior, and so clearly demonstrates that the hitherto considered impassable gap between normal and abnormal mental states is more apparent than real."³² Freud claims "that there is no reason for astonishment that psychoanalysis, which was originally no more than an attempt at explaining pathological mental phenomena, should have developed into a psychology of normal mental life. The justification for this arose with the discovery that the dreams and mistakes . . . of normal men have the same mechanism as neurotic symptoms."³³ Freud wishes, however, to pass even further than this into the speculative realm and offer a complete general theory of psychology that will be capable of answering the highest questions bearing on religion, morality, sociology, esthetics, pedagogy, etc. It is interesting to note the disdain in which psychoanalysts seem to hold the important findings of modern experimental psychology, of physiopsychology and of pathology. Freud has shown a marked dislike in admitting that any of his findings have been based on previous discoveries, or owe their origin to any other school of thought. As far as possible he wishes to establish a theory outstanding in its originality. It is for this reason that his choice of principles of activity seems to be arbitrary.

	A primary division mentioned by Freud groups the instincts under two heads: the "ego-instincts" which are directed
Manifestation	toward self-preservation and the "object-instincts"
of "Eros" or	which are concerned with the relations to an external object. The inclusion of the ego-instincts is
the "Libido"	said by Wittels to be a temporary expedient

³²Brill, *Introduction to Freud's Psychopathology of Everyday Life*.

³³*Encyc. Brit.*, XVIII, p. 673.

against the "masculine protest" of Adler. "He (Freud) has frequently declared that he is quite ready to abandon this part of his theory as soon as he can find a better."⁸⁴ At present, however, he has nothing better to suggest and builds on these. "Theoretical speculation leads to the suspicion that there are two fundamental instincts which lie concealed behind the manifest ego-instincts and object-instincts; viz., (a) Eros, the instinct which strives for ever closer union, and (b) the instinct for destruction, which leads toward the dissolution of what is living."⁸⁵ In Freud's opinion sexuality (Eros) is the elementary character, and the manifestation of this force of Eros is called "*libido*." According to psychoanalysis all mental processes have an interior origin due to the interplay of these instinctive forces, or an exterior origin arising from the reception of external stimuli. The psychic forces are originally in the form of instincts which are invested with an affective charge (cathexis). The Eros unites the impulses grouped around the principles of pleasure and reality, the instinct of conservation, and the sexual instinct with all its components. The nature of the instinct for destruction is not clearly stated by Freud, but is evidently psychological.⁸⁶ The interplay, either hostile or in concert, between Eros and the instinct for destruction gives us "the image of life."

Freud supposes that in our psychic life the instincts are invested with definite quantities of energy. It is the function of the mental apparatus to maintain this energy at an even level. "The course of mental processes is automatically regulated by the 'pleasure-pain principle'; and pain is thus in some way related to an increase of excitation and pleasure to a decrease."⁸⁷ The principle functions of the psychic mechanism is the search for pleasure, but the possibilities for pleasure may be transformed into displeasure by reason of repression. The principle of pleasure, however, is not entirely dominant, for the infant soon learns that it is subject to various restrictions, and thus is generated the principle of reality. Pleasure as a goal is never really discarded but "the mental apparatus learns to

⁸⁴Wittels, *op. cit.*, p. 157.

⁸⁵*Encyc. Brit.*, XVIII, p. 673.

⁸⁶Cf. De La Vaissière, *op. cit.*, p. 84.

⁸⁷*Encyc. Brit.*, XVIII, p. 673.

postpone the pleasure of satisfaction and to tolerate temporarily feelings of pain."⁸⁸

Having laid down these principles Freud proceeds to build on more comprehensive lines, hoping to be able to include therein his former contentions. The psychic apparatus, according to him, is composed of three parts: the *id*, the *ego*, and the *super-ego*. The *id* is the reservoir of the instinctive impulses, the fount of mental energy deriving from the instincts. The *id* consists of two parts, one hereditary and consisting of all tendencies which do not come from conscious perception, and the other brought about by the psychic life of each individual. Another addition ascribed to the *id* is the product of the person's racial history. The principle is well known: Ontogenesis is the repetition of phylogenesis. The theory maintained here is that the past experiences of the human race, if sufficiently intense and if frequently repeated, may be transformed, so to speak, into experiences of the *id* to be conserved, maintained, and transmitted to posterity. The *ego* is a portion of the *id* and is modified by the influence of the external world. The *id* in its activities is entirely unconscious, but its most superficial portion develops into the *ego* through conscious perception of external things. Our knowledge, therefore, is contained in the *ego* either as actually conscious or retained in the preconscious and subject to ready recall without marked hindrance from the censor. The *ego* functions by expressing the tendencies of the *id* and transforming them into actions. The existence of the *super-ego* is due to a differentiation of the *ego* and is welded out of the *id* by the *ego*. It is the heir of the *Œdipus* complex for its genesis is due to the identification of the child with its parents in the solution of that complex.

In its initial libidinous love the child had the mother for the object and consequently identified itself with her. But at the same time there was respect and admiration for its father and an attempted identification with him also. As the libidinous impulse toward the mother increased there grew up a hatred for the father who occupied an envied place which the child desired. During the period of

⁸⁸*Ibid.*

latency the child ceases to regard the mother as an object of desire and hatred toward the father ceases and the return of the child's identification with him becomes complete and stronger than before. During this time, therefore, the parents have been introjected into the child's ego. In that process, if they have been desexualized, the Œdipus complex is overcome and the psychic development of the child is normal. The modification of the ego brought about during that early sexual phase is the source of the super-ego which now commences to play a separate rôle and opposes itself to the other content of the ego. The primary function of the super-ego is to exercise a restraining control over every attempt of the repressed, infantile, sexual desires to merge into consciousness. It is Freud's doctrine also that the tendency for religion and morality, the desire for power, and the complacency in severity are due to the activity of the super-ego. Freud claims that these very general ideas are the conclusions of psychoanalysis, and are in every respect open to revision.

Freud claims that the applications of psychoanalysis (which originated in the sphere of medicine) are constantly increasing with regard to the fields of anthropology, the study of religion, literary history, and education. An example of this application is given in

Theory Regarding Origin of Society	<i>Totem and Taboo</i> (published in 1913) where he expresses his opinions concerning the origins of society and religion. In another work, <i>The Future of an Illusion</i> , he discusses the supreme illusion (religion), and shows its inevitable outcome (extinction). Still more recently in <i>Civilization and Its Discontents</i> he
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reiterates his views concerning the origin and nature of conscience. He makes use of the "old man of the tribe" theory first suggested by Darwin. In the distant past, men lived in a small community formed of one man, several women, and numerous children. When the boys grew to mature age they became the objects of the father's jealousy and he drove them out of the tribe. The sons, whose desires rested in the women, banded together, returned, killed their father and (because they were cannibals) ate him. In this way they satisfied their feelings of hatred, but the Œdipus complex, characterized by ambivalence (mingled feelings of love and hatred),

caused them to regret their act. With remorse and a consciousness of guilt they instituted a reparation act, *viz.*, a commemorative act in which they slaughtered the Totem in place of the father.

This beginning of conscience led them to renounce what had formerly been forbidden to them, i.e., access to the women, and they elaborated a code against incest with those living under the same Totem. We have here, then, more than a theory of social origins. It is a theory that hopes to account for the beginnings of conscience, morality, and religious institutions. The phylogenetic phase is applied in all its vigor to the individual; the conflict between Eros and the instinct for destruction commences within each individual with the entrance of the Œdipus complex. There is the commencement of feelings of guilt, the commencement of a conscience. The conflict is engendered anew when man is made to live with his fellow man. Men are by nature aggressive to one another, but civilization makes use of conscience to hold human aggressiveness in check. The craving for aggression is controlled by the super-ego which manifests itself in the form of conscience. There is a tension created between the moral force of the ego and the aggressive tendencies of the ego, and this tension we call the "sense of guilt." Conscience is defined by Freud as the result of instinctive renunciation. The child's attitude toward his father, therefore, is the origin of his individual conscience and the root of his religious sentiments. The categorical imperative of Kant is declared to be the direct heir of the Œdipus complex. The development of the super-ego becomes the moral factor within us which dominates the ego.

Freud's opinions concerning religion are grafted on these same notions. The need for religion, he tells us, springs from the child's radical feelings of helplessness, and the longing

On the Origin of Religion for a father evoked by that helplessness. To claim God as our Father can be traced to the child's earliest reactions to his earthly father. The attributes of omnipotence, omniscience, and moral perfection are invariably ascribed to the father at one stage or another during the child's early years. Providence, watching over man and making up to him for all the shortcomings of this life, is nothing more than this greatly exalted Father. The idea of a sacrificial rite as a religious ceremony goes back, of course, to the slaughter of the Totem by the

clan. We need not mention here the offensive applications that are made concerning Holy Communion. Freud remarks that the notions clustering around religion are so infantile, so incongruous with reality, that it is painful to think that the vast majority of mortals will never be able to rise above this view of life.

In the field of education, psychoanalysis refers to the importance of studying the inner springs of the child's intellectual advancement. These deep, primitive forces are of the utmost importance because they condition and color the child's whole future. The significance of this may be realized if we accept the psychoanalytic conclusion that the child's whole character is permanently formed for good or ill by the age of five, and that later influences have only a superficial effect or, at most, rearrange the elements already built. All children, they claim, seem to pass through the stage of neurosis. Whether this can be abolished entirely with proper training they are not willing to state. But they suggest that the more secure path is to have every child psychoanalyzed. It is psychoanalysis alone that can search the depths of the unconscious wherein all conflicts arise. Thus, by means that are either corrective or preventive the child may be spared many of the neurotic symptoms which otherwise are almost certain to develop. Till the present no extensive general work has been done along the lines suggested by psychoanalysis, but its application to individual cases has brought to light much matter which has been grouped by Doctor Ernest Jones under three heads. (1) The very imparting of instruction by the teacher is often unduly resisted by the child in spite of its thirst for knowledge because the child consciously or unconsciously takes it as constituting a criticism. The assumption of the child's ignorance concerning some subject and the effort to improve this is a wound to the child's self-love. Where this happens the child is a bad learner in spite of its intellectual gifts. (2) In the child's unconscious, the teacher takes on much of the significance that was formerly attached to the parents. This holds not only in matters of authority, but also with regard to the deeper erotic ties. There are many repressions and reactions in connection with this unconscious erotism which are bound to influence the affective bonds between teacher and pupil. (3) The assimilation of the actual mat-

ter taught shows extraordinary variations, not only in gross matters such as when a child is good at languages and hopeless at mathematics, but also within the details of each subject. Psychoanalysis shows this to be due to affective inhibition versus sublimation. This depends on the child's reaction to unconscious associations, for every part of the conscious topic becomes associated with unconscious ideas and so can on occasion symbolize these. Thus, for example, all arithmetic may become difficult (i.e., unconsciously inhibited) because of the unconscious associations "figures — counting on fingers — forbidden fingering."

Psychoanalysis has shown that patients who have considered themselves deficient in some subject have been able to overcome this by conquering the repressions unconsciously connected with it. Psychoanalysis stresses the importance of sublimation over repression as an educative measure. Repression may be too feeble and have no effect, or it may be too severe and bring in its wake many serious nervous troubles. It is the general teaching of Freud that the sexual impulses can be transmuted into the highest achievements of mankind. The process is one of desexualization through the sublimation of these impulses into spiritual ends such as art, science, religion. It is the hope of psychoanalysts that educators will learn to look on their new science as the best means of the normal development of the child.

This account of Freud's psychoanalytic theory has necessarily been brief and in consequence we have been able to sketch merely the more general outlines of the theory. Its study, however, has convinced us that Freud's name will go down in history as the originator

Psychology's of many findings that will be of inestimable value to psychology. Certainly, we cannot fail to admire
Debt to Freud his self-sacrificing labor in the formulation and development of his numerous theories. His clear, interesting style has a captivating charm that has won for him a host of readers. Nor must we forget that most of his writings have been composed in those few leisure hours during the night after days spent in the arduous tasks of lecturing, and of conducting innumerable consultations and analyses. He is admirably admitted by all as an outstanding pioneer in his theoretical and practical work on mental therapy. Under this head, psychoanalysis has gained for

itself a pragmatic sanction: it produces results. Even here, however, there are some who are competent to judge and who make no hesitation in saying that Freud has yielded somewhat too readily to self-glorification. Many of the cures that he claims to have effected are cases that would have remedied themselves if given time. Moreover, many of his descriptions of hysterical accidents, delirium ideas, and symbolic interpretations are "entirely outlandish and correspond to complexes which probably have never existed outside of his imagination."⁸⁹ It must be admitted, however, that pathological psychology owes much to him for his insistence on the important rôle of the unconscious, of repression, and of the employment of symbolism.

His entrance into the realm of normal psychology is less praiseworthy. Important as many of his discoveries have been concerning neurotics and other pathological subjects, they give him no grounds for making general applications to persons whose psychic life is entirely normal. A penchant for generalization and exaggeration is to be listed among the cardinal sins of Freud. Let us take, for example, his theory of the infant's precocious sexuality. According to Freud this is no longer an isolated pathological condition, but

is universal and entirely normal. The infant is a polymorphous obvert. But we must never lose sight of the fact that the fundamental psychoanalytic principles established for childhood have been forged by adults. Freud has insinuated a want of good will on the part of those who have not of themselves already recognized that sexual life begins, not with puberty, but at birth. The psychoanalysts make capital of numerous infant activities that do show a sexual significance when viewed according to our adult point of view. But is it not entirely gratuitous to overlook the immense differences that separate our present psychic life from those of the infant, and yet at the same time to claim that similar manifestations must have the same explanation?

The psychoanalytic theory has ridden roughshod over a fundamental principle of psychology, *viz.*, that children have their own psychic life which is entirely different from the psychic life of adults,

⁸⁹Dumas, *Traité de Psychologie*. Vol. II, p. 1049.

and that it is a mistake of method to interpret the actions of the child in terms of the actions of an adult. If the urge of an all-absorbing *libido* pushes children to perform acts for their sexual gratification, why is it that they fail to remember that in later life, in spite of the fact that those years must have been the most impressionable? Freud answers that between the ages of six and eight the censor commences to become active, causing the majority of the sexual impulses to be repressed into the unconscious and forgotten. But this explanation is a glaring case of a *deus ex machina* produced by Freud without a shred of experimental proof. "It is a convenient way of explaining that we do not recall having been little, pervert monsters, but it is in a completely gratuitous way that Freud supposes an elective forgetting of our infantile, sexual remembrances."⁴⁰

Furthermore, is it true that toward the age of puberty the child again passes through the phases of autoerotic, homosexual, incestuous desires already experienced in infancy, and that through fixation or regression to one of these the normal sexual development will be

blasted? "The facts of this kind are not constant,

Unwarranted they are not even frequent," writes Dumas.⁴¹ The
Claims burden of producing experimental evidence rests on

Freud. Till this is done his theory of precocious sexuality must be judged as an exaggeration that springs merely from his own fertile imagination. It may be objected that if the infant itself were questioned concerning why it exercises certain actions, it would reply: Because I find delight in them. "Undoubtedly it experiences pleasure in touching what it loves, in drawing near to it; the mother's caresses are a source of intense delight for it; its curiosity never fails, it loves to explore the world, to try out everything, to imitate everything. But why should these pleasures be sexual? Either because we interpret infant acts in the light of adult language, or (if we admit the common thesis that pleasure is an affective modality of operations conformable to nature) because we very gratuitously suppose that every action is sexual."⁴²

It is evident, then, that Freud has taken some pathological findings and has raised them into a theory to cover the normal life of

⁴⁰*Op. cit.*, p. 1050.

⁴¹*Ibid.*

⁴²De La Vaissière, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

childhood. His inspiration came from the confidences received from hysterical patients. "A client who comes to him has almost always lived in the Freudian atmosphere. She knows very well what is going to be asked of her, and what she is going to reply."⁴³ In some of his mentally tortured patients there may have been an element of truth in establishing this condition as due to a perverted sexual infancy, but a generalization of this state of affairs to all human individuals is beyond the acceptance of science. "I have remarked with interest that many experiments (*travaux*) have confirmed an objection that I have always raised, namely, that the universal and normal precocious sexuality is in reality only a pathological case."⁴⁴

Freud's theories concerning the origin of religion, morality, conscience, show evidence of his extreme ignorance concerning these subjects. "He shows no understanding of the essential meaning, purpose or facts of religion, no knowledge either of its history, or of its spirited defense, and no appreciation of the well-known findings of anthropologists."⁴⁵ Even before the writing of *Totem and Taboo* in 1913, many of the anthropological ideas exploited by Freud had been definitely declared untenable by scientists. Still more recent findings have established the following facts: Totemism is not the starting point in the development of civilization; nor is it a necessary stage of human development. It is not true that sacrifice and consumption of the Totem formed an essential element of the Totem cult. The older pro-Totemistic peoples knew nothing of cannibalism, and the murder of a father would have been an impossibility."⁴⁶ His theory of conscience is further vitiated because he "never seems to grasp the essential characteristics of conscience."⁴⁷

The introduction of psychoanalysis into the educational psychology of childhood has brought its train of disasters. Teachers, enamored of the high-sounding phrases of the doctrine, but without understanding them, have flung themselves into an orgy of psychoanalytical applications, often with the most disastrous results. Psy-

⁴³Dumas, *op. cit.*, p. 1051.

⁴⁴Quoted by De La Vaissière from the Report of the First International Congress of Sexual Knowledge, Berlin, 1926.

⁴⁵Vance, "Religion and Conscience," *Clergy Review*, April, 1931, p. 381.

⁴⁶Cf. Vance, *op. cit.*, pp. 390, 391.

⁴⁷Vance, *op. cit.*, p. 387.

choanalysts themselves are the first to decry this indiscriminate use of their method and technique.

Some pedagogues, with more enthusiasm for the subject than genuine knowledge of it, have preached and attempted the application of it to school life in a way that no analyst can support, for there remains a great deal of work to be done before we can feel sure of our ground here. This criticism is made not because the bearings of psychoanalysis on the problems of childhood are not important; on the contrary, it is because of their weighty import that one needs to be clear about them.⁴⁸

But even expert psychoanalysts, in applying this method to the child psyche, are following an illusion. They make the mistake that we have pointed out before, of taking the child as an adult in miniature, whereas the best psychologists and pedagogues insist on the fact that the child has its own proper psychological laws

Outcry which must be rigorously respected. Stern, one of the
Against most highly esteemed specialists in child education, is
Freud most outspoken in his appeal: "I request pedagogues, psychologists, medical men, and all those who are solicitous for the welfare of youth, to combat the new peril which threatens our children — the psychoanalysis of Freud — particularly in its application to childhood — it is not only a scientific error, it is a pedagogical sin."⁴⁹ Father De La Vaissière remarks that all the inquiries and particular observations show how little the child is made for anxiously reflecting on itself. He suggests that there is nothing better than making the child aware of its failings, of exhorting it to watch over its passions, to examine its conscience and to repent of its falls. It is noticeable how Freud stresses his psychical determinism to such an extent as to leave no place whatever for the activity of our wills. Granting that psychoanalysis may have beneficial results for the adult, it is preposterous to apply the same method to a child who is still in the process of formation. When applied to a child it is a sort of physical vivisection that can only be pernicious in its results.

The unconscious of the normal adolescent is the soil in which the seeds of the future are strewn; these seeds should not be plucked from the earth if we wish them to produce. It is certain that the child and the adolescent will often find aid in the manifestation of thoughts and images that trouble him; they have need

⁴⁸Jones, *op. cit.*, p. 87.

⁴⁹Citation from De La Vaissière, *op. cit.*, p. 61.

of enlightened advisers since they are not capable of resolving their own moral difficulties.⁶⁰

Freud insists that a person cannot be a successful educator unless he can participate in the psychic life of the child. If we do not understand children it is because we do not know more about our own childhood. The remedy suggested is that we should have ourselves psychoanalyzed in order to solve the mystery of our personal childhood. But the same difficulty is met here; it is impossible to really have ourselves psychoanalyzed. The only result that can happen is that we would recall remembrances of childhood and interpret them in terms of our present adult life. It is practically impossible to think that these remembrances have not been modified by our subsequent psychic development. At the very most, these remembrances would be recent imaginations unduly retrojected into the days of our early childhood. It is a commonplace in educational psychology that all the tendencies of later years have their roots in the first days of life, but Freud's method for revivifying them in their primal state is faulty and cannot stand the test of criticism.

DISCUSSION

FR. EDWIN DORZWEILER, O.M.Cap.—The Freudians warn against the evil of "suppression." They tell us not to inhibit a wish, for it will prove harmful, perhaps disastrous. Suppressed wishes, they say, are thrust into the lower region of the mind where they behave like the legendary Titans who from time immemorial have borne the ponderous mountains which the victorious gods once rolled upon them, and which even now quiver from time to time from the convulsions of their mighty limbs. The assertion that the mind becomes diseased from restraint has found a wide acceptance. Many parents and pedagogues spare the rod and coddle young culprits, lest stern measures of correction should cause a suppression and the baneful phenomena consequent upon it.

But it is becoming more and more apparent that the fear is groundless. For the Freudian doctrine of suppression fosters egoism, lawlessness, and disrespect for parental authority, proving once again the wisdom of the Scriptural injunction not to spare the rod and spoil the child. It is rather the rank growth of passion that is so prolific of mental and bodily troubles.

Now there is such a thing as a wrong kind of suppression. And it is very common today. It consists, as Dr. J. J. Walsh has somewhere pointed out, in denying a desire its external expression while it is encouraged internally; modern society arouses passion, but will not have it betrayed in any overt act. Thus it creates a disharmony between thought and expression; it tantalizes and tintillates

⁶⁰De La Vaissière, *op. cit.*, p. 61.

delicate nervous mechanisms, and this can but undermine healthy living. The traditional Christian teaching, on the contrary, insures an agreeable harmony between thought and action, saying that if the action is unethical, so too is the mental enjoyment of it. One cannot pleasurably contemplate the forbidden fruit without succumbing to the temptation of plucking and eating it. This is not only good catechetics, but also good psychology. And it is just as good psychology to prevent harmful desires from lodging in the unconscious. This is a point which seems to escape the notice of Freud and his followers. They know nothing of the custody of the senses, of guarding well the avenues of access to the unconscious and prohibiting dangerous invaders.

Christian asceticism is not a negation, a denial of life and a destruction of nature, as the Freudians imply; it is an affirmation of life. Self-discipline is the contradictory of selfishness. Professor Dietrich von Hildebrand, philosopher and psychologist, in his thorough analysis and explanation of the Catholic idea of sex, showed that chastity is not a negative virtue of repression only, but is decidedly constructive, fashioning life into a consistent and harmonious whole. It is rather Freudianism that offers but little that is positive, constructive, synthetic. It is chiefly analytical, disintegrating.

The Freudian diagnosis is not always as innocent and harmless as in the case reported by a poet:

"A progressive young lady of Rheims
Had confessed some astonishing dreams,
And was justly annoyed when the great Dr. Freud
Said, 'a surfeit of chocolate creams.'"

The interpretation is commonly, "a surfeit of sex." Practically all psychoneuroses are ascribed to sex repression. But it has been observed that throughout the Christian era there probably never was so little sex repression as there is today, and yet never so much evidence of psychoneurotic conditions. Psychoanalysis, as conducted by the Freudians, is regarded by many as the most pernicious complex of the day, manifesting itself as an unexpressed desire to discover an œdipus complex in every household. And, as a critic pointed out, there is no escape from the troublesome bogies of this sort unless the human race develops parthenogenesis; but, upon second thought, also this proved inadequate, for even the woman who believed in reincarnation and wished to be reborn the next time as a widow with two children, would naturally look upon her children as jewels, and thus lay herself open to the charge of suffering from a Cornelia complex.

Psychologists and educators realize more and more that we are beginning to reap the bitter and unsavory fruits of Freudian sowing. Judge William McAdoo, Chief Magistrate of New York City, said in an article (*Harper's Magazine*, September, 1927) that psychoanalysis is one of the most "active" evils corrupting our young people. And his words should carry weight, for he sees thousands of young criminals pass through the courts every year. The number of those who have been taught to look out upon the world through sex-colored glasses is legion. And many are the cases recorded of terrible compulsory ideas and even complete mental derangement in consequence of Freud's psychoanalytic treatment.

Dr. Placzeks, of Berlin, a recognized authority in the things of body and mind, lately asserted that the majority of specialists in psychology and psychiatry reject the pansexual interpretations of Freud as something utterly inane and positively foolish. Nor does medical science, he continues, observe the remarkable cures of which psychoanalysts are wont to boast; nor does Freud's psychoanalysis justify the heavy costs, the laborious investigations, and the large expenditure of time

which it entails. And thus, it is hoped, the Freudian movement is entering on the stage of a faddism, to disappear when a new fad takes its place.

And so paying due respect to Freud for having pointed out new ways for the critical study of emotional life and for having shed new light on the workings of the unconscious, we must agree with Harvey Wickham and place Freud's name on the list of the world's foremost "misbehaviorists."

A THEORY OF THE GENESIS OF KNOWLEDGE

FR. ALFRED MARTIN, O.F.M.

A noteworthy feature of our knowledge of outside reality is that it projects itself back into reality. We are conscious, not immediately of our own thoughts, but of the things represented by those thoughts. Normally, we live, not in the intramental

A Vexing Problem world of ideas, but in the objective world of reality. Therefore, external objects are apparently so real and so obvious that it seems self-evident that we should know them. Consequently, to the uncritical mind, there is no problem of how we know. However, it is a problem, a very real and interesting problem, as a little study will readily show; in fact, the more we study it, the deeper the problem becomes. Indeed, it is one of those vexing problems which have engaged the attention of philosophers from the very beginning, which have led to the formation of a great number of widely divergent theories, and which will probably never be settled to the satisfaction of all.

Naturally, the theories dealing with this problem divide themselves into two great classes — those that admit the

Two Classes of Theories activity of a supersensitive, immaterial faculty, the mind into their explanation, and those that deny the existence of any such faculty. Into the latter class

we must place a large group of philosophical sects, ancient and modern, which, differing among themselves on many points, agree in the primary dogma that all knowledge is ultimately reducible to sensation. They are variously described as Sensationists, Associationists, Materialists, Phenomenalists, Positivists, Empiricists, Evolutionists. According to all of these the mind possesses no faculty of an essentially supersensuous nature. All of our most abstract ideas, as well as our most elaborate processes of reasoning, are but sensations — reproduced, aggregated, blended and refined in various ways.

Our purpose here is, briefly, to state the problem in itself, to sum up the material we have to work with in finding its solution, to outline some of the solutions so far offered, to show, particularly, the need of admitting a supersensuous intellect, and to harmonize, if

possible, the old-time Scholastic solution with the proved facts of modern scientific research.

In the first place, we wish to point out that we are here concerned, not with the epistemological problem of the validity and objectivity of our knowledge. We are not asking how

The Question closely our knowledge corresponds to outside
To Be Answered reality — if at all. For the purpose of this paper we are taking that for granted; we are presuming that there is an outside world, and that everything in it is just as we think it is. Our question here is with the genesis of knowledge — how it comes about. How do we come to know? How do material things — pens, tables, houses, mountains, constellations — get into my consciousness?

Also, how does my general, universal knowledge come about? How is it that over and above my knowledge of this house or that, I have the simple idea 'house'? And finally, how do I come to know immaterial, intangible things like the relations of cause and effect, those difficult, complex human things like emotions, motives, purposes; abstract ideas, like justice, honor, beauty?

Let us go into the matter a little more fully — it is essential to the solution of the problem. Outside of me, existing before me and persevering after me, entirely independent of me and indifferent to me there exists a mighty, complex universe — the world of reality. I appear on the scene, and on my little journey through life, I make a number of contacts with this world, and in every contact something of that world comes to me. In a peculiar and unique way I come to make it my own; that is, I come to know about it. I come to know, not only a great number of individual things, but I also get some grasp of their inner natures; I get at least a glimpse of the complexity of the whole.

This knowledge becomes all the more remarkable when we stop to consider how limited are our means of making
The Senses, contact with this world of reality. They consist ex-
the Means of clusively of our senses, and these bring us only what
Acquiring the Scholastics called "accidental qualities." Our
Knowledge eyes bring us only colors, our ears only sounds; touch brings only sensations of heat, cold, and

resistance; taste only sensations of sweet, sour, salt, and bitter; smell, similar accidental qualities.

And that is all we have — there is nothing else. We cannot safely postulate any innate ideas, and even if we did, they would account only for an infinitesimal part of our store — a few vague fundamental notions. Scientifically, we can practically disprove any other source of knowledge except the senses. And yet, our knowledge is plainly not of this accidental nature. I see, not a globe of color, but a man, a house, a ship; I hear, not sounds, not even words, but meanings; I feel not a smooth, cool resistance, but a doorknob.

Tracing the development of our knowledge physiologically does not yield the solution. The physiological apparatus of knowledge is the nervous system. Afferent nerves, terminating in the brain centers, reach out to various parts of the body where they are connected with end-organs, which are specially adapted to be acted on by some particular form of physical energy. Let us take vision for an example. The eye is the end-organ of vision. Against the back wall of the eyeball, the optic nerve arborizes into the retina, the rods and cones of which are peculiarly sensitive to light waves. What happens when we see? Light rays — ether waves — falling on the eye are concentrated and focused on the retina. Here they produce some sort of chemical change in the material of the rods and cones. This chemical change gives rise to an impulse, a current, which must be more or less electrical in character, since it can be made to activate a galvanometer. So far we have — light rays, a tiny chemical change, an infinitesimal electric current. This current, let us call it a "nervous impulse," is carried along the optic nerve to the brain, and here we lose it. As the nervous impulse enters the brain, we lose trace of it — lose trace of it as completely as bloodhounds lose the trail at the edge of a lake. Our impulse has entered a new medium, where physical science, no matter how delicate its instruments, cannot follow.

Further discoveries may give us a more refined knowledge of just what happens, physically and physiologically, when the nervous impulse enters the brain, but it never will, because it cannot, fully explain how and why we see. How and why this impulse gives rise to consciousness at all; how and why we see, not a globe of color,

but a man. How, through this nervous impulse, we actually gather, often at a single glance a whole series of nonvisual, immaterial facts: a man, who he is, what he is doing, why he is doing it, how he is doing it.

As we have said, at the point where the nervous impulse enters the brain, the process of knowledge enters a new medium, and similarly, at this point, our process of explanation leaves the field of exact science and enters the field of pure philosophy. Our physiological tracing has not yet explained how we see, and we have come to the end of our resources, physically. Therefore, unless we are willing to admit, first, that the process of knowledge involves a higher faculty, and secondly, that the process of further explanation becomes a matter of philosophical speculation, any further investigation into the genesis of knowledge is fraught with insurmountable difficulties. Most modern psychology labors under serious handicaps in that it is so universally materialistic, and must reduce everything to exact science, and explain everything on a purely physical basis.

We cannot get along without philosophy, and though these psychologists deny that there is any such thing as pure thought, they themselves are just as philosophical and as metaphysical as the Scholastics at their best — or at their worst. As a result, we have a collection of strange and bizarre theories, ultraphysical in matter and ultrametaphysical in manner, all of which, however, beg the question of how light waves give us people, and sound waves, meanings.

Let us sum up again what we have observed so far in our attempted explanation of the genesis of knowledge. We noted the fact that the mind of man at birth is a perfect blank; that his physical means of knowing about the world were his senses, but that his knowledge did not remain sense-knowledge. We traced the physiological process of sensation from eye to brain. Naturally, similar processes could be pointed out for the other senses. And finally, we found ourselves at the end of the trail when we reached the brain, without as yet having found our looked-for explanation.

Entering now into the domain of philosophy, we hope to make

The Philosophical Explanation further progress. We insist that our first philosophical conclusion must be that our original sensation has entered into a new medium, and that this new medium is what we call the intellect — the mind. It is true, we here face a difficulty if we insist, as we do, on the immaterial nature of the mind. How do we go over from the material to the immaterial? How can one affect the other? We shall not attempt here to remove that difficulty. We merely wish to point out that if at first I was there and now I am here, I must have made the transition, whether I understand how I made it, or not. We feel that the facts, namely, the immaterial, nonsensuous nature of our knowledge, entitles us to claim that we have gone from one medium to the other.

Psychological Explanation How does modern psychology explain the process of acquiring knowledge from sensations? It sums it all up in the word "interpretation." This interpretation consists in the assimilation of a sensation, or a group of sensations to the "proper categories of past experience." Knowledge starts with sensations, which are the effects produced in the nervous system by suitable external stimuli. A sensation in itself means little; it is only when there exists in the mind a proper category, which is aroused to consciousness by the sensation, that real knowledge follows. The building up of these categories is a slow, gradual process. Very likely, during the first weeks and months of life an infant is capable only of the vaguest sensations, which begin and end as pure sensations. Very soon, however, certain experiences (sensations) repeat themselves so often that they gradually take on a quality of definiteness, and thus the foundation of the categories is laid. Starting with the vaguest "something," the impressions like on the child's mind constantly assume a more and more definite form, they divide and subdivide, they become more and more clear and precise, they group themselves into classes and families. During childhood the number of these "categories" increases very rapidly — it being one of the chief occupations of childhood to build them up — until, by the time of adolescence, the normal individual has filled the storehouse of his mind with a great number of them, often sufficient to meet the ordinary needs

of everyday life. Henceforth, perception becomes automatic, instantaneous, and direct. All that is required is that a bit of color is carried to the eye, and that, by attention, the aroused sensation is brought to the focus point of consciousness, and we see. In an adult, the degree and perfection of a person's knowledge is in direct proportion to the number and the orderly arrangement of these categories, and his power of advancement in knowledge is in proportion to his native or acquired ability to build new ones.

A number of questions now present themselves. What is the process of building up these categories? How is it done? What is the faculty that does it? What are the categories in themselves? It is at this point that we feel impelled to call in the aid of the schoolmen. First of all, let us sum up shortly the Scholastic theory on the genesis of knowledge. It will then be evident that their theory serves as an answer to the above questions, and also serves as a complement and completion of the modern theory.

It is true, the Scholastics did not study the nature and origin of sensation with the scientific accuracy of the modern schools. But to say that they were completely ignorant of the process would also be false. St. Thomas describes the process quite accurately and empirically. He teaches that there are no innate ideas; that the mind at first is a *tabula rasa*; that all knowledge begins with sense-knowledge. Sensation, he says, is the act by which the object produces a modification in the animated organism. The senses, therefore, are purely passive, or at most, reactive. They do not produce anything; they neither make the object, nor do they, as modern theories of apperception maintain, group together the qualities of an object and unify them. The object acts, the senses react. The effect produced in the living organism is the famous *species sensibilis* of the schoolmen. The *species sensibilis* is not a miniature object; neither is it something which we first perceive in the sensation, and by which we are led to perceive the object. It is merely the vital phase of the stimulative action of the external object — a medium of communication between object and subject, but not a medium in the order of knowledge, for in normal conditions it does not rise into direct consciousness at all — the first thing perceived being the object itself.

We feel that this explanation of the *species sensibilis* comes fairly close to the commonly accepted modern theory of sensation, though, of course, in the works of the Scholastics, the language is entirely different. But it is their meaning. Persistent misrepresentation of the Scholastic doctrine on the part of modern writers on psychology has led to much error and much unmerited ridicule.

So much for sensation, the *species sensibilis*, sense-knowledge.

But how do we rise from sense knowledge to intellectual knowledge? How do we derive from the world of material things the universal and the immaterial, which is the object of pure thought? St. Thomas recalls, in his answer to these questions,

the Aristotelian distinction between the active and passive intellect. These, he insists, are two separate faculties, not one and the same power viewed under two different aspects. The object, as it presents itself to the senses is indeed singular and contingent; but hidden beneath the surface of qualities which give the object its individuality and contingency, is the unalterable nature or essence, which is universal and necessary. The active intellect, by virtue of its illuminative power, separates what is contingent and particular from what is necessary and universal in the object — in this causing the universal and necessary element to stand forth in the clear light of its own intelligibility, and rendering actually intelligible what before was only potentially intelligible. The actually intelligible element now acts upon the passive or receptive intellect in the same way as color acts upon the eye, producing the *species intelligibilis impressa*. On being received into intellectual consciousness this impression becomes the intellectual expression of the object, the mental image, the *species intelligibilis expressa*, the *verbum mentis*.

The idea which results from this abstractive process has a two-fold aspect. Entitatively considered, it is an accident or quality of the mind in which it is; representatively considered, it is an image or representation of the object, functioning, not as a medium in which we see the object, but as a medium by which the object acts upon consciousness. The analogy between the function of the *species sensibilis* and that of the *species intelligibilis* is perfect.

With regard to the chronological order of the genesis of our

St. Thomas and the First Idea of the Mind

knowledge, St. Thomas holds that the first idea which the human mind acquires is the idea and notion of being. By this notion of being we must not understand a definite concept, such as the idea of being which is the object of metaphysical analysis, but a vague concept of reality, more aptly expressed by the word *thing* or *something*, than by the word being. It is only after a long process of training that the mind, by reflecting on its own acts, comes to know itself. The senses, the natural windows of the soul, are open on the side that looks out on the external world; consequently, our first knowledge is sense-knowledge, and the first idea which we glean from sense-knowledge is naturally the most imperfect; that is, the vaguest and least definite of notions, the idea of being — *something*.

With this short summary of the Scholastic explanation of the genesis of knowledge before us, let us hasten to the answer of the questions we put before: what is the process of building up the "categories of past experience"? What is the faculty that does it? What are the categories in themselves?

Rôle of the Intellect in Building up the Categories

Let us begin with the second question. All psychology admits that some wonderful unifying process takes place, over and above the mere passive stimulation of the senses. Knowledge is a process of interpretation, a process of synthesis, a fitting of a sensation to its proper category. But who, what, does the interpreting? Who fits the sensation to its category? It cannot take place just of itself — the process requires a faculty. The brain is that faculty, say a large group of modern psychologists. That the brain is a necessary factor, a *sine qua non*, we readily admit. But there is absolutely no proof that the brain really does this work, and the immaterial, universal and necessary nature of our knowledge demands a proportionate faculty — one that is immaterial. We insist, therefore, that our first conclusion must be to the existence of a spiritual mind; that no theory of knowledge yet proposed sufficiently and satisfactorily accounts for all data, which does not postulate the activity of a supersensuous faculty. We conclude therefore that, in answer to the question, what faculty builds up the categories in the mind, there is but one answer

— the faculty of the intellect. A faculty separate from and superior to the senses and the brain, spiritual and immaterial in nature, and residing in the soul. Even if we are unwilling to go all the way with the Scholastics in their explanation of just how this intellect works, we cannot escape going with them at least as far as admitting the existence of the intellect.

Then, what are these "categories" of which psychology makes so much? Evidently they are nothing else but the "ideas," the "universal concepts" of the Scholastics. And, the process by which they are built up receives its only adequate explanation, if it is going to receive an explanation at all, in the theory of the active and passive intellect, worked out originally by Aristotle and

The Active and Passive Intellect accepted and perfected by St. Thomas and the Scholastics six hundred years ago. Knowledge of the outside world is carried to the brain through sensations; here in the brain, by a method which we do not understand, but which must be intimately bound up with the mystery of the union of body and soul, the sensation is carried over to the intellect. Here the active intellect takes it up, works on it, separates the contingent and particular from the necessary and the universal, and presents the latter to the passive intellect, which receives it and absorbs it exactly as the brain does the sensation. When the passive intellect accepts this product of the active intellect, there comes into being an "idea," a "concept," a "category," useful for further experience. The whole process is built up slowly from innumerable experiences and sensations; it goes from the less to the more perfect; our categories are always capable of still greater perfection.

To sum up, the problem of the genesis of knowledge is one of the most important and interesting fields of psychological investigation. It has engaged the attention of philosophers from the time of Empedocles to the present day. We must admit that patient, modern, empiric research has added greatly to our scientific understanding of the physiological and psychological background of sensation and perception. But we must also admit that the old-time Schoolmen went deeply and wisely into the analysis of the higher processes. Neither in themselves gives us a complete explanation of how knowledge comes about. Only by a synthesis of the two, only by putting

together the best elements of modern empiric psychology with the best elements of the theories of the Scholastics, can we hope to come to a complete and satisfactory understanding of why and how light rays give us people, and sound waves, meaning.

DISCUSSION

FR. MARK STIER, O.M.Cap.—It seems to me that the doctrine of St. Thomas as to how we rise from sense-knowledge to intellectual knowledge, has not been clearly stated by Fr. Alfred. After a very intelligible explanation of the function of the active and passive intellect according to St. Thomas, Fr. Alfred concludes with the words: "The idea which results from this abstractive process has a two-fold aspect: entitatively considered, it is an accident or quality of the mind in which it is; representatively considered, it is an image, or representation, of the object, functioning, not as a medium *in which* we see the object, for that would be to open the door to subjectivism, but as a medium *by which* the object acts on our consciousness."¹

I think Fr. Alfred fails to discriminate between the impressed intelligible species and the expressed species or *verbum*. The intellectual determinant (*species intelligibilis impressa*) is a medium *by which* the object is known (*medium quo*). To the question whether the intelligible species abstracted from the phantasm is related to our intellect as that which is understood (I, q. 85, a. 2), St. Thomas answers: "Dicendum est, quod species intelligibilis se habet ad intellectum, *ut quo* intelligit intellectus." The expressed species or the *verbum*, however, functions as a medium *in which* we see the object (*medium in quo*). St. Thomas explains the function of the *verbum* in his opuscle *De Natura Verbi Intellectus* (ed. Mandonnet, t. V, p. 371), . . . "verbum est totum rei dictae expressivum, et totum *in quo* res exprimitur, et hoc intellectum principale, quia res non intelligitur nisi *in eo*. Est enim tanquam speculum *in quo* res cernitur." The mental word considered as a representation or image of the object is known directly by the same act whereby the object represented in the word is known.

It is usually said that to affirm that the *verbum* is a *medium quod* in cognition would be to open the door to subjectivism. But is one really forsaking the Scholastic position regarding the objectivity of knowledge by maintaining that the "*verbum*" is the "*id quod*" in cognition, in the sense that it forms the immediate term of cognition? This is the opinion defended by Father de la Taille, S.J., in his weekly lecture in the St. Thomas Academy at the Gregorian University during the scholastic year 1927-28.²

There is no question here of sense-cognition; nor of the knowledge which the intellect has of its own proper internal act; nor of the knowledge of first principles. These points are excluded. We are raising a question about the intellectual cognition by which—through the judgment—we reach the thing outside the mind: is this immediate?

¹The same statement is made by Turner, *History of Philosophy*, p. 366.

²Cf. also *Acta Primi Congressus Thomistici Internationalis* (Romae, 1925), pp. 218-222.

To Fr. de la Taille the answer seems to be beyond all doubt: I know the external object in some intellectual intention which I have formed of it. This intention as known, or the mental word, is *that which* is known primarily and of itself and in this, when known, the object is known. Thus intellectual cognition of the external thing is, in some true sense, mediate, i.e., through a psychological medium, not indeed a medium *ex quo* but a medium *in quo*.

Briefly, I know the external object in the mental word, which is what I know *primo et per se*. When this is known, I know the object. Our knowledge then is mediate? In a certain true sense, Yes. We must have a psychological medium, which indeed is not the material which we use to formulate our knowledge of the thing (*medium ex quo*), but a *medium in quo*. The thing and the mental word are known by one and the same act. For it is the same motion which is directed toward the image as an image, and toward the thing whose image it is.

On the other hand, insofar as no discursive process is required, knowledge is in some degree—immediate, but never by the immediate presence of the object (*per praesentialitatem*). Though the object and the word are known by one act, it is the mental word which is known primarily and directly. We know the thing only by the word and in the word.

Fr. de la Taille is accused of forsaking the scholastic position which has always maintained that the thing is the *id quod* in cognition. His view seems to lead to subjectivism, making the word—our mental state—*that which* we know. He answers: If I maintained that the mental state, the word, were the first concern of the act of cognition (*id circa quod*), then the objection would be justified; but I do not. Knowledge is always concerned with the things themselves. However, I do hold that the mental word is what formally terminates the act of cognition (*id quod formaliter terminat actum cognitionis*). The mental word, when first known, leads to the cognition of the thing, because it is essentially related to the thing and its whole being and purpose is to do just this. The word is like a perfectly proportioned mirror reflecting the object to which it is proportioned. As soon as I see the mirror I see the object with it. The analogy of the mirror, so frequently used to convey an idea of the *verbum*, is used by Fr. de la Taille to clarify his position. Still the very same analogy has been turned against him, if not conclusively then very pointedly: When I know something in a perfectly proportioned mirror I do not directly see the mirror but only the thing represented by the mirror; the whole intention of the mind is borne toward the *thing*. The mirror is only seen indirectly, and thus it is with the mental word. Perhaps we could reply that this is true if we consider the first concern of the act of cognition (*id circa quod*), for knowledge is always concerned with things, due to the essential relation that the word has to the thing; but the mental word always remains that which formally terminates the act of cognition.

This seems to be the teaching of St. Thomas when he says in *de Ver.* q. 4, a. 2: "Sciendum est quod verbum intellectus nostri est id ad quod operatio intellectus nostri *terminatur*, quod est ipsum *intellectum*, quod dicitur conceptio intellectus." Thus the mental word is both the term produced and the term apprehended: but its first aspect is that of the term apprehended. For the mental word produced remains that which formally terminates the act of cognition.

RAPPROCHEMENT BETWEEN MODERN EMPIRICAL PSYCHOLOGY AND SCHOLASTIC RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY

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There are those who still ask how it is possible to reconcile the time-worn psychology of the Scholastics and the great strides made in modern psychology. An answer to the question of **Defining** those who still ask whether anything good can come the **Thesis** out of Scholasticism is found only in the right understanding of terms. The word *psychology* has been much used and much abused in our days and it would require time and energy to define the word in a genuinely Scholastic manner. The adopted word *rapprochement* might mean anything and loosely used, it might be an apology for Scholasticism. To the Scholastics, psychology meant *De Anima* or concerning the soul; to the moderns, *De Anima* has too much of a theological tang to it. *Rapprochement* is better expressed in Neo-Scholastic literature by "The Neo-Scholastic Appreciation of the Trends in Modern Psychology." Since the word can mean a bringing together or an assimilation, we shall use it in this paper in the strict Scholastic sense of *assimilari*. Hence, our thesis is that the rational psychology of the Scholastics or the *De Anima* is able to assimilate with little difficulty what is true in modern empirical psychology. We do not intend to institute any comparison between metaphysical and empirical psychology, neither do we maintain the thesis that rational and empirical psychology are at variance and stand in need of a reconciliation. For in Scholastic thought, the underlying nature of a thing can never be really distinct from its manifestations and hence, *prima facie*, it would be impossible for a Neo-Scholastic to look for a reconciliation between empirical and rational psychology.

A well-known radio preacher gave this advice to a young man who questioned him about the study of psychology. **Definitions** "If you knew all the things done in its name, you would steer clear of it and stay with philosophy."

The truth or falsity of this statement can be seen only in a clear definition of terms: Maher says: "The inquiry into the character of our various mental states and operations is called by different writers Phenomenal, Empirical, or Experimental Psychology; while the investigation into the nature of mind itself is styled Rational Psychology."¹ Rational psychology is an expression of metaphysics, the existence apart of two kinds of entities in the world of reality, the mental and the material. Experimental psychology is the problem of the contact of the world of mind and of the world of matter. It is the manifestation of the mental world and the contact of this mental world with the material world. When the moderns attempt to reduce mind to matter in their monistic conception of the world, then psychology ceases to exist, and all psychic phenomena become the manifestation of matter in this specific setting. Van Der Veldt says: "Besides . . . philosophical, metaphysical or speculative (psychology) another science has developed: positive, scientific, empirical (psychology), or taking the *pars pro toto*, experimental psychology, which wishes to approximate to the natural sciences or even be one of them. The object of these two psychologies is the same: the study of psychic phenomena, but empirical psychology has a different scope (the description of the facts with the utmost precision, and, if possible, a measurement of them), a different method (experiment and systematic observation), and, moreover, has several practical applications. Thus, we acknowledge two different branches of psychology as, e.g., Gemelli and Fröbes, also do."² Moore says,

Empirical Psychology, as a real scientific discipline, had its birth in physiology and not in the philosophy of Christian Wolff (the method of experience). A new science was begotten which was first termed psychophysics and later, physiological psychology, and then, experimental psychology, and, occasionally, empirical psychology. . . . Psychology is merely the science of human beings developed by an analysis of their mental life by experiments, by observation, by everything that will enable us to obtain insight into the minds of men—how they know, how they think, how they reason, how they feel, how they react in the difficulties of life.³

Modern psychology, then, is a study of facts, the facts of mental life, the organism through which the mental nature of man operates.

¹*Psychology, Empirical and Rational*, p. 5.

²*Twelfth Report of F. E. C.*, pp. 93–94.

³*Dynamic Psychology* (Chicago, 1924), pp. 5 and 10.

Is Experimental Psychology an Independent Science? Since the material object of experimental and rational psychology is the same, a vital question arises, namely, is experimental psychology sufficiently independent to be classed as a science or is it still so closely connected with philosophical, metaphysical psychology that it, like education, cannot be separated or totally divorced from philosophy? We are speaking here of modern empirical psychology, not of modern speculative psychology. For the moment, the psychologist speculates on his empiric findings, he is in the realm of philosophy. It is then quite impossible to ask for a *rapprochement* between modern rational psychology and the rational psychology of the schoolmen. For all philosophers must recognize an incontestable fact and assimilate that fact in their system of philosophy. But when one system of philosophy is founded on principles that are contrary to the principles on which another system of philosophy is founded, then it is impossible for one system to assimilate the other. For the most part, modern speculative psychology utterly contradicts Scholastic psychology in basic principles. Eliminate the soul from modern psychology and it is impossible to find grounds for a *rapprochement*. There is a diversity of opinion concerning the dependence of empirical psychology on rational psychology and also concerning the relationship of the two. This difference of opinion is also found in Neo-Scholastic circles. Maher says:

There is at least one phase of current psychological literature to which my opposition is in no way diminished—the prevalent view that the science of psychology and the psychology of the human mind can be shut up in water-tight compartments and rendered completely independent of each other. For it seems to be taken for granted by many writers that of all human beings the student of psychology feels least interest in the question as to whether he has a soul, or what is to become of it; and that of all branches of human knowledge, the science of mind has the least to say on such a subject. In fact, to trespass on such alien matters is assumed by them to be the gravest of professional delinquencies. To construct such a water-tight science of psychology from which all metaphysical beliefs have been effectually bailed out, is simply impossible.⁴

This opinion, tenaciously held by many, refuses to emancipate empiric psychology from philosophy. The reason for this is that Scholastic psychology admits both body and soul and, due to the oneness of man and the simultaneity of the operation of the soul

⁴*Op. cit.*, p. VIII.

and body, you cannot separate totally the science that studies soul and body. Scholasticism, connecting as it does mind and body in the only natural or morally intelligible way, deserves renewed esteem. The Scholastics had a profound knowledge of the inner life, of the soul, its nature, its aspirations, its needs, and their works abound in excellent psychological analyses. Here they were in close touch with experience, and the philosophy they built on this foundation is correspondingly important. In these days, when materialism is prevalent in so many quarters, it is particularly imperative that the voice of the Scholastics be heard. There are other Neo-Scholastics who do not hold this opinion of the dependence of empirical psychology on rational psychology but insist that empirical psychology is a science *sui juris*, with its own subject matter, method and application. Van der Veldt remarks: "But even if it be true that the old speculative psychology of the Scholastics still means something more than a question of mere historical interest, as Ziehen contends, yet it is difficult to call it experimental or empirical psychology in the modern sense, as M. Barbado seems to do. With the Scholastics the empirical element was completely fused with the speculative, and the scope of the study of the facts was to draw conclusions as to the nature of the substance to which they inhered, which same process is still followed in Neo-Scholastic philosophy." In the discussion of this opinion we read: "whether or not one sides with Geyser, the practical advantages accruing to a divorce of empirical and rational psychology have been so eloquently portrayed by the writer that one will not hesitate to endorse his stand."⁵

The foregoing citations give us a general index of the division in Neo-Scholastic circles concerning the independence of the science of empirical psychology. Much of the confusion which is so characteristic of modern thought can be traced to a mistaken view of the true scope of psychology. Etymologically the word refers to the soul, that is why it was known to the Scholastics as *De Anima*. To them it embraced in its material object, not only the rational soul but the vegetative and the sentient souls as well. The Scholastics not only treated of the origin, the nature and the destiny

⁵*Loc. cit.*, pp. 93 and 102.

of the human soul but also of the operations and the activities of the soul. They did not limit themselves to speculation on the soul alone but their psychology, following that of Aristotle, embraced the whole scope of modern empirical psychology. Their facts were what gross observation had given to them; they did not have the finer details of the human organism that biology, anatomy, and physiology contribute to the field of psychology today. Rational psychology becomes very circumscribed unless taken in connection with the facts that these sciences have contributed to the understanding of psychic phenomena.

These natural sciences are very helpful and in a way necessary to psychology, but it is not entirely true to be insistently calling them psychology as the moderns do. It may be that psychology wishes to approximate the natural sciences or, at least, one of them, but this desire does not make physiology psychology.

Subsidiary Sciences These sciences are subsidiary or contributory but by no means so essential in all of their ramifications to rational psychology that a lack of their data makes rational psychology abortive and false. We may call them kindred sciences but have they contributed enough to change the fundamental conclusions of rational psychology? Through them psychology has become more extensive in its applications but, has it become more extensive or intensive in content? If psychology is a science of life or of mental activity or of psychic phenomena, it is necessary to know the sciences which treat of the instrument or the organs through which these activities and phenomena take place. But can these sciences for this reason be called psychology? Do they not remain strictly physiology or biology? If so, we can speak of them as sciences subsidiary to psychology but not psychology strictly so called.

We do not mean to lessen the value of these sciences as contributory to rational, philosophical psychology, but from the very nature of science and from the admission of empiricists, science ends when the fact or the observation ends. At this point philosophy begins. In studying the physiology of the brain, what fact has been discovered that is a strict psychological fact? In sensation, how far does science trace the stimulus? When the fact is no longer observed, then the scientist is very close to philosophy, if not over the border

line of it. That man thinks and feels and reasons and senses is an observed fact; the instrument through which he does this is also an observed and scientific fact; an hypothesis or theory as to how man thinks, feels and reasons, is not so clearly observed and verges on philosophy, although we shall allow hypothesis and theory to so-called scientific psychology. But an answer as to why man thinks, and reasons, is beyond the scope of empirical psychology.

Modern psychology has made man the object of its study more today than ever before. Is it not a one-sided study?

Study of the Whole Man Necessary It is a study of his organism, a study of the mechanics of mental activity, a mathematics of consequences. Scholastic psychology insists on a study of the composite, not the soul alone nor the body alone, but the whole man. Call it the old speculative psychology if you will, it still speculates on the whole man, not on a part of his being, and it still speculates even on that which actually has a theological tang to it, the human soul. A study of the mechanical side of human nature alone leads to greater errors and to more ridicule than the supposed one-sided study of the soul in Scholastic philosophy. It is quite impossible in a study of psychic phenomena to refrain from going deeper into the nature of that which causes the phenomena. A clear, scientific study of psychic phenomena is desired but one need only consider the various textbooks on psychology to ascertain that this is not yet accomplished. The scientist, undefiled by philosophy and religion, is a desideratum, but as such has never been found. This is true in psychology more than in the other sciences because the empiricist is not content to study psychic phenomena without theorizing on the origin of such phenomena. Regardless of how much the moderns stress their scientific method and their adherence to fact, their facts are tainted with a philosophy. A cursory study of any manual of psychology attests this.

Modern psychology psychologizes everything, every field of action, every human action, but cares little to admit, although they study it, the all-important factor, the substance of all possible psychic action, the soul. Empirical psychology asks for a divorce, not from rational psychology, but from the soul. It seeks emancipation, not from speculation, for it speculates as much as rational

psychology, but it seeks freedom from the soul and its possible religious entanglements. "Psychology does not like to call itself the science of the soul, for that has a theological tang and suggests problems that have so far not seemed accessible to scientific investigation. Psychology is a study of actions rather than of things."⁶ In fact, Neo-Scholastics themselves chafe under the charge of the *odium theologicum* and gladly muster lame arguments to free themselves from this charge.

In Scholastic thought, *operatio sequitur esse*. No action is greater than its source. Actions are not taken out of thin air, they are not movements that just happen with no subject in which they inhere. A study of the subject of an action may be just as scientific as a study of the action. In stressing scientific experimental psychology, they would lead us to believe that the soul and the study of the soul is not a scientific fact. The operations of the psychic being are admittedly scientific facts. It is from these facts that we can deduce metaphysically the substance or being that is the source of these evident actions or operations. If one means by a scientific fact, that it must be visible and subject to the scrutiny of the microscope, then the soul is not a scientific fact and neither is consciousness and all the rest of psychic phenomena that are studied and looked upon as scientific facts. We seem to think that science deals only with material facts, and hence, a consideration of the soul is outside the pale of science, and cannot be considered in scientific psychology. It is left for speculation. The soul is a scientific fact and in the science of psychology it is necessary to come in contact with it whether one likes it or not. If it did not offer an obstacle, why should so many of the moderns be concerned in denying it? They relegate the soul to religion and to philosophy but in so doing they beggar the science of psychology. The problem of the separation of rational and empirical psychology can only be settled when one settles the body-mind problem. It is difficult to see according to the body-mind problem in Scholastic psychology how there can be a total separation or divorce between empirical and rational psychology. The mechanics of life can be studied in a dead body; it is

⁶Woodworth, *Psychology a Study of Mental Life* (New York, 1928), p. 7.

difficult to study the operations of a living body and keep aloof from its vitalizing principle. The body may be a machine, but it just won't work like other machines.

If we stress the spiritual element alone in the human composite there is great danger of our philosophy running into extreme idealism. The logical consequence of stressing man's organism alone is behaviorism. We find both extremes in modern psychology and the reason for these extremes is due to extreme attitudes toward science. There are operations in man that belong neither to the body alone nor to the soul alone. Body and soul constitute one active principle or one nature. A science that is not willing to admit that it is studying this one active nature is bound to be abortive. When the scientist is confronted by facts that are not material facts, when he is faced by facts that he does not find in other animals from a comparative study of them, then he cannot logically deduce that all the psychic activities of man are merely animal and belong to the organism just as the facts discovered in animal psychology. On the other hand, in man there are animal activities, hence, the spiritualist must be scientific and account for them. Otherwise, it is difficult to escape the extremes that are found in philosophy today, due to a false interpretation of facts.

Scholastic psychology admits a dualism in man. Admitting a dual nature in man, it must admit spiritual and animal activities. Man, according to his metaphysical definition, is a rational animal.

This rational animal is not two beings but is one. Hence in the study of man we can admit empirical and rational psychology. We can even admit that the former is one of the natural sciences and that the latter belongs to philosophy. In this hypothesis, there cannot be a contradiction between the two, for according to the Scholastics a scientific fact and a philosophical fact cannot be contradictory and yet true. One or the other must be wrong. Since both sciences deal with the same subject, the one dealing with the operations of the nature, the other dealing with the nature itself or the source of the operations, rational psychology can assimilate any scientific fact proposed as such by empirical psychology. The proof of this lies in

the doctrine of the interrelationship of science, philosophy, and theology. A fact true in one of these great divisions of human knowledge cannot be false in the other. Considering the aim of rational psychology we can readily see that it not only can assimilate any scientific finding but actually uses the phenomena that empirical psychology studies when it considers any problem falling under the object of rational psychology. Maher says:

The aim of Rational, Metaphysical or Philosophical Psychology is to penetrate to the source of the phenomena of consciousness. It endeavors to ascertain the inner constitution of the subject of our psychical states, and to discover the relations subsisting between the subject and the body. In a word, Philosophical Psychology seeks to learn what may be gathered by the light of reason regarding the nature, origin and destiny of the human soul.⁷

We do not wish to conclude this paper as some conclude this interesting subject by saying that Scholasticism or rather Thomism solves the whole problem of psychology. We may hardly call Scholastic psychology, modern empirical psychology. Neither may we say that Scholastic psychology is founded only on timeworn metaphysical doctrine. We do maintain that Scholastic psychology can assimilate the facts of modern psychology because, **Scholasticism** if it could not, it would cease to be a system of **Necessary** philosophy. Before we can say specifically what **as Basis** the Scholastic system can or should assimilate from empirical psychology, we must understand Scholastic, rational psychology. The reason for much misunderstanding among Neo-Scholastics is due to a lack of understanding of the deep problems of Scholastic psychology and the body-mind problem. It is not sufficient to know what a textbook says on the subject; one must enter into the Scholastic frame of mind and study the problems as they studied them. It may be foolish to ask what would the Scholastics do in the face of the findings of empirical psychology. It seems not presumptuous to say that they would do just as they did in the heyday of Scholasticism, accept the facts, study them and interpret them. We like to boast that the Scholastics used what science they had in their own day and we are ready to condemn that science as puerile and false.

⁷*Op. cit.*, p. 458.

The New Scholasticism, as far as science goes, is not medieval but modern. As a matter of fact, that is one of the reasons why it is a New Scholasticism. We are quite conscious of the scientific handicaps under which Bonaventure, Albert and Thomas labored. We should consider it nothing short of suicidal to fail to make use of every item of information laboriously achieved by modern research and investigation. The New Scholasticism cannot accept the physics, the chemistry, or the biology of the Middle Ages, nor does it make any pretense to justify the scientific views of that period.⁸

"The physics, chemistry and biology of the thirteenth century strike us as only a bit less childish than the animism of certain Australian semi-savage tribes of the present day."⁹ Scholasticism assimilated and interpreted the facts of thirteenth-century science. If it did so then, it can also assimilate the facts of the twentieth century. An interesting question is, how far does rational psychology depend on science? In condemning the science of the thirteenth century are we not endangering our principles in philosophy in attempting to ingratiate ourselves with the moderns? After all, philosophy is an interpretation of facts as well as speculation. Scholastic, psychological theories, as we have said, are not theories picked out of thin air. They are theories based on science to a degree and on the interpretation of scientific findings of their day. If their science is all wrong and quite puerile, isn't there a possibility that their theory is wrong? Ryan says: "Where these results (of modern science) have contradicted theory, we have not wavered in sacrificing theory to facts."¹⁰ There are some psychological theories that Thomism does not seem to answer. When has another theory been tolerated? Scientifico-philosophers who have educed new theories from facts in the Scholastic field have not long survived in Neo-Scholasticism. The ultimatum seems to be that St. Thomas can assimilate every scientific fact. I dare say that in psychology no new fact has been discovered to ask for a change in the body-mind problem of Scholastic psychology. The unicity of form theory, which is the backbone of Scholastic doctrine, does not seem to answer satisfactorily many scientific facts.

In order to appreciate the findings of empirical psychology and

⁸Zybura, *The New Scholasticism*, p. 88.

⁹Ryan, *Anthology of Recent Philosophy*, p. 631.

¹⁰*Ibid.*

Theories of Other Schools to Be Studied to solve problems brought forth by these findings, the Neo-Scholastic movement must consider all the theories of the schoolmen and not dogmatize one opinion in Scholastic philosophy. It is impossible to believe that every Neo-Scholastic understands the unity of body and of soul in the sense of the unicity of form of St. Thomas. We should not condemn the matter and form theory of the Scholastics, neither should we enshrine its Thomistic interpretation. To take this theory from Scholastic thought is to destroy Scholasticism. It stresses the dualism in Scholastic philosophy. In order to interpret the findings of modern science, Scholastics must consider not only one interpretation of the matter and form theory, but it is necessary to study the other medieval interpretations of it in order to understand fully the facts of modern science. The moment that the doctrines of other medieval Schoolmen become of mere historical interest, then the whole system of Scholasticism will become of mere historical interest. Inactivity and lack of discussion in philosophy leads to stagnation. Is this the reason why there is a call "to the perfecting of our philosophy so that Scholasticism may win the recognition which it has so far not achieved" as was spoken in the President's address at the last meeting of the American Philosophical Association?

Franciscan School to Be Given a Hearing For a possible interpretation of the facts of modern science, I believe that it is necessary to consider the doctrine of the Franciscan School concerning the matter and form theory so essential to the psychological theories of the Schoolmen. We do not mean to say that their interpretation of the matter and form theory will give us a better understanding of the facts of science, but it would revive interest in the questions so vital to philosophy, it would energize Neo-Scholasticism, and possibly give us a better interpretation of the facts of modern psychology. The Franciscans themselves must promulgate their doctrine; we can hardly expect others to specialize in it. We should endeavor to present the disputed questions of the thirteenth century but before we can present these questions we must know them ourselves. An historical study of Scholasticism is necessary but an historical study alone does not help us to understand the minds of the masters

and contributes nothing to the interpretation of the facts of modern science. *Ipsedixitism* should be avoided by all camps in Scholastic philosophy. It was this that caused the decline of the precise philosophy of the schoolmen.

There are certain doctrines of the Franciscan masters that might give us grounds for a *rapprochement* between empirical and rational psychology. Some of these doctrines that really lent glory to the schools of the thirteenth century are: matter and form constituting all things and correlatives of potency and act; the doctrine of plural forms; the soul considered as a substance with its own individuality and also as the form of the body; the doctrine of the formal distinction and of the *forma corporeitatis*. The doctrine of the Franciscan masters does not do away with the unity of form in man but it does not teach the unicity of form. If one would understand just what the distinction is between the unity of form and the unicity of form, he would understand many of the problems offered to Scholastic psychology by modern psychology. To say that there is no problem and that the system of St. Thomas answers everything makes Neo-Scholastics automatons. Man is a composite being. Scholasticism must answer for the animal *esse* and the spiritual *esse* and since each *esse* has its operations and its acts, it must answer for the operations of the *esse*. *Operatio sequitur esse*. Before we can say that Scholastic psychology can assimilate the facts of modern empirical psychology we must understand what St. Bonaventure means by the existence of the forms in the composite; what St. Thomas means by the forms existing in the composite *in virtute licet remissae*; what Scotus means by the forms existing also *in virtute sive remissae sive non remissae*. Do they all mean the same? What does *in virtute* mean? In stressing the unicity of form and in understanding *in virtute* as something logical, have we not underestimated the animal acts in man? When we fully understand what the Scholastics meant, we shall understand our metaphysical psychology which, without a doubt, can assimilate the facts of empirical psychology. A system of philosophy that cannot interpret and assimilate the facts of science has no claim to consideration. The philosopher is the in-

terpreter of facts. Hence, it would be ridiculous to ask how can there be a *rapprochement* between empirical and rational psychology. Scholasticism can and does assimilate the facts of science, not only in psychology, but in all fields of philosophy.

DISCUSSION

FR. VICTORINE HOFFMAN, O.F.M.—Fr. Conrad has made a serious and praiseworthy plea for harmony between the old and the new as maintained by the Scholastics and the Moderns. The problem is extremely difficult, but a *rapprochement* should be possible provided just compromises be made on both sides. The only further remark I desire to make is one suggested by the *distinctio formalis* mentioned in the paper as being one of the doctrines of the Franciscan masters which might give ground for *rapprochement* between empirical and rational psychology.

It has always been a puzzle to me that philosophers have no *distinctio metaphysica*. They have all the other categories in the three orders of physics, logics, and metaphysics. The *distinctio virtualis cum fundamento in re* is only a logical distinction, because it does not exist *qua talis ante operationem mentis*. The fact that they appeal to an actual foundation for this distinction does not make the distinction an actual distinction. Just as little as we may say that the house is actually existing *extra mentem* when all the material for its construction is actually present, so little may we call the *distinctio virtualis cum fundamento in re* an actual distinction *ante opus mentis*. And yet, we must have such a distinction, otherwise there can be no science of metaphysics. The *distinctio formalis* is such a distinction.

THE PLURALITY OF FORMS

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Before entering into any discussion of the problem at hand, I wish to make it clear that the burden of this paper **Purpose of** does not concern itself with the perplexing and highly **This Paper** involved Scholastic theory of the fundamental constitution of matter — the theory of Hylomorphism. No claim to originality is made at the very outset, simply because centuries of intensive study on the part of those who have made this field their lifework well-nigh precludes any such possibility. Furthermore, I do not wish to give the impression of favoring or disfavoring any particular or general opinion concerning controversies connected with this problem which have taxed the mentality and ingenuity of the keenest intellects of the ages. All I purpose to do is to state the question as briefly as consistent with clearness, enumerate certain real or apparent difficulties which have arisen since the days of the schoolmen because of the tremendous and revolutionizing discoveries and advances made by the several sciences, and finally, to seek a method of explaining and bringing these incontrovertible and irreducible facts or phenomena into alignment with the best and most acceptable theory of the Scholastic teachings on matter and form.

That modern science has found facts unknown to the schoolmen, no one will deny. For this reason it seems necessary that a philosophical and psychological explanation of these points be attempted.

Primordial or prime matter is defined as “an incomplete substance which, as the primary and indeterminate subject, along **Matter** with another incomplete substance, constitutes the es- **Defined** sence of a body” (7).^{*} Just what this primordial matter is has been the bone of contention for centuries, but for our present purpose it suffices to say that “in contrast to God, Who is pure act, it (*materia prima*) is pure potentiality, wholly actuated and determined by some form, in conjunction with which alone it

^{*}NOTE: Figures in parentheses refer to the numbers of the Bibliography on page 138.

can exist, and toward which its one function is to serve as subject or support, and constitute with it a single being. Hence, corporeal being results from the coalescence of two components, neither of which could connaturally exist apart: the form is the *primus actus* actuating the *pura potentia*, and so giving rise to the *primum esse rei*. Each principle apart is rather *id quo aliquid est*, than *id quod est*; only the compound is *id quod est*" (15).

Matter is thus conceived to be an incomplete substance, indeterminate yet determinable, the substratum for all things as we find them in nature. Creatures, in spite of their diversity, complexities, and multiplicity, all have a common basis in that they are made up of this primordial matter in part, and receive their individual stamp, character, or being through the union of this prime stuff with what the Scholastics called the *forma substantialis*, which was looked upon as "an incomplete substance which is the prime act of matter with which it constitutes the specific nature of a body" (7). Maher, writing on this phase of the subject, tells us that "both matter and form are sometimes called *substances* by the schoolmen, inasmuch as their coalescence results in a *substantial* being. Except the human soul, however, no *forma* or *materia prima* can exist *per se* apart. The epithet *incomplete* is occasionally used of inferior forms to express this circumstance; this adjective more properly, however, connotes the fact that the union of these factors gives rise to *one complete* composite substance" (9). Elsewhere the same author declares that the substantial form is "a principle which by its union with the subject it actuates constitutes a complete substance of a determined species. It is this determining factor which defines the essential nature of the plant or animal, and from which proceeds the activities by which the being is separated from other species of things, whether animate or inanimate" (9).

Turning to the findings of modern science, we see certain facts which demand an interpretation according to these Scholastic ideas of the ultimate makeup of things; more correctly, these facts must be explained by Scholastic psychology as it is at present applied. If, as the majority of Scholastics hold, there is only one form of actuating substantial principle which constitutes the unifying factor of organisms, how can we explain or

account for the countless chemical changes, various phenomena either natural or induced, brought to light by chemists, biologists, physiologists, and experimenters in general in the various subsiences of biology? Thus, we have numberless examples of chemicals when brought together forming new substances or compounds with properties entirely different from the properties of the substances which went to make up the compounds. True, no microscope can reveal the intimate makeup of these new substances or compounds, but one could not therefore conclude that the individual chemicals in the compound have lost their identity or substantial form, because the spectroscope reveals their presence very clearly and definitely. Moreover, one may and can recover the individual constituents of any chemical compound and thus help to complicate the problem of the unity of form of individual substances and of what happens to these forms when a chemical union occurs or is brought about in nature or in the laboratory.

"All things are in a perpetual flux and reflux. The primary elements join hands and let go again, as they move through the concentric circles of material substance. Yet, as regards *something* of their substantial entity, these atoms remain the same throughout their journeys. The substantial form changes; but the matter remains the same, ready to receive the different forms which successively determine its being. Surely, these facts of nature justify a strong presumption, and more than a strong presumption, that the material cause of all corporal substances is one and the same. . . . Since Primordial Matter is uninformed, there is no possible foundation of distinction and consequent multiplication. Its plurality is, therefore, a sheer impossibility. Numerical plurality is derived

from individual distinction, at least in the instance
View of of real entities; and all distinction is due to the form
St. Thomas whence proceeds specific actuation"(5). Prior to St.
 Thomas, the schoolmen generally held to the theory

of the plurality of forms in all compounds and composite substances. After St. Thomas, this teaching was superseded generally by the teaching that a substance has only one form, hence any compound brought about by a chemical change or union of elements has only one form because (as they hold) the individual elements have lost their own independent forms and have assumed a new form, the

forma compositi. St. Thomas's reasons for adopting this idea are due to the fact that he "recognized that a plurality of forms would compromise the unity of a substantial compound; for, as soon as a form determines primary matter, it makes by its union with it a substance, a subject capable of receiving actual existence, and the union of another form with this already substantial compound could only result in an accidental determination; the substance and the form so added would thus form an *accidental* whole, not a *substantial* unit. Substantial unity, he concludes then, demands that there be only *one* form: a conclusion that is a characteristic and noteworthy advance of Thomism" (11). The older opinion was based upon the axiom of "*operari sequitur esse*" and many there are today who hold that the older teaching is more in harmony with modern scientific facts than the opinion of St. Thomas and his followers.

How can one explain by the unity of form the simple example of water? It is made up of two atoms of hydrogen and one of oxygen to every molecule of water. A molecule of water does not easily reveal these elements after they have formed the combination known as water although the spectroscope will show their presence. What happened to their individual forms of hydrogen and oxygen after these elements joined to form a molecule of water? The molecule of water may be broken up and the two atoms of hydrogen and one of oxygen recovered—in this case where is the form of water? When one views water may he say that it contains neither oxygen nor hydrogen? Hardly. Yet, if they have lost their individuality, their own actuating forms, they must have ceased to exist, in which case, there could scarcely be water. If water has its own individual form and no other, where do we get oxygen and hydrogen when water is resolved into its two component elements? Physics tells us that "the essential difference between ice, water, and vapor, invisible and visible, is simply a matter of molecular freedom; that is, the excursions of the molecules of this mixture of hydrogen and oxygen may be described as fixed, fluid, and free"(10). That is well and good for physics, but what does Scholasticism say of the problem of forms in connection with this simple example?

The cultivation of tissues outside the organism has become a

Examples commonplace, although years ago, when this feat
From the was first accomplished with the nerve cells of the
Medical World frog, it created a great deal of speculation. The
successful handling of frog tissue was soon followed
by that of experiments on the more complex mam-
malian tissues with the same great success. Doctors Burrows and
Carrel of the Rockefeller Institute were able to grow glandular
tissue in a suitable medium. This was justly heralded as a great
boon for biological research. Sometime later human tissues were
kept alive in various nutrient media for varying periods of time; in
fact, it was not long before these tissues could be kept indefinitely,
and at the present time no one acquainted with this work looks
upon it as startling. Tissues have thus been kept alive and grow-
ing in suitable media for years; in fact, they must be cut to keep
them from growing larger than the container. As all this mass of
evidence grew, numerous explanations were offered. The problem
was difficult and had to be treated circumspectly. The various ex-
periments along these lines for plants and animals presented many
serious problems for the philosopher and psychologist, but all these
facts paled into comparative insignificance when plastic surgery
performed the many astounding feats of grafting skin, muscles,
bones, and even eyes from one human being to another. Materials
needed to carry on these operations were taken from living and dead
bodies and kept in storage or under aseptic conditions indefinitely
or until needed.

Plants have a vegetative soul, animals a sentient one, and man a
rational soul. Moreover, the Scholastics explained that animals
possess both a vegetative and sentient soul, whereas man had these
two plus the rational soul, but in this case we must keep in mind the
distinction they made in connection with man. Man has the three
above-mentioned principles, but with this distinction that in man
these principles are not three distinct principles, as some have main-
tained, but the rational soul performs the threefold activity. "That
the rational and sentient soul are one is proved by the testimony of
consciousness to the perfect identity between the mind which thinks
and the mind which feels and the intimate interdependence of
thought and sensation." Further, "that the principle of vegetative
life in man is identical with his rational, sentient soul is proved from

the intimate union and mutual interdependence subsisting between the sensuous and vegetative activities which cannot be accounted for on the supposition that two distinct principles are at work" (9).

Some of the points at issue were discussed some years ago in the *Ecclesiastical Review*. E. J. Wirth, in September, 1914, insisted that these facts could and should be interpreted according to the teachings of St. Thomas saying: "as the greater contains the less, so the soul virtually includes all the lower forms. When the body dies the chemical elements receive the natural form they had before entering into the composition of the body. Why should we not apply this doctrine to the living tissues of the body and to the cells that constitute them? The rational soul virtually contains the lower vital forms and exercises their activities in the cells. Why should not the cell activity be a proximate disposition for the production of a vegetative principle of life in the breaking up of the composition in death or in the separation of a part of the tissue from the unity of the body? You ask where does the principle of life come from? I answer by asking, where does the substantial form of the chemical elements come from when they leave the unity of the body? *Educuntur de potentia materiae*; that is precisely where the principle of life in the isolated cell comes from" (18). Dr. Austin O'Malley maintains the same ideas in discussing these points, particularly as regards human skin kept in cold storage (14).

It is noteworthy that these explanations deal with the problems from the angle of those who hold the theory of the unity of forms in all instances, particularly in those cases where chemical elements are taken up into the body, lose their identity and substantial forms, and receive again their natural forms when they leave the body. I wonder at times if the substantial form is looked upon as a real or logical entity in corporeal things. If it is real, how can we say that it is destroyed when elements combine to form a new substance? St. Thomas and others after him (Scotus holds the same views on the matter) maintain that the substantial form of the body contains all the lower forms *virtualiter* and not *potentialiter*. Before the elements come together to form an *ens novum* the several elements had this new form in *potentia*, but after their union the form

is actual. What does *virtualiter* really mean? If it means *realiter* or *actualiter* there is no need for the distinction; if it signifies anything else it is hard to see how it has any sort of existence in fact. The forms which these new, separated, or decomposed elements or substances receive, are said to receive them as a natural consequence of the workings of nature. They are said to be educed from potency of matter in the usual acceptance of this phrase, but this does not explain matters for those who do not accept the theory of the unity of forms in the light of modern scientific discoveries.

The older opinion of the pre-Thomistic schoolmen and the vast majority of the philosophers of the Franciscan School see no great difficulty in accepting the doctrine of the plurality of forms because they can prove the existence of chemical elements with a subordinate form in bodies. Chemical elements, they claim, do not lose their original forms but remain unchanged in their passage into, through, and out of the life cycle. The same can be said of chemical elements and cells making up organic compounds in the body or in the laboratory. The facts of the case seem to warrant this conclusion.

"The process productive of forms (*eductio de potentia materiae*)," writes de Wulf, "is rightly regarded as one of the most difficult questions of Scholasticism. Its greatest teachers are unanimous in admitting the intervention of a triple factor; the First Cause exerting *concursus generalis*; the preëxisting matter disposed to receive the new form and give birth to the new compound; the natural agent or active principle which actualizes the receptive subject. But there is little or no agreement as to the respective rôle of each of these factors" (3).

The laws governing this process are not stated but we know that in nature everything happens according to very definite and very exact laws and that chance has no place in the workings of nature whether we concentrate on animate or inanimate things. Life Only From Preëxisting Life Biology tells us that life can only come from preëxisting life, hence to seek to explain the facts of science philosophically by appealing to *eductio formae de potentia materiae* appears to be side-stepping the real issue. Tissues are made up of numberless cells, if they are separated from the body, where do these separated cells comprising

the tissues get their life principle? If they receive it from the original organism, there seems to be no need of *eductio de potentia materiae*. If they do not, then, what means could be invoked to explain their ability to continue to live when dissociated from the organism of which they once formed an integral part? Just as in chemistry the unity of things is the molecule and atom for all practical purposes, so in biology the unit of structure and function is the cell. Regardless of what one might think, each and every cell has its own life as can be seen from various activities which are strictly vital, presupposing a quasi-independence of the cell, because it can select its food, assimilate it, grow, respire the protoplasm streams, and finally under proper conditions, reproduce itself.

In zoölogy we see organisms which are merely loosely aggregated sets of tissues. Such animals can be cut into a multitude of pieces and after a given period each tiny piece will become a full-fledged individual like the parent organism from which it was cut. We have examples of this in the Porifera (sponges), the Cœlenterata (hydra), the Echinodermata (starfish, etc.), the Annelida (the worms), and less extensively in the higher groups (6). No group of animals lacks members which manifest this power of regeneration of parts or of the ability of parts to live severed from the bulk of the organism. Everyone knows that in many instances nails and hair continue to grow long after the human organism has ceased to live. In botany we know that plants may be propagated by runners, slips, stolons, suckers, shoots, etc., and we still lack a philosophical explanation of the form of these new entities.

All these facts go to show that the various systems or organs which make up an organism are not all subject to the guiding principle or soul to the same extent or degree. Today, the organism as a unit is stressed in biology but this does not eliminate the idea that its units lack some independence of activity, call it subordinate if you wish. The soul is the substantial form of the body, it has subsumed all the elements which have come within its cycle, but has it entirely deprived these elements of their subordinate forms or individuality or identity? True, the Council of Vienne in 1311 decreed as an article of faith that the intellectual soul is *per se* and essentially the form of the human body.

The idea of subordinate forms does not militate against this decree in the least; in fact, "most of the thirteenth-century Scholastics and a considerable number of the fourteenth, admitted that the various degrees of perfection found in one and the same being have distinct forms corresponding to them and this without detriment to the complete and perfect unity of the being"(3). As long as we do not conceive the life of cells as a distinct vegetative soul, any independence which we give them cannot be said to run counter to this opinion of the aforementioned Council. This may be seen from the fact that "they (the cells) are not capable of becoming anything or of being anything but cells with sensitive life adapted to a living organism. If they are detached or the substantial form recedes, they can continue to grow for they are endowed with vital forces or secondary principles of life, but their ultimate scope is curtailed, as the primary object of their reproduction no longer exists. In this event their tenure of life becomes quite precarious; and in the struggle for ascendancy which ensues with their own elements, when the dominating power is gone, they soon succumb, unless a substitute is forthcoming to hold in check the aspirants for independence. This fitness affords some notion of the final causality of their nature. For though their proper activity is purposeful, still their relic qualities are restricted to the function of compassing an appointed end as members of a compound" (13).

It seems that Neo-Scholasticism has some answer for these problems and for others suggested by embryology.

The Task of If the unity of form theory is rigidly applied
Neo-Scholasticism it is very difficult to see how these facts can be fully explained. When a fertilized egg is allowed to develop until a given cleavage stage is reached and then the component cells mechanically torn apart, we get in many instances smaller but fully formed individuals from these blastomeres. Identical twins are from a single egg which developed till it reached the two-cell stage and then the halves fell apart, but (8), instead of atrophying or dying, these two cells continued to divide and eventually form two distinct embryos and finally two distinct individuals. Scholasticism must face these problems sooner or later and give a comprehensive and true, reasonable, scientific explanation of the facts. The schoolmen, had they known or dreamed of these facts,

would have long ago come forth with a good workable solution of the whole difficulty. When theories conflict with facts, then the theories should be abandoned. Time-honored opinions should not be made a fetish nor should we seek to give a wooden interpretation of things and be satisfied. A thorough investigation of every possibility is necessary before definite steps are to be taken, theories relinquished, new ones formulated, and definite conclusions drawn. Neo-Scholasticism must adapt its medieval concepts to modern scientific findings and interpret them; otherwise it will soon become a storehouse of historically interesting theories, opinions, and conclusions without effective meaning or influence on modern life and times.

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DISCUSSION

FR. MARK STIER, O.M.Cap.—A plurality of forms seems to be incompatible with the doctrine of a being's substantial unity. On the hypothesis of several substantial forms, though subordinated, we must conclude that man, for instance, would not be one individual but several individuals, and in consequence, an accidental union would be the result.

Objections to Plurality of Forms

If it be said that the first form does not remain "formally"

but only "really" or "materially," it is difficult to see the distinction between the *reality* of a form which remains, and its *function* which is no longer exercised. A second substantial form either continues to give being or it does not. If it continues, then we have a twofold substantial being and, in consequence, an accidental union; if it does not continue to give being, then it is no longer a true form and, consequently, there is only one substantial form in every being.

Furthermore, from a plurality of substantial forms there would result a unity of order between two or more substances, but never one substantial being or one substance.

Of great interest is the problem of unicity of substantial form and explanted tissues. Among the intense explant *in vitro* experiments that biologists are conducting, perhaps the most sensational are Carrel's. Certain integral organs have been made to function after separation from the organism; explanted animal tissues have been made not only to live, but even to grow. These facts seem to indicate that explanted cells have a "cytodynamic" or cellular soul which animates the cells and is the principle of their continued vital action.

Here the question arises: Were those cells informed by cytodynamic forms before separation or not? If they were, then we must admit the plurality of forms in every multicellular being, though subordinated to the specific principle of the living being, in man, to the rational soul. If they were not informed, then how can we explain the origin of these cytodynamic forms after separation?

The first question to be answered by way of a solution is: Do explants really live? By a very thorough investigation of the facts it is evident that there is a vast difference in the manner of operation before and after separation from the organism. Wherefore, if the facts can be explained without an actual vital principle, then we must exclude these cytodynamic forms: *entia non sunt multiplicanda sine necessitate*. But these forms seem to be superfluous if we consider the circumstances or conditions in which explants are preserved, and the functions which they perform.

The conditions of preservation can be reduced to four: (1) the dissection of the fragment is made so accurately that its structure acquired in the organism by ontogenetic evolution remains intact; (2) the explant is preserved in an apt medium, namely, in plasm that has been extracted from the blood of the animal, or in some other substance that contains the same elements as plasm; (3) the explant is artificially preserved in the same temperature that it had in the organism; (4) toxic elements are eliminated by a change of the medium, and thus the elimination of toxin is artificially effected, which before separation was brought about by the circulation of the blood.

Is it surprising, then, that such explants, retaining the chemical energy received from the organism—though deprived of their vital principle—should discharge this energy by similar chemical reactions as if they were still united with the organism?

This solution is confirmed if we consider the functions and reactions in explants: (1) the fragment does not generate similar fragments, nor does it manifest that typical embryonic evolution obtained by progressive differentiation and co-ordination of cells and the wonderful adaptation which we observe in all living organisms; (2) the processes observed in the fragment are "regressive," that is, the medium merely retards the natural corruption of the explant, due to the artificial means used to remove the natural causes of corruption.

Let us now view these biological facts on the supposition that explants really

Interpreting St. Thomas

live. How do they fit into St. Thomas's doctrine of the unicity of substantial form? It is not my purpose to violently dovetail explants into St. Thomas's doctrine of substantial form. Neither do I claim that St. Thomas foresaw twentieth-century explants before formulating his doctrine. I merely wish to show that explants *in vitro* do not throw overboard St. Thomas's doctrine; that his doctrine stands the test not because of its medievalism or because it is Thomistic but because, as it seems to me, it is the truth.

As there is question in explants of nutrition and augmentation the vital principle would be a principle of vegetative life. Furthermore, since it is a material and nonsubsistent substantial form it is educed from the potency of matter, that is, the new form becomes dependent upon matter. Therefore, without admitting the preëxistence of cytodynamic forms in the organism, a sufficient reason for the origin of this new principle of life is the education of the form from the potency of matter. The various natural agents are the efficient causes of this eduction.

FR. RAPHAEL VON DER HAAR, O.F.M.— Need of Harmony between Philosophy and Science

The need of harmonizing philosophy and the natural sciences is evident. Every school of philosophy admits its obligation of building upon the foundation stones provided by scientific research. Neo-Scholasticism is no exception; it undertakes to explain phenomena in their ultimate causes, and de Wulf aptly remarks: "It is not possible to explain the world of phenomena, while neglecting the phenomena that make up the world."

While accepting the experimental-speculative method in principle, the schoolmen have in practice not always paid enough attention to the experimental phase. But if the men of the Middle Ages had enjoyed the advantages afforded modern philosophy by the rapid development of empirical science, they would have used them to the utmost. If it is true, as suggested in the paper, that some present-day Scholastics are too slow to abandon worn-out theories, it is equally true that others are sufficiently progressive; this applies likewise to the matter and form theory, which was discussed previously.

A number of prominent modern Scholastics, such as Donat, McWilliams, and Dario, no longer accept hylomorphism as proposed of old, but have changed it and brought it into agreement with the latest findings of physics and chemistry. For instance, Donat says: "Because it appears to be demonstrated that bodies are composed of molecules, molecules of atoms, and atoms of sub-atomic parts, the question of matter and form must be reduced to these ultimate components."

Although hylomorphism must be modified, it cannot be entirely abandoned. We may not discard the substantial form, for the soul is surely the substantial form in man. Still we might admit the form without retaining the doctrine of prime matter; according to Donat, the form determines matter, not necessarily prime matter.

The doctrine of the plurality of forms is becoming more and more common among Neo-Scholastics. In any compound the elements are believed to retain their own proper form, even when their functions change; similarly in organisms the various constituents, e.g., tissue, blood, and bone, are considered to have their own determining principles. It would be a mistake to represent this teaching as new, since it was held, at least as probable, by Albert the Great, Lugo, and others. Before the time of St. Thomas it was the common opinion among philosophers; only later, due to the authority of the Angelic Doctor, the other doctrine prevailed.

While showing reverence for scientific discoveries, the philosophers need not bow to all the theories advanced in the name of science. It is well to remember that scientific thought is continually changing concerning the ultimate components of bodies. For many years physicists have represented the atom as a central sunlike mass, surrounded by planetlike electrons. The electrons were known as negatively charged particles and were supposed to be the smallest things in the universe. Now, however, scientists assert that the central mass, the nucleus of the atom, is itself a complex body, consisting of twin electrons and alpha particles, or infinitesimal fragments of helium atoms. The very latest is that atomism, so popular till now, is yielding to a form of dynamism. Two weeks ago, Dr. Pauli, Jr., physicist, announced before the scientific élite in Pasadena his belief that every material thing in creation can be divided and subdivided until nothing is left except some form of electricity. In other words, the entire universe seems to be merely electricity piled together in various forms.

THE STUDY OF ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY FOR THE GUIDANCE OF SOULS

FR. EDWIN DORZWEILER, O.M.Cap., A.M.

The psychology of our day descends into the arena of life to cope with the many problems of human behavior. It addresses itself to the charitable task of forestalling mental disturbances, reclaiming psychic defectives, and enabling man to enjoy a fuller and more normal life. The study and treatment of mental ailments is the achievement of the past few decades. There were, indeed, efforts made in former times to deal with the abnormalities of the mind, but they remained for the most part desultory in character. Only in recent times have the data of investigation been scientifically assembled and studied.

The need of the day made it imperative. Our age has frequently been styled a "nervous age." The complexities of modern civilization, the noise of the street, the grind of machinery, the keen competition of business and profession, the craze for sport and pleasure — all leave their sorry effect on the nervous system of man. Is it any wonder, then, that men are giving ever more evidence of the *cor inquietum*? It has been said that to remain in a state of mental sanity under present conditions calls for a special effort, that the health of the mind requires thoughtful consideration and fostering. The fact is that psychic disorders are on the increase. A recent writer stated that if the present rate of increase continues, in thirty years there will be just about enough people in the world to take care of the mentally disordered and there will be no other occupation.

However it be, the guide of souls cannot take a passive and indifferent attitude. He will be glad to learn that the results of modern psychology and psychiatry will render him invaluable services in dealing with so many of the stricken souls that come to him for relief. He will discover that a number of traditional opinions and methods in pastoral care have become obsolete and need to be revised in the

light of the latest findings in this field. But he will also be pleased to find that so much of the new psychology is in full accord with the great psychologists of Christian asceticism and proves to be a plain indorsement of the principles and methods employed these many years in the spiritual and sacramental system of the Church.

To possess expert knowledge of all the ills of the human mind in their devious and complex nature belongs to the professional psychiatrist. But it comes within the scope of the priest's pastoral care — if he is to be all to all — to have an intelligent insight into the chief drives of human nature and their psychotaxic and parataxic¹ manifestations, and to be sufficiently familiar with the methods of psychotherapy.

A study of clinical cases will prove very beneficial to the spiritual guide, even if he does but seldom come in contact with them in his priestly ministration. Here he can observe the mechanism of a plain psychosis and learn to recognize the symptoms of mental aberration in the incipient stage. Actions which are regarded as mere eccentricities are in reality often signs of a parataxis, and many a pessimist or negativist is distinctly pathological, for psychopathical cases are more frequent than one would suspect and escape the notice of the inexperienced. In fact, many patients have a way of concealing their condition; they go about their daily tasks as others do and betray themselves only to those next to them.

Kretschmer explains the psychosis as a distortion of the essential features that constitute the structure of the mind. He maintains that any normal person may slip into the twilight and night of a psychosis, if internal and external factors of a sufficient strength are brought to bear upon him; that we all have a tendency to a mental breakdown, but manage to resist the forces that make for mental disintegration.

In every human life there may be happenings of such deep and lasting effect as to change the entire mental structure, whether for good or for evil. Infantile experiences may create inhibitions and

¹This serviceable terminology is introduced in Moore's *Dynamic Psychology*. Psychotaxis is a *normal* impulsive drive to react to a given difficulty; parataxis is an *abnormal* adjustment to a situation and may be the preliminary stage to a complete psychosis.

fixations that will largely determine the complexion of the after years. Add to this the experiences of adult life. A never-ending current of experiences is streaming from our conscious life into our unconscious self, leaving there those psychic sediments the sum total of which constitutes our character. As long as this unconscious self is allowed to seek the satisfaction of the lower passions and is not forced to produce its insidious affairs into the light of day, so long shall we suffer in body and mind. For psychical disharmonies are frequent causes of organic and functional disturbances. The opinions concerning functional diseases which have no organic foundation have changed considerably. Psychiatrists no longer content themselves with establishing the exhaustion of body and mind or the influence of heredity as factors of nervous troubles, but are more intent upon seeking out the psychic causes and also emphasize psychical rather than physical measures in the treatment of patients.

Only a proper understanding of the mental mechanisms will insure an effective treatment. Many reactions otherwise wholly unintelligible appear in their true light, once we have understood the various drives of the human compound. Take, for example, the primary urge of man — that of self-ideal. As long as this urge is allowed to hold undisputed sway in the unconscious, it will beget a number of incorrect reactions with which conscious self would have nothing to do. We see it suddenly break out in the form of an overbearing and disputatious attitude, of stubbornness and defiance, of an urgent need to crack jokes at the expense of others with the unconscious intention of lowering them in the estimation of their fellow men. It mobilizes all its forces to gain recognition before oneself and in the eyes of others. In the face of failure it expresses itself in abnormal dejection and anger; in its daily struggle against the pricks of social intercourse it meets with disappointments and conflicts that give rise to worry and envy and unrest of soul. All this makes an unusual demand on the nervous resources of a person and leads to nervous exhaustion and neurosis. This fundamental urge is treacherous. It strives to frustrate every attempt at being exposed and dragged into the open. It endeavors to obtain a mastery over the faculties of the soul. It exerts its power over the memory, making it subservient to itself insofar as

unpleasant things are conveniently forgotten; it casts its spell over the intellect by not permitting it to understand whatever may conflict with the flattering picture of self; it has a way of silencing the voice of conscience, so that measures appear as harmless no matter how much they run counter to the moral code.² Many a "praiseworthy excuse" will not hold before the bar of plain honesty and Franciscan simplicity. Judas demurred when the precious ointment was poured over the feet of the Master. The evangelist analyzes this complaint by saying that Judas was not so much interested in the poor as in the purse which he carried. Such defense reactions may appear quite innocent in the beginning, but they may become malignant and completely abnormal and lead to open violations of sacred duties, while the victim all along seems totally blind to the real motives that actuate his conduct.

In order to form a just judgment of a patient's responsibility, we must be sufficiently acquainted with his mental **Responsibility** make-up and the drives that play upon him. A helpful introduction will be found in the scheme devised by Ewald. This scheme distinguishes between the sthenic and asthenic characters. In both groups it studies the individual as to his urges or the absence of them. It will prove highly serviceable in the study of character as well as in the education of self and of others.

It is as difficult to determine in how far a psychopathic subject is accountable for his actions as it is to say at what time he passed from the twilight of parataxis to the darkness of a full-blown psychosis. The fact that a person is afflicted with an obsession does not yet absolve him from all responsibility. But it is also true that many such patients can achieve but a partial success despite their most valiant efforts. The descent from the top step where man stands as the master of self to the lowest step where he sits divested of his prerogative of rationality may be the result of a brain disease or a disorder of endocrine secretion. In such cases there is, of course, no responsibility. But the descent may also be due to the fact that a person of an unfortunate predisposition failed to educate himself and

²Cf. I. Erhard, *Seelische Ursachen und Behandlung der Nervenleiden* (Freiburg i. Br.: Herder, 1925), p. 50.

offer manly resistance to the forces that drove him on. It is of importance to know whether a person who is predisposed to a mental disorder keeps himself well in hand or lets the reins shoot. Allowing freedom to wild fancies and impetuous drives will prove disastrous for such a person. And since most of these patients are not institutional cases but move about freely, it becomes apparent to what great dangers they are exposed and how much they need a spiritual guide who is also able to direct them with the aid of psychiatry.

It devolves upon the spiritual physician to give his full attention to the tortured souls that suffer from mental maladies. The priest is admirably qualified for the task by his very calling. All those qualities which should accompany the professional knowledge of the psychiatrist are wont to be connected with the priestly character. In the priest we look for kindness and patience, self-possession, freedom from prejudice, understanding of human nature — all virtues which inspire trust and confidence and establish a favorable relationship with the psychic patient.

The mental sufferer cannot understand himself. He feels his own helplessness and realizes that things cannot continue in this way. His restlessness and torment of soul prompt him to seek relief. He casts about for someone who can

“ . . . minister to a mind diseased;
Pluck from the memory a rooted sorrow;
Raze out the written troubles of the brain
And with some sweet oblivious antidote
Cleanse the stuff'd bosom of that perilous stuff
Which weighs upon the heart.”

—*Macbeth*, Act V, Scene III, 40-46.

Happy he, if he finds a spiritual guide who has an understanding for his ills and can analyze them, trace them to their sources, explain their nature and unreasonableness, and point out the way to rid himself of the dread incubus. His fears will cease, the pressure subside, and hope revive, as the strong and positive thoughts of the guide supplant the disturbances of his tired mind.

Encouraging results are obtained from the application of the direct method of treatment which is commonly called Rational Persua-

sion or Reëducation.³ The patient is to receive an insight into the nature of his troubles. Modern psychiatry has achieved remarkable success in the use of this method. Thus in the war neuroses, the helpless tremors, yielded to the lucid explanation of the physiology of muscular contraction that was connected with the neurosis, and promptly disappeared once the psychological mechanism of fears and complexes was made clear to the sufferer.

As long as the patient is in a prepsychotic condition, much can be done for him. But when he has once passed into a state of psychosis, he may be beyond help. A timely correction may arrest a downward trend. If a person shows evident signs of a neurosis, he should be kindly but firmly told that the classic lines of his mental countenance are turning into a hideous grimace. A merciless knowledge and iron discipline of self, sustained and strengthened by prudent direction, will keep the person from lapsing into a parataxis and neurosis. Shakespeare wisely said: "Therein the patient must minister to himself."

Within proper limits, psychoanalysis has a real value, especially in disclosing the connection of mental phenomena which would otherwise remain mysterious. Freud possessed something of the penetration and intuition of genius when he divined the significance of symbolic mechanisms and neurotic compulsions. Without giving credence to the pansexual doctrine of Freudians, the physician of souls will be alert to recognize the symbols and masks behind which an unsatisfied sexuality may lurk. As a therapeutic method, psychoanalysis can render but small services. There are indeed people, particularly the more intellectual, with whom the exposition of the hidden cause of abnormality will suffice to bring relief. But in most cases a relapse ensues with the cessation of the psychoanalytic treatment. A mere opening of the boil that causes the discomfort is not sufficient; something more positive must be done for it, in accordance with the admonition of St. Paul to "overcome evil by good."

Abnormal behavior presents such baffling problems as to resist effective treatment, unless we can unravel the peculiar skeins of the

³Cf. J. Mullen, *Psychological Factors in the Pastoral Treatment of Scruples* (Baltimore: Williams and Wilkins, 1927), p. 145.

unconscious mind; for all neuroses and psychoses must ultimately be traced to this hidden cavern from which they issue into the light of day to startle us with their grotesque incongruity. We may have certain morbid fears, likes and dislikes for which we cannot account, certain obsessions and compulsory ideas that assert themselves in spite of our better judgment. The subconscious holds the key to the secret. "We must recognize that the subconscious is intelligent; it is adaptable; it is able to reason, to indulge in constructive thinking, and to utilize the powers of a creative imagination; and further, that it is keen, cunning, and crafty, and is able to formulate and perpetrate systematic deceptions and sustained delusions upon the minds of neurotic sufferers."⁴

Since psychoanalysis enters into the very sanctum of the soul and attempts to bring to light whatever is found there, it lays itself open to much abuse. Jastrow somewhere says: "The most pernicious complex of the day may well be the psychoanalytic complex — the unrepressed desire to dig at the roots of delicate growths. . . . The analyst vivisects the most sensitive tissues of the human personality." The spiritual guide will therefore protect his charges from getting into the hands of the unknowing and unscrupulous. It is plain that the priest may not convert the tribunal of penance into a psychoanalytic clinic, although he may well profit in the administration of the sacrament of penance by the helpful information which psychoanalysis has provided.

In his pastoral care the priest will meet with undeveloped cases of dementia precox. Correct guidance on his part can prevent much harm if the affliction is purely psychic.

Dementia prevent much harm if the affliction is purely psychic.

Precox An imprudent assent, however, to a mania which is not recognized as such will only serve to confirm the malady. If a folly is taken for piety, and "voices" for mysticism, the mania becomes intensified. Hallucinations and "visions" are symptoms of paranoid deterioration and must be nipped in the bud of an evil growth. A soul specially favored with the visitations of God will always be humble and docile and reasonable, even in the severest trials. But a soul infected with paranoia is stubborn, eccentric,

⁴Cf. J. F. Barrett, *Elements of Psychology* (Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Co., 1931), p. 319.

brazen, and impatient of correction and direction. Priest and physician must here coöperate. Not all cases yield to treatment and healing, but many are curable if detected and recognized in time.

Medical men have said that most people are susceptible to hysteria if the shocks of life are sufficiently violent. The **Hysterical** phenomena of the war hysteria seem to bear out the **Type** truth of the statement. Hysteria is an abnormal reaction to the shocks and demands of life. It breaks out in a chaotic way with some adolescent boys and girls, and also with men and women of weak character, who have been the subjects of a very distressing experience. The normal person will soon gather his forces and overcome the latent hysterical impulse. The psychopath is carried along by his impulse and breaks out in fits of exaltation and depression. He frequently seeks refuge in abnormality in order to achieve an end that could not be obtained in the ordinary way. He is not so much weak of will as rather weak in fastening upon the purpose of action. His impulsive mechanisms are not brought into coördination with the reasonable consideration of the ends and purposes to be pursued. The treatment and cure of such patients will therefore have to consist in bringing about this agreement of impulse and reason. Loewenstein has presented evidence that there are deaf and blind people whose sense defects are due to no other cause than hysteria. They have the same sense stimuli as other people, but the stimulation is not allowed to reach the field of consciousness. Such phenomena are usually connected with the craving for a wish-fulfillment or the escape from an unpleasantness. The wish, "I would like to be free from this or that task," frequently turns into a hysterical impotence as though the patient wished to say, "There, you see, I simply can't do it." The wish, "I should like to have this or that," reaches its object by the strangest of fits, seizures, fainting spells, and grotesque scenes. Mild cases of this kind come within the experience of everyone. Such patients present problems of great interest and importance to the educator and moral psychologist.⁵

⁵Cf. I. Klug, *Tiefen der Seele* (Paderborn: F. Schoening, 1927), p. 280.

The manic depressive type of reaction is of frequent occurrence. It becomes the task of the priest to restore the psychic balance of the patient, especially if the affliction is purely psychogenic. The sadness is to be neutralized by a cheerful and active life. Those who suffer from depression must be encouraged to speak freely of their real and imaginary troubles. The tendency to entertain ideas of despair and damnation and suicide is to be counteracted by directing the mind to thoughts of cheerfulness and serenity and confidence. The Book of Ecclesiasticus (xxx. 24, 25) says: "Drive away sadness far from thee, for sadness hath killed many and there is no profit in it." And St. Paul tells the first Christians that they should not be sad like the heathens who have no hope; for no one has more right to be joyful of heart than the Christian. There are so many means of nature and grace at the disposal of the priest that he can often sever the first threads of depression that are being spun about the victim and thus set him at liberty. But where pastoral care will no longer suffice, the sufferer must be referred to a physician who is well versed in psychology and psychiatry.

The disturbances arising from apprehensive and compulsory neuroses are very common. They manifest themselves in divers fears, doubts, inhibitions, and urges to contrary thoughts and actions. They are best removed through proper hygiene, recreation, explanation, and a sane psychoanalysis. The unfounded phobia must be dislodged by disclosing the unreasonableness of it, and the mental tension must be relieved by a widening of the field of vision and by an education to greater courage and magnanimity. It is of importance for the anguished souls to have a correct and clear insight into their suffering and understand aright the language of nature, and not try to argue away a perfectly natural phenomenon. They must remember that they are human beings and not angels. The Manichean attitude toward the divinely ordained facts of sex must be made to yield to a serene, pure, and clear understanding of these realities. The fear must be converted into reverence.

Still it is true that phobias and compulsory notions sometimes defy expulsion. They assume such a firm hold on their victims as to resist all attempts at being simply brushed aside or shaken off

or talked away. The firm grip can best be unloosed by positive considerations. If the patient spends himself over the words: "The ones shall enter into everlasting fire," he should be taught to give thought to these other words of Eternal Truth: "And the others into life everlasting," and sing with Mother Church, *O felix culpa*.⁶ The fundamental relation of the soul to God is determined by a good will and not by an anxiety and fear that may harass the soul.

Scrupulosity is a variety of phobias and obsessions. Psychology and psychiatry have in our time investigated these abnormal phenomena of the spiritual life.⁷ These new researches offer a number of helpful means which were denied to the spiritual guide of an earlier day. Priests know that the directions given in the textbooks of moral theology often prove inadequate to deal with scrupulous penitents. Since the beginning of this parataxis manifests itself first in the tribunal of penance, it is clear that the confessor should be able to understand its mechanisms and apply the right therapeutics.

It should not be impossible to clarify many of the seemingly hopeless difficulties of conscience by which the scrupulous are upset and tortured. There is a vast difference between a temptation and a morbid obsession. The former entices the will to evil, while the latter is a pathological phenomenon which asserts itself in opposition to the will and normal thought of the sufferer. Once the scrupulous understand this, their suffering is greatly reduced and perhaps even dispelled. Besides, a lucid explanation of the psychology of passion and of what constitutes certitude often brings relief, provided the scrupulosity has not become plainly obsessional. It is important in this matter to effect the cure before the pebbles of scruples have assumed the proportion of boulders that bear the patient down with them. Nor should one delay too long to invoke the aid of a competent doctor to insure success.

⁶Cf. Klug, *op. cit.*, p. 273.

⁷Cf. Janet, *Les obsessions et la psychasthénie*; A. Gemelli, O.F.M., *De Scrupulis*; J. J. Mullen, *ibid.*

The spiritual guide also comes into contact with criminal delinquency due to abnormality, i.e., to blunted moral perceptions, to an enfeebled power of restraint, and to the absence of emotional reaction. The distorted outlook on life of these delinquents appears to them as the normal thing and renders the appreciation of moral and social standards quite impossible. The treatment of such abnormal subjects is a most delicate and difficult one. They must first be wholly reëducated. To present to them religious truths is well-nigh useless. Appeals must first be made to their selfishness, to their own best interests, as well as to those of their family and of society. Gradually may they be led to see the abnormality and unreasonableness of their own behavior. Only in this way can the soil be prepared for the grace of God and a true appreciation of religious and social values.

The complement of all natural treatment of psychic diseases is often found in the institution only which the Divine Physician has left us — in sacramental absolution. **Sacramental Absolution** "Go and show thyself to the priest," is still sound therapeutics. After all analysis and treatment of mental illness there often remains something in the soul which no psychoanalysis can banish — the real illness of the soul — sin and its guilt. There are those whose sinful deeds pursue them like hideous shadows bringing with them the punishment of abnormal reactions. "Unnatural deeds do breed unnatural troubles," says Shakespeare and continues to say, "More needs she (Lady Macbeth) the divine than the physician."

All the salutary effects of psychoanalysis are realized in sacramental confession. The psychological powers of this sacrament are perhaps too little recognized. In the examination of conscience even the most painful conflicts are raised over the threshold of consciousness, in contrition is found a wholesome catharsis, in the purpose of amendment one sees an effective sublimation, confession of sin produces the extraversion of the conflict, and absolution effects the objective and subjective liberation of the penitent from the burden of his affliction.⁸ All these happy results are doubly assured in a

⁸Cf. Klug, *op. cit.*, p. 170.

good spiritual retreat. Here the soul is made aware of its conflicts as well as of the divine truths and graces that cleanse and soothe.

Medical science has achieved its greatest triumphs in the prevention of disease. It has discovered that if the child **Prophylaxis** is reared in accordance with its prescriptions, it will keep the adult from breaking down with tuberculosis, heart disease, etc. In like manner can mental catastrophes be averted, if prophylactic measures are duly applied, and Christian ideals of life are allowed to exercise their wholesome influence. Many causes that lead to abnormality and final disintegration of mind can be removed and made inactive. The duty of doing this rests with those whose task it is to educate youth intellectually and religiously.

Catholic education has ever recognized the period of childhood as the fertile ground for the growth of later years. The same may be said of the impressionable years of adolescence. The impressions and traumatic experiences of these early periods create dispositions—strange attractions and aversions—with which the spiritual guide will have to reckon. He will have to avoid everything that will leave unpleasant memories in connection with the practice of religion and the reception of the sacraments in particular. A too stringent and rigorous catechetics, from which the sentiments of joy and confidence are excluded, may mark the beginning of scrupulosity and make the practice of religion forever difficult and cheerless.

Jastrow says that the chief problem of early life is to control the emotions. "It does not seriously matter," he writes, "whether or not children of seven to ten years of age learn much from books. . . . But we cannot postpone the learning of emotional control in childhood. This must be done early and step for step. This is nature's decree and part of nature's schooling."⁹ And an English neurologist maintains that all children are by nature hysterical and that the chief problem of education is to deal with a universal hysteria.

⁹"Keeping Mentally Fit," in *The Healthy Mind*, ed. by H. Elkind (New York: Greenberg, 1929), pp. 242-43.

Now, Christian asceticism has ever turned the face of youth to the realities of life. It is well known that uncurbed daydreaming in childhood and adolescence may foster such a pronounced egoism that it can no longer be dissipated by an appeal to common sense. If vain imaginations are allowed to stand for truth, they will blind their unhappy subjects and make them appear silly and distinctly abnormal. The old Catholic practice of self-examination has a peculiarly sobering effect. It focuses one's attention upon the unpleasant things of character and behavior with a view to correct them. In this way much anguish of soul is averted and a fund of genuine happiness is established. The shutting out of self-criticism leads to anxiety, chagrin, and pathological disdain for all the world. "This egoism, which is the source of so many ills, has its origin in infantile life and is bound to develop in everyone, unless early training, friction with reality and personal endeavor eradicate it. It might be said that the natural tendency of the untrained or poorly trained personality is the ultimate mental disaster."¹⁰

It is a common failing to cast off the blame we should shoulder and fix it upon another. The irreproachable character of self may be so firmly rooted that the burden of responsibility will be shifted even in the face of evident failing and neglect. In its extreme cases of abnormality it takes on the most bizarre appearance and manifests itself in ludicrous defense reactions. Now it is the aim of Christian education to train youth to a sense of fairness — to shoulder responsibility and be humble enough to admit one's faults and strive to amend them; and the Christian doctrine of original sin makes it plain not to rely too much upon one's impeccability.

Christianity also guards against the disappointment of failure and its consequent surliness. Its sane advice reads:

Religion, a Preventive Do not be finicky, expecting things to adjust themselves favorably to your whims — all is not lost because your wish fulfillment did not come true — let your ambitions be within the bounds of reason, for if you attempt an Icarian flight, your wings will melt in the heat of the sun, and

¹⁰T. V. Moore, "Emotion and Intellect in Adult Life," in *The Healthy Mind*, p. 134.

there will be a fall from which there may be no rising — look upon life as a journey to an everlasting home. Such advice insures evenness of mind. And equanimity with its soothing effect is a valuable preventive of a useless expenditure of energy. It is only through self-renunciation and detachment that this attitude of mind can be obtained and the afflictions of fortune be borne courageously. And thus precious energy will be preserved for the performance of the duties which life imposes and not be wasted in the struggle with phobias and manias.

The Christian philosophy of life discountenances the fallacy of the day to get as much out of life as one can regardless of whether or not it agrees with the rights and feelings of others. Self-expression is a misleading word. It is the philosophy of the popular novel, the talk of the street and social gatherings. Self-control, regard for others, and a reasonable adjustment to the exigencies of life, are cardinal principles of a true education. If the subconscious mind of the child is made the home of noble thoughts and noble endeavors, it will offer no room for evil and abnormal longings. Man is truly free in proportion as he has firmly set himself to the task of doing good and has sublimated the lower inclinations by a desire for virtue and moral perfection. When the conscious and the unconscious in man are one and harmonious, there will be no repression of unfulfilled wishes, no struggle with vexing complexes.

Since then the psychopath presents weighty problems to the psychologist, moralist, and spiritual director, the study of abnormal psychology should find a place in our curriculum. The elements of it can be taken in the course of psychology.¹¹ The lecturer of pastoral theology can complete the course by applying the science to the needs of souls as they are encountered in the pastoral charge. Besides the need of such a study in the service of religion there is the unmistakable personal benefit which we derive from it. We at once become more lenient in our judgment of others. The words of the Master, "Judge not," recur to the mind as we deal with psychic patients. We come to understand how the sad experiences of these unfortunates have weakened their power of resistance and

¹¹T. V. Moore's *Dynamic Psychology* may serve as an excellent introduction.

how heavily laden many of them are with the burdens of their forefathers. Then, too, once the student has acquainted himself with the mechanisms of the human mind, he will have frequent opportunities to observe the working out of them in his own case, and he will appreciate the statement that the correct consciousness consists in becoming conscious of our unconscious. He will obtain a better understanding of self — the first requisite for spiritual advancement. He will acquire an insight into certain reactions of his which before possibly refused to yield to the treatment of a spiritual retreat. Grace builds on nature. Perhaps, too, he will discover much truth in the words of a recent writer who said that only that person is fully free from every neurosis who has completely dedicated himself to the performance of life's duties, both natural and supernatural; in other words, beyond the neurosis stands the saint only.¹²

DISCUSSION

FR. PHILIBERT RAMSTETTER, O.F.M.—The very practical paper read by Father Edwin should make it clear to all that the study of abnormal psychology is helpful and quite necessary for an effectual guidance of souls. And this should be reason enough why it ought to find place in our seminary curricula.

In the first place it forms part of the study of psychology, with which every man of culture, and therefore every priest, must be fairly well acquainted. And it is becoming more evident every day, though to some it may appear paradoxical, that a study of the abnormal in behavior leads to a keener and more complete understanding of the normal.

Furthermore, such a study must show highly beneficial results in the work peculiar to the priest, the guiding and healing of souls. Carefully carried out, it will, as a matter of course, discredit the too prevalent method which treats all abnormal cases (with emphasis upon the scrupulous and the neurotic *recidivi*) in the same iron-clad way. To be sure, the principles of solution must ever be the same. Nevertheless, methods must be individual. Even general groupings, necessary and helpful though they be, are not sufficient from the standpoint of treatment; no two cases of abnormal mentality are exactly alike in all their circumstances, and so no two cases may be thrown into the same curative mold. Surely, then, if the spiritual director himself is not familiar with the symptoms or the workings of the particular type before him, it is altogether improbable that the unhappy subject will ever reach a fairly correct appreciation of his condition and thus become amenable to any therapeutic method.

And, if it be objected that the number of abnormal characters coming under the ordinary priest's ministrations is relatively small, let not the important fact be

¹²R. Allers, *Das Werden der sittlichen Person, Wesen und Werden des Charakters* (Freiburg i. Br.: Herder, 1929), p. 282.

overlooked that, owing to the weight and pressure of unusual circumstances, specific mental aberrations may and frequently do show themselves in persons who are ordinarily normal. A well-informed spiritual guide may easily prevent what is a mere lapse from developing into a fixed state of abnormal behavior.

Abnormal psychology, all will admit, is intensely interesting. However, it may not for that reason displace or in any manner curtail the study of normal psychology. Rather, it is of primary importance to the student of the former that he be solidly grounded in every phase of the latter: rational, experimental, and practical psychology. The *materia* of the psychology courses in our seminaries could and should be so arranged as to allow for correlation with the various aspects of abnormal mentality. It cannot be denied that many a text is woefully deficient here and almost entirely disregards, seemingly on principle, all reference to such matters.

Let me forestall a possible misunderstanding. I do not mean to imply that our clerics while in their years of philosophy should be given cases in abnormal conduct to solve. This is so far from my mind that I should consider the philosophy lector imprudent who would more than cursorily refer to specific questions of pastoral care. By their very nature such matters belong to the classes in moral and pastoral theology, and for numerous reasons the treatment of purely pastoral questions in classes below theology would produce little good and might produce great harm. In theology, however, they should be given careful and generous treatment.

A caution or two may not be out of place here. As was mentioned before, abnormal psychology is absorbingly attractive; but, more than that, there is something dangerously compelling about the interest which this study naturally arouses. And precisely in this characteristic of stimulating curiosity lurks a real danger. Great care is consequently required both in study and in practice.

The lector in pastoral theology has an obvious duty. He must be extremely circumspect in his presentation of matter and cases, so that his students may not be led by an unhealthy curiosity but by the pure spirit of science and vocational education. Furthermore, he must prepare them for the dangerous realities they will have to face when once they have taken up the *cura animarum*, continually stressing the need of prudence and prayerfulness in the conduct of cases.

A common-sense course in abnormal psychology is a necessity. But upon the shoulders of the lector in pastoral theology falls the weighty responsibility of educating practically the *ordinandus* in this important and delicate matter. Though the instructions must above all be prudent, the deacon is far enough advanced to be spoken to in plain terms—he must not be left in ignorance where ignorance is harmful and treacherous.

FR. VICTORINE HOFFMAN, O.F.M.—In my fifteen years of experience at a tuberculosis sanitarium, I have found many souls so timid, so overwhelmed with an unreasonable fear of God's judgments that the only thing I could do for them at the hour of death was to try to instill hope into their hearts. A lingering illness very frequently upsets the nervous system and during their long lonesome hours the imagination of the sufferers paints terrible pictures of death, judgment, and retribution so that the mere mention of these words makes them tremble. Every nerve in the body seems to react on the imagination and very often a continually disturbed and excited imagination plunges the mind into a state of despair of which normal persons have no idea. It was only after I had made them understand the tenth article of the Creed, "the forgiveness of sins," that they were not only justified in hoping for the forgiveness of their sins but also were in duty bound to do so, did I succeed in calming their fears. Not every soul, therefore, is in need of the motive of fear.

OUR SERAPHIC SEMINARIES

FR. THEODOSIUS FOLEY, O.M.Cap., B.A.

In all our previous annual Meetings we have devoted ourselves exclusively to teaching matter, and have covered to date nearly every subject taught in our houses of study. It might, therefore, be acceptable to you, if in our next Meeting we diverge from the beaten path and focus our attention on our institutions themselves. For, after all, no matter how creditable to us our deliberations on the arts and sciences may be, all our work will be mere theory, even though splendid theory, unless our respective monastic schools render it practical by application and thus offer concrete examples of the thoroughness of traditional Franciscan education.

Now the system of education hitherto prevailing in the Seraphic Order throughout the United States calls for three stages of development and, consequently, three houses of learning. These institutions are the seraphic seminary, the novitiate, and the clericate or major seminary. One or the other province has introduced the so-called 4-4-4 system, i.e., four years seraphic seminary or high-school course, then one year novitiate, thereafter four years junior clericate or college course, and finally, four years senior clericate or major seminary course. As the seraphic seminary is the portal where the incoming student is welcomed by the Order and started on his career toward the cloister and the sanctuary, it is only logical to begin with it.

As this paper is supposed merely to launch the topic "Our Seraphic Seminaries," in order to provoke discussion on various phases of these institutions in the hope that out of a mutual exchange of ideas a practical program may be elaborated for a future conference, there will be no exhaustive treatment given to any of its parts. All it aims at is to offer suggestions. These you may accept, reject, or add to, as it seems good to you. It gives me great pleasure, therefore, to introduce the topic, "Our Seraphic Seminaries."

I offer as a plan for discussion the following outline:

1. The Purpose of Seraphic Seminaries.

2. Their Field of Work.
3. The Equipment of Seraphic Seminaries, as to Personnel and Apparatus.
4. Problems Demanding Solution.

The seraphic seminaries are the receiving stations of the Order.

To their portals every year applicants in the raw come seeking admission with the conviction that they are called to the religious priesthood. It is the scope of the seraphic seminary to welcome such vocations, test them, separate the wheat from the chaff, and in every way prepare them for higher development in the novitiate and the clericate. All that this work of preparation involves, such as the cultivation of vocation, the education of mind and body, the training of character, belongs to this preparatory course. The Order expects from the seraphic seminary that, when its work is done and its graduates are presented to the Provincial as worthy candidates for the novitiate, these have been given all that the Church or the State can demand of graduates of a high-school course, in the ecclesiastical sense, besides having been prepared in a certain measure for the religious state.

In this connection it may be asked:

1. Wherein and how far must the seraphic seminary prepare the student for the novitiate?
2. What means are being employed to effect this?
3. How do our seraphic seminaries measure up to the requirements of Canon Law governing preparatory seminaries?
4. Do they answer all the State requirements?

The task confronting the seraphic seminaries is, as we have seen, to prepare their young charges for their future high

Their Field of Work calling. This preparation is fourfold: intellectual, moral, spiritual, and physical.

Intellectually the student must be schooled in the arts and sciences demanded by Church and State. In this respect he ought to receive the best that can be given, because his future calling is the highest that can ordinarily be given to man. The last word in education is not too good for him. Hence the finished product of a seraphic seminary ought not to be the usual type of

graduate, armed with a diploma attesting to his proficiency in mere mental gymnastics, but he should be a real student who, besides excellence in class subjects, has acquired the habit of study and a certain amount of resultant culture.

This is, at least in theory, the goal of intellectual training in a seraphic seminary. When achieved, the student is fully equipped for the higher studies. Reason, imagination, memory, judgment, taste — all that pertains to a liberal education of the highest order must have been awakened, stimulated, and brought to that degree of perfection which is usually attained in high-class schools.

Morally. By "moral training" is understood the inculcation and practice of natural and supernatural virtue. We must not stop at developing a boy's brain, we must cultivate as well his heart, his will, his conscience — in a word, his character. Character training with all that it presumes, such as the implanting of priestly ideals, principles of conduct, etc., falls under this heading. The preparatory seminary gets the boy in the formative period of his life, in that critical stage of adolescence when habits, good and bad, are forming, when his dawning passions and his curious mind wake up to the problems of life. At no other crisis, outside of infancy, does a man need guidance, sympathy, instruction, encouragement, more than when he is progressing from innocent boyhood into youth. All teachers from the rector down, especially confessors and the spiritual director, must be vitally interested in the development of a boy's character, his morals, his ideals during this dangerous time. He must be shielded from the contaminating influences of bad associations, from dangerous reading, worldly ideals, while at the same time positive work in the forming of his conscience and will must be carried on. Here might be suggested for discussion, spiritual direction, public spiritual instruction, etiquette, sex hygiene, college amusements, reading matter, vacations, visiting days, etc.

Spiritually. Although spiritual and moral training may and often are considered as one and the same thing, I emphasize separate treatment of them here because our seminaries aim at the Franciscan type of piety. They must give a boy's piety that seraphic flavor peculiar to his calling.

For this reason a student must learn what the Order that he intends to enter stands for. All through his seminary course, by means of contact with the Order and by daily association with the Fathers as well as by public and private instruction he must become acquainted with the history and achievements of the Order, its peculiar mission in the Church, its ideals, its spirit, its characteristics, so that when he is ready for the novitiate, his vocation should be clearer to him and his enthusiasm in proportion.

Just how far is a seraphic seminary expected to prepare a boy for the novitiate? By supplying him with the necessary information on his calling, by surrounding him with an atmosphere of community life, by insisting on the special practice of those virtues involved in his future vows, and by inspiring him, both by word and example, with love and veneration for St. Francis and all for which this saint stands.

How all this is to be done will admit of much discussion. It will be of interest to learn how our various seraphic seminaries conduct spiritual direction, conferences, spiritual reading, meditation, Franciscan devotions; what they are doing to acquaint the student with the nature of the Order, its history, its work, its missions, its literature.

Physically. The old axiom *mens sana in corpore sano* means much more to our candidates than to many another student. The austerities of their future life coupled with daily application to intense study will make heavy demands on their physical strength. We owe it to them to provide for this emergency by promoting in their student days good, sound physical health and vigor. To do this we must provide, besides healthy location, good ventilation, nourishing fare, and well-furnished infirmaries, also positive health culture whether in the line of personal hygiene or athletics. For this purpose we must furnish proper recreational facilities, indoors and outdoors. Here again we can compare notes to advantage, learning especially what others are doing for the physical development of our seraphic youth. As athletics will enter into this discussion it would be advantageous to learn what others think about intercollegiate athletics for seraphic seminaries, or whether all games are to be intramural. Then, just what games are allowed,

what prohibited? Whether the students do light work indoors or on the grounds.

This is far more important than it at first appears. Many religious orders are faced with the problem of weak and delicate clerics and young priests, unable to carry on their studies or work. What is the cause of this? Does it lie in a want of proper physical development in the seraphic seminary, or is it to be attributed to the later grind of the novitiate or clericate? Is it due to being improperly housed or too scantily nourished, too much confined, or too heavily worked? In any case, physical training is of prime importance for the seraphic seminary, unless it wants to turn out nervous dyspeptics or hollow-chested scholars who will later on break down under the strain of the higher studies and the discipline of religious life.

This brief survey of the work expected of the seraphic seminary in its fourfold preparation of its young candidates shows how important these institutions are and in what relation they stand to the other houses of study. They begin, the others finish the work of education; they lay the foundation, the others build up thereon. It stands to reason, therefore, that this foundation no matter how considered, whether intellectually, or morally, or spiritually or physically, must be well laid, if we expect the superimposed structure to stand.

To lay a foundation well, however, two things are necessary: skilled labor and choice building material. Applied, this means efficient personnel and up-to-date apparatus.

The Equipment of Seraphic Seminaries

It is of prime importance that our preparatory seminaries be manned with efficient teachers. In a certain sense the educator is everything. If he is solid he can effect more even with poorly talented pupils and handicapped by a lack of apparatus, than a deficient teacher with the best equipment and the brightest scholars. An efficient professor knows how to arouse the enthusiasm of his students and to communicate subject matter in so clear and interesting a fashion that the most obtuse will make some progress.

For this very reason our teaching staff should be made up of men

who are endowed by nature with the faculty of communicating knowledge, who, furthermore, have this faculty trained by a course in pedagogy or matured by long experience, and who, finally, are qualified by normal training to teach the particular branch assigned them according to approved methods.

It is a great drawback to the reputation of a college as well as an injustice to the students and an imposition on the professor himself, when a newly ordained priest, fresh from studies, without any regard to his ability, inclination, or training, is placed at teaching. It is like expecting an amateur to produce a masterpiece. Teaching is a profession, as well as law and medicine, for which theology and the grace of ordination alone does not fit a man. He must be gifted by nature and qualified by training to fill such an office with credit to his Order and profit to his charges.

A professor, however, who has the ability, training, and the appointment to the teaching office should cultivate a love for his work and by continuously educating himself up to the best possible efficiency in his line, should strive, out of religious motives and loyalty to the reputation of his Order, to add to its luster in the field of education.

It is one thing to know *what* to teach, and another to understand *how* to teach it. This brings the question of *method* before us. This has been taken up and treated in detail in two foregoing meetings, that of 1928 at Hinsdale and 1929 at Alleghany. In this connection it would be helpful to hear just how these methods are applied in our seraphic seminaries and what experiences educators are making along this line.

Given the skilled workman in education, there still remains the element of *apparatus* to be considered. What can the best artisan do without competent tools? We might restrict the subject of apparatus to the furnishing of laboratories and library, although every department of an educational institution demands attention in this respect. In these days everyone is interested in knowing how a student is fed, bedded, warmed, served, and entertained. Visitors to our institutions want to see how our rooms are ventilated, lighted, furnished. And so the total equipment of a house of studies comes advisedly under this head. Still, when we speak of equip-

ment we naturally look to classroom, laboratory, and library as essential.

A laboratory and library report from the various seraphic seminaries would prove just how we stand as to modern requirements; we could learn from one another whether we are up to the mark or lagging.

Although, strictly speaking, all the things previously mentioned are problems in one respect or another, there are still some very particular difficulties which might be mentioned separately under this heading. Discussion on them will surely go far to clear them up. I shall merely list them as topics for deliberation.

Problems of Our Seraphic Seminaries 1. *Vocations.* What experiences are the various provinces making in this line? What is being done to awaken and cultivate vocations in our parishes? What literature are we producing on vocation? What are the requirements of the various seraphic seminaries as to entrance?

2. *Boy Psychology.* The modern boy with his love of all fun and little work comes to us from an environment where pleasure in its many modern forms has become a craze. He is usually superficial, distracted, and restless under discipline, too easily satisfied with the minimum of what is demanded of him. His ambitions run along the line of athletics or entertainment, such as music or dramatics. To instill in him a love of study and a thirst for knowledge is a knotty problem more pronounced today than ever before. The boy of today is inclined to be sophisticated and has lost reverence, to a great extent, for time-honored traditions. He wants thrills! He looks for activity, excitement, and movement. How are we to come in rapport with him? Unless we "get next to him," as he terms it, we cannot "get anything across." Many extravagant novelties in teaching are in vogue today to catch a student's attention and to hold it. Some advise teaching Latin in the form of mental baseball! Even spiritual writers are adopting a sport background to support their doctrine. How far must we appeal to fads in order to reach a boy's intelligence? Must we pander to his exaggerated love of sport to arouse his attention? We can surely learn a great deal from an exchange of opinions and experiences on this problem.

3. *Curriculum.* Another problem is the modern curriculum of studies. The old days are gone when we went "the even tenor of our ways" on this point. Today we are hedged in by laws and requirements which force us to standardize our educational system. Qualified teachers with degrees, affiliation with the State, laboratory and library equipment, up-to-date curriculum, time element — these and other demands of modern educational progress are pressing for solution.

4. *Financing Our Seraphic Seminaries.* Education is a costly work, as all our superiors know. It might be asked here, how do the various provinces meet the expenses of the houses of study? What is their stand on endowment for these institutions? Are scholarships permitted? Have they sodalities, magazines, collections, benefits, etc., for raising necessary funds? Also, what is the tuition fee in seraphic seminaries? What provision is made for poor students? Are legacies accepted?

As stated at the outset, this paper is not a complete or exhaustive treatise on seraphic seminaries. It merely serves to blaze a trail for competent followers in a future conference, who will, we hope, take up some or all of these matters and enlighten us on their solution.

The personal interest which we, as educators, feel in our work, the love which we, as religious, cultivate toward our Order and individual province, the loyalty which is ever green in our hearts toward our old Alma Mater, the seraphic seminary, where first we placed our young hand in that of the Poverello of Assisi to be guided along the path to his seraphic life and thus realize the call from above — all this will induce us to do justice to this topic, "Our Seraphic Seminaries."

DISCUSSION

FR. CLEMENT NEUBAUER, O.M.Cap.—Anyone who believes in the analytical-synthetic method will indorse the idea proposed by Father Theodosius. "*Divide et Impera*" has been the wise rule followed by the Conference during the past twelve years. Some of the finest commendations of these meetings have expressed the fact that Friars never take a bigger bite than they can manage in a single Conference. Various topics which constitute the educational program of our institutes have been treated so thoroughly because considered so individually.

**Reviewing
the Past**

After this analytical procedure it will be good to pause and consider the result of our findings. The resolutions formed at the annual meetings ought to be summarized, centralized, and gathered into a synthetic whole. This can be accomplished very nicely by considering our educational program from the viewpoint of "SERAPHIC."

However, even in this synthesis we must not wholly forget the "*Divide et Impera*." To achieve satisfactory results and to be true to our established tradition, we would have to treat the major and minor seminary separately. Father Theodosius evidently had in mind only the latter, though he does not expressly mention a distinction or restriction.

In order to acquaint the Friars with the work of the past Conferences, would it not be practical to sum up all the resolutions and publish them in a separate pamphlet? This would even make an interesting number of "The Franciscan Studies." No one will deny that the matter is worthy. And it certainly would be a study if the compiler could get the exact information from every affiliated province just how many and which resolutions have been put into practice and with what results. In proposing this compilation we are not losing sight of the fact that the Very Rev. Provincial Superiors are not bound to introduce into their houses of study whatever the Conference resolves upon in its deliberations, but we do believe that the survey would prove helpful, not only to our superiors, our educators, and all our Friars, but particularly to a Conference which will consider "Our Seraphic Seminaries."

A Suggestion

Father Theodosius speaks of the staff, the equipment, and affiliation of our institutes. As to our high-school and college department, I think there no longer is room for debate. Whether we like it or not, we must accept affiliation with the State. And that settles the question of equipment, and as far as degrees are concerned, also that of the staff. We must meet their requirements. As far as our experience goes, their demands are not extreme. Two years ago our high-school department of our institute at Mt. Calvary was accredited to the University of Wisconsin. We did not have to change or introduce a single thing. And they not only accredited the high school but are even willing to acknowledge the work done in the two years of college. Many reasons might be alleged in favor of affiliation, but I hardly think we want to enter upon that matter now.

The main issue in treating "Our Seraphic Seminaries" will not be the intellectual or general moral training of our students but the answer to the question, What will make our seminaries truly seraphic?

The Question at Issue

If our students are equal to the graduates of diocesan seminaries in intellectual, moral, and spiritual equipment, we are achieving a great deal. If that is all we accomplish, our seminaries as Seraphic Seminaries are a failure. Franciscan intellectuality and spirituality must be the blessed inheritance which our students imbibe in our houses of study. Only then may we call them "Our Seraphic Seminaries."

REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON RESOLUTIONS

The Committee on Resolutions of the Thirteenth Annual Meeting of the Franciscan Educational Conference begs leave to submit the following resolutions:

1. To Pope Pius XI, Vicar of Christ on earth, the Conference renews its pledge of reverence, love, and obedience.

2. To the Most Reverend Ministers General of the three families of the Seraphic Order we offer our grateful appreciation for their continued interest and good will toward the work of the Conference.

3. To the Very Reverend Superiors of the Provinces affiliated with the Conference we likewise offer our deepest feelings of reverence and, especially, of gratitude, for their paternal solicitude and encouragement in the interest of the Conference.

4. To the Very Reverend Urban Freundt, Provincial of the Province of St. John the Baptist, Cincinnati, to the Very Reverend Conrad Link, Guardian of Duns Scotus College, and to all the members of the community, we pledge to pay our debt of gratitude by grateful remembrance of their sincere cordiality, very generous hospitality, and for favoring us with the presentation of the "Beloved," a drama of the life of St. Anthony, in commemoration of the seventh centenary of his death.

5. To the Right Reverend James H. Ryan, S.T.D., Rector of the Catholic University of America, we express our appreciation for honoring our Conference by requesting Reverend Valentine Schaaf, O.F.M., J.C.D., Professor of Canon Law at the Catholic University, to represent him at our meetings.

6. To the Reverend Ephrem Longpré, O.F.M., S. T. Lect. Gen., LL.D., of our Collegio di S. Bonaventura, Quaracchi, Italy, we are sincerely grateful for having favored us with a very instructive and interesting paper, a fruit of his many years of scholarly researches.

7. Mindful of the straitened circumstances under which the Collegio di S. Bonaventura at Quaracchi is at present laboring, we earnestly entreat our Very Reverend Fathers Provincial to give

every possible assistance that the worthy cause of this institution may continue and flourish.

8. The Conference indorses its former resolutions to the effect that it wishes to maintain a keen interest in the progressive ideas of modern science, and that it wishes to assimilate into our philosophical system whatever new findings have been tried and accepted as true. We likewise emphasize the fact that modern research has shown the character of modernity to be found in the Psychology of the Franciscan School of Philosophy.

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